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INTRODUCTION

Commercial boycotts have a storied history in the United
States. In some quarters, in fact, boycotts are seen as a “ringing
affirmation of the constitutional right of all citizens to organize . . .
to achieve political, economic[,] and social change.”1 As with any
other right, however, the right to boycott is not without
limitations. When the desire of individuals to effect change
through boycotts intersects with the legitimate goals of
government, the right to boycott is often inhibited, if not
suppressed in its entirety. As the United States Supreme Court
stated in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.:
Governmental regulation that has an incidental effect on
First Amendment freedoms may be justified in certain
narrowly defined instances. A nonviolent and totally
voluntary boycott may have a disruptive effect on local
economic conditions. This Court has recognized the
strong governmental interest in certain forms of economic
regulation, even though such regulation may have an
incidental effect on rights of speech and association. The
right of business entities to “associate” to suppress
competition may be curtailed. Unfair trade practices may
be restricted. Secondary boycotts and picketing by labor
unions may be prohibited, as part of Congress’ striking of
the delicate balance between union freedom of expression
and the ability of neutral employers, employees, and
consumers to remain free from coerced participation in
industrial strife.2
Since it has been well established that there are limits on the
free-speech rights accompanying commercial boycotts, the obvious
inquiry is where the line between permissible restrictions and
impermissible infringements on First Amendment rights resides.
In Claiborne, the Court addressed the rights of United States
The title of this Article is based on an oft-repeated passage from the play
Romeo and Juliet commonly understood to stand for the truism that changing
the name of something does not change its underlying nature: “What’s in a
name? That which we call a rose; By any other name would smell as sweet;
So Romeo would, were he not Romeo call’d, Retain that dear perfection which
he owes . . . .” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 1.
1. Leonard Orland, Protection for Boycotts, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 1982),
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/07/31/opinion/protection-for-boycotts.html.
2. 458 U.S. 886, 912 (1982) (citations omitted).
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citizens who boycotted certain local commercial enterprises as
part of a campaign to realize equal rights under domestic law.3 In
essence, the boycotters used their First Amendment rights to
demand enforcement of existing domestic civil rights laws in their
communities.4 Thus, it is not surprising that the Court held that
the primary boycotts in Claiborne were protected. In doing so,
though, the Court reiterated that the situation would have been
dramatically different if the government had interposed a
compelling rationale for limiting the right to boycott, such as
protecting the right of “consumers to remain free from coerced
participation in industrial strife.”5
Both the United States Congress and the United States
Supreme Court have followed the general principle that when a
boycott interferes with commerce or disrupts important policy
goals of the government, the right to boycott is vulnerable to
government infringement, especially if the boycott is of a
secondary or tertiary nature.6 It is under this principle that we
must examine a particularly noxious strain of boycott whose
supporters claim an exemption from the application of United
States anti-boycott laws: foreign boycotts of Israel and its
affiliates that are forced upon individuals and companies in the
United States.
The “BDS Movement,”7 a Palestinian Arab organization with
supporters and affiliates throughout the world, is the most
prominent organization today to promote a boycott and
divestment campaign against Israel.8 The BDS Movement has
3. Id. at 886.
4. Id. For a more detailed analysis of the BDS Movement’s activity
under the First Amendment, see Marc A. Greendorfer, The Inapplicability of
First Amendment Protections to BDS Movement Boycotts, 2016 CARDOZO L.
REV. DE NOVO 112 (2016). In short, there is no supportable legal basis for
claims that BDS Movement activity has the same protected status as the
primary boycott activity at issue in Claiborne and, in fact, there is ample
precedent for the position that BDS Movement activity, as a form of
discriminatory conduct, is not protected by the First Amendment.
5. Claiborne, 458 U.S. 886 at 912.
6. See infra Part II for a discussion of the characteristics of primary,
secondary, and tertiary boycotts.
7. “BDS” is an acronym standing for “Boycott, Divest, and Sanction”
that is used by a number of affiliated groups seeking to foster, inter alia,
boycotts of Israel.
8. Though the history of the BDS Movement is not clearly defined,
according to the BDS National Committee, the self-acknowledged global
organizing and coordinating entity of the BDS Movement, BDS:
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heretofore relied on the United States government’s failure to
enforce existing anti-boycott laws to grow its influence in the
United States and, as a result, has lured United States entities
and individuals, including unions, into implementing its illegal
boycotts.9 This lack of enforcement, however, should not mean
that the BDS Movement’s activities are lawful or that those who
support and participate in its activities are immune from civil and
criminal prosecution. In fact, this Article will show that, because
the BDS Movement is affiliated with other illegal foreign boycotts
and has ties to designated foreign terror organizations, supporters
face significant risks, including severe monetary penalties and
criminal liability under federal anti-boycott, anti-trust, and antiracketeering laws.
Part I of this Article examines the BDS Movement, including
the history of other foreign boycotts against Israel, to determine
whether existing federal laws apply to the BDS Movement’s
activities—specifically, the anti-boycott provisions of the Export
Administration Amendments of 1977, as amended (EAA AntiBoycott Law).10 Part II of this Article discusses the legislative
history of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law and the global events that
occurred during the congressional debates on the EAA AntiBoycott Law to demonstrate that the purpose of the law was to
broadly prohibit foreign interference in domestic commerce and

[W]as launched in July 2005 with the initial endorsement of over 170
Palestinian organizations . . . . The efforts to coordinate the BDS
campaign, that began to grow rapidly since the 2005 Call was made
public, culminated in the first Palestinian BDS Conference held in
Ramallah in November 2007. Out of this conference emerged the
BDS National Committee (BNC) as the Palestinian coordinating
body for the BDS campaign worldwide.
Palestinian BDS National Committee, BDS MOVEMENT, http://www.
bdsmovement.net/bnc (last visited Sept. 9, 2016). This website claims to be
the official outlet for the BDS National Committee, which in turn claims to be
the Palestinian Arab authority in charge of the BDS Movement.
9. See Mario Vasquez, UE Becomes First National Union in U.S. to
Endorse BDS Against Israel, IN THESE TIMES (Sept. 1, 2015, 3:56 PM),
http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/18361/ue-unions-israel-bds-palestinelabor (recognizing that the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of
America was the first national union in the United States to endorse the BDS
Movement).
10. Pub. L. No. 95–52, 91 Stat. 235 (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 4607
(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244)). For a detailed examination of the
EAA Anti-Boycott Law, see Alan S. Dubin, A Journey Through the AntiBoycott Laws, 14 TULSA L. REV. 695 (1979).
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affairs. Part III of this Article examines whether other existing
federal laws apply to the BDS Movement’s activities, including
anti-trust, anti-terrorism, and anti-racketeering laws. Finally,
this Article concludes by providing suggestions for private actions
against and government prosecutions of the BDS Movement’s
illegal activities. As with any prosecution or litigation, the
outcome of legal action against the BDS Movement and its
supporters cannot be predicted with certainty; what is certain,
however, is that the BDS Movement and its supporters are being
misled by advice and opinions claiming that their activity is lawful
and without risk.
I.

THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN BOYCOTTS AGAINST ISRAEL

A. Before BDS: The Arab League’s Direct Boycott
Before there was a BDS Movement, or even an Arab League
or a State of Israel, there were boycotts against Jews, especially
those advocating for the establishment of a modern state of
Israel.11 During the Ottoman reign over the land of Israel, which
was commonly referred to as Palestine at that time, there were
numerous calls for Arab boycotts of Jews.12 Once the British
succeeded the Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century and
began recognizing the rights of Jews to their historic homeland,
the Arab boycott of Jews in Palestine intensified13 and quickly
became a pan-Arab movement that threatened to expand into a
general boycott of British goods.14 Between 1909 and 1939, at
11. This Article assumes that the reader has a basic understanding of
the history of Israel. For a general overview of the history of Israel prior to
its founding in 1948, see generally JOAN PETERS, FROM TIME IMMEMORIAL: THE
ORIGINS OF THE ARAB-JEWISH CONFLICT OVER PALESTINE (1984) and ILAN
PAPPE, A HISTORY OF MODERN PALESTINE: ONE LAND, TWO PEOPLES (2d ed.
2006). I have purposely referred to books containing opposing views of the
modern history of Israel to provide, what I hope, is a balanced background on
the topic. I am not endorsing either point of view by including them here.
12. AARON J. SARNA, BOYCOTT AND BLACKLIST: A HISTORY OF ARAB
ECONOMIC WARFARE AGAINST ISRAEL 3 (1986) (documenting boycotts in 1891,
1908, and 1911).
13. Id. at 5 (“Following Arab pogroms of Jews in 1920 and 1921, the
boycott weapon was further developed as a major instrument in the campaign
against Jewish settlement. In 1922, the Fifth Palestine Arab Congress
passed a resolution calling on Arabs to boycott Jewish businesses. This
policy was widely adopted in western Palestine in 1929, a year of bloody
outbreaks of Arab violence against Jews incited by the mufti.”).
14. Id. at 6–7 (“The boycott became a pan-Arab issue at an October 27
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least thirteen different Arab boycotts were implemented,
including one that was fostered by the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem,
Haj Amin al-Husseini, who later collaborated with Adolf Hitler
during World War II and reportedly modeled his boycott after the
pre-World War II Nazi boycott of Jewish businesses in Europe.15
The early Arab boycotts, however, while far-reaching and lethal in
their objectives, were disorganized and ineffectual in practice.
A more organized and enduring boycott was established
immediately after World War II, concurrent with the
establishment of a pan-Arab organization known as the Arab
League.16 The origins of the BDS Movement can be traced
directly to the boycott of Israel that was initiated by members of
the Arab League in response to the creation of the modern State of
Israel in 1948 (Arab League Boycott).17 In fact, the Arab League
was so intent on engaging in a boycott of Israel that it started its
boycott nearly three years before the establishment of the modern
State of Israel.18
[1929] congress of 800 Arabs from western Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Syria,
Iraq and Egypt. The congress vowed to boycott all Jewish merchandise and
to compel other Arabs to do the same . . . . [At a successor congress in 1937,
[r]esolutions were passed demanding the repeal of the Balfour Declaration
[wherein the British promised to establish a Jewish state in Palestine] and a
boycott against Jews as a patriotic duty. Unless Britain altered its policy, a
boycott of British goods by Arab and Moslem countries was threatened.”).
15. GIL FEILER, FROM BOYCOTT TO ECONOMIC COOPERATION: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL 21–24 (1998).
16. As a response to the Balfour Declaration and the progress then being
made by Zionists to fulfill the dream of re-establishing a Jewish state, the
Arab League, also known as the League of Arab States, was founded in 1944
with “strong support” from Britain. SARNA, supra note 12, at 7. The purpose
of the Arab League was “to promote pan-Arab cooperation in the political,
military, economic, and social spheres.” Id. Though the Arab League was not
founded solely to deny Jews the right to their own state in Palestine, that
objective has always been a central focus of the Arab League. Id. The Arab
League currently consists of twenty-two members. See Profile: Arab League,
BBC NEWS (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east15747941. Among the twenty-two members is “Palestine,” which is not
generally recognized as a state under international law. See Rick Richman,
“Palestine” Does Not Qualify as a “State”, COMMENT. MAG. (Nov. 13, 2012),
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2012/11/13/palestine-does-not-qualifyas-a-state/.
17. See The History and Antisemitic Nature of Boycott, Divestment, and
Sanctions Campaigns, AMCHA INITIATIVE, http://www.amchainitiative.org/
1842-2/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2016).
18. MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33961, ARAB LEAGUE
BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL 1 (2015) (“The Arab League was founded in 1944, and in
1945 began a boycott of Zionist goods and services in the British controlled
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While previous boycotts against Jews intended to prevent the
re-establishment of a large Jewish population in Palestine, the
Arab League Boycott intended to politically and commercially
isolate the state of Israel and its Jewish population, preserve Arab
purity and hegemony over the territory of Palestine,19 and
ultimately, complement Arab military attempts to destroy Israel
as a recognized political state.20 Using the terms Zionist and Jew
interchangeably,21 in 1945 the Arab League Council declared
(Arab League Boycott Declaration of 1945) that:
Jewish products and manufactured (goods) in Palestine
shall be (considered) undesirable in the Arab countries; to
permit them to enter the Arab countries would lead to the
realization of the Zionist political objectives. Accordingly,
mandate territory of Palestine. In 1948, following the war establishing
Israel’s independence, the boycott was formalized against the state of Israel
and broadened to include non-Israelis who maintain economic relations with
Israel or who are perceived to support it. The boycott is administered by the
Central Boycott Office, a specialized bureau of the Arab League based in
Damascus but believed for many decades to be operating out of Cairo,
Egypt.”).
19. See [2 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS] MUHAMMAD KHALIL, THE ARAB STATES
AND THE ARAB LEAGUE, A DOCUMENTARY RECORD, 161 (1962). The resolution
of the Arab League to boycott Jews and Zionists, dated December 2, 1945, is
contained in this volume of Khalil’s work and states that the boycott was
enacted so that “Palestine will remain an Arab (country).” Id.
20. FEILER, supra note 15, at 9 (“The original purpose of the Arab states
when they declared the boycott in December 1945—two and a half years
before the State of Israel was proclaimed—was to prevent its emergence as a
state. Later the boycott was one of the means used to try and destroy the
Jewish state—in other words, it was not an alternative to the use of military
force, but a supplementary means.”).
21. In this Article, I will primarily use the term “anti-Israel” to refer to
the ideology of various organizations and individuals who seek the
destruction of Israel. However, the term “anti-Zionist” is in many ways
equally applicable, since the goal of both ideologies is the elimination of
Israel. To some, the term “anti-Zionist” is actually a broader term that
includes a genocidal component since Zionism is synonymous with Jews. For
the purposes of this Article, however, any distinction between “anti-Israel”
and “anti-Zionist” terminology is presumed to be outside the scope of this
analysis. In the same vein, in the context of the ideological conflict with the
existence of Israel as a Jewish state, I will use the terms “Arab” and “Islamic”
interchangeably, while acknowledging that in other contexts there are
fundamental distinctions between the two terms: not all Arabs are Muslim
and not all Muslims are Arabs. In the Middle East, however, especially vis-àvis the conflict with Israel, Israel’s protagonists are overwhelmingly Muslim
Arabs. A notable exception is Iran—an Islamic republic that is not Arabic—
but is extremely active in anti-Zionist affairs.
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until these objectives are changed, the Council of the
League decides that every State of the League should,
before January 1, 1946, take measures which they
consider fit and which will be in conformity with the
principles of administration and legislation therein, such
as making use of import licenses in this respect in order
to prevent these products and manufactured (goods) from
entering (these) countries regardless of whether they
have come directly from Palestine or by any other route.
(These States should) also oppose Jewish industry by all
possible means.22
Participation in the Arab League Boycott was not limited to
established states. Indeed, the boycott declaration directed:
[P]eoples not represented on the Council of the League to
collaborate and co-operate with the States of the League
concerning this decision, so that the institutions,
organizations, merchants, commission agents, and
individuals in these (States) will refuse to deal in,
distribute,
or
consume
Zionist
products
and
manufactured (goods).23
The meaning of this may not be obvious on its face, but
fortuitously, the boycott declaration provided an explanation:
The Committee further draws attention to (the fact) that
the boycott (of Zionist goods) should not be confined to
governmental action only, but should also be
(undertaken) through the people.
Thus, necessary
propaganda should be conducted in order to convince the
Arab peoples of the necessity of boycotting Zionist goods,
so that the boycott becomes the firm creed of every Arab
which he may most enthusiastically preach to all and
which he may defend faithfully and genuinely.24
This declaration shows that the Arab League Boycott was
intended to be carried out through multiple and coordinated
channels, using state and non-state actors. On the one hand, the
members were to engage in primary boycotts. Concurrently, nongovernment organizations, through individuals and groups of
22.
23.
24.

KHALIL, supra note 19, at 161 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 163 (emphasis added).
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individuals, were directed to maintain a concerted propaganda
effort aimed at furthering the goals of the boycott. Because the
Arab League believed that Jews were using resources from around
the globe to establish their state, the Arab League Boycott
targeted Jewish economic interests globally through secondary
and tertiary boycotts.25
The operational terms of the Arab League Boycott were
further solidified upon the establishment of the State of Israel in
1948, expanding upon and formalizing the principles of the Arab
League Boycott Declaration of 1945 into a true bureaucratic
enterprise. As it has recently been described in a report to the
United States Congress:
The boycott [after its 1948 formalization] is administered
by the Central Boycott Office, a specialized bureau of the
Arab League based in Damascus but believed for many
decades to be operating out of Cairo, Egypt.
....
The boycott has three tiers.
The primary boycott
prohibits citizens of an Arab League member from buying
from, selling to, or entering into a business contract with
either the Israeli government or an Israeli citizen. The
secondary boycott extends the primary boycott to any
entity world-wide that does business with Israel. A
blacklist of global firms that engage in business with
Israel is maintained by the Central Boycott Office, and
disseminated to Arab League members. The tertiary
boycott prohibits an Arab League member and its
nationals from doing business with a company that in
turn deals with companies that have been blacklisted by
the Arab League. The boycott also applies to companies
that the Arab League identifies as having “Zionist
sympathizers” in executive positions or on the board of
the company. According to one analyst, the “nature and
detail of these rules reflect the boycotting countries’
tolerance for only the most minimal contacts with
Israel.”26
From its initial tactic to generally boycott Jewish goods, the
25.
26.

See id. at 161.
WEISS, supra note 18, at 1–2 (citations omitted).
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Arab League Boycott steadily progressed into a broader and more
regulated endeavor. The Arab League’s Central Boycott Office
initially provided oversight of the boycott, and the movement was
bolstered by the establishment of state-level boycott offices in each
Arab League state.27 The first tangible directive from the Arab
League was a requirement that anyone selling goods to a member
would have to provide a negative certification (a certification that
the goods being sold were not of Israeli origin).28 This certification
requirement led to the creation of a propaganda unit which
ensured that the boycott of Jewish goods was strictly enforced and
well publicized.29 These directives were quickly implemented and
successful.30
Shortly after the establishment of the modern State of Israel
in 1948, the Arab League Boycott was expanded to include a total
ban on all commercial and financial transactions with Israel as
well as a sea and air blockade.31 The Arab League Boycott gained
a powerful new weapon in 1954. Pursuant to Arab League
Council Resolution 849, the Central Office for the Boycott of Israel
(CBO), which had been established and incorporated into the
political apparatus of Arab League states several years earlier,
promulgated a wide-ranging and unified set of rules and
regulations binding all Arab states.32 Under these rules and
regulations, a primary boycott of Israel and Israeli products was
formalized, making illegal any dealings between Arab individuals
and entities and Israel or Israeli individuals and companies.33 In
addition to the primary boycott of Israel, secondary and tertiary
boycotts were instituted to prohibit any dealings between Arab
League members and any entity that: (1) did business with Israel
either directly or indirectly, (2) provided support to Israel, or (3)
processed goods or services through Israeli facilities prior to their
introduction into Arab markets.34
By 1959, the most notorious weapon in the Arab League
Boycott’s arsenal was adopted: the blacklist. An entity could be

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 1; KHALIL, supra note 19, at 163.
KHALIL, supra note 19, at 163.
FEILER, supra note 15, at 25.
Id.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 32–33; SARNA, supra note 12, at 40–41.
See WEISS, supra note 18, at 1–2.
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placed on the Arab League blacklist for numerous reasons
including having operations or branches in Israel; manufacturing
goods or components in Israel; providing intellectual property
rights to Israeli companies; owning equity of Israeli companies;
rendering consulting and technical services to Israel; or even
simply having a “bias in favour of Israel,” or refusing to answer
Arab League questionnaires regarding Israel.35 The financial
consequence of being placed on the Arab League blacklist was
severe: the offending party was forced to choose between either
terminating the offending acts or losing access to Arab League
member markets.36 It should be noted, however, that while the
CBO was responsible for establishing a uniform set of rules and
maintaining the blacklist, the enforcement of the boycott was and
still is effectuated by, and at the discretion of, individual Arab
League members.37
Furthermore, as the Arab League Boycott Declaration of 1945
set forth, non-members and non-governmental organizations
supporting the Palestinian Arab cause were expected to
participate in the propaganda efforts as well as the boycott
itself.38 The best modern example of this is the case of Iran.
Though a non-member of the Arab League, Iran is one of the most
vehement supporters and advocates of the Arab League Boycott
and anti-Israel agitprop.39 In fact, the secondary and tertiary
elements of the Arab League Boycott are actively supported by a
wide range of non-Arab League entities.40
In many ways, it is the non-member and non-governmental
organization participants in the Arab League Boycott who wield
the most enforcement power.41 This is logical, given that the Arab
35. FEILER, supra note 15, at 34.
36. Id. at 37 (“[I]f a company was blacklisted, no private or public factor
in the Arab world was to trade with it. Anyone found to have broken the
regulations was liable to be fined, imprisoned or have boycotted goods
confiscated.”).
37. WEISS, supra note 18, at 2.
38. See KHALIL, supra note 19, at 163.
39. See FEILER, supra note 15, at 40.
40. See SARNA, supra note 12, at 39 (listing Bangladesh, Iran, Malaysia,
Mali, Pakistan, and Uganda as boycott participants and further identifying
joint Arab-foreign chambers of commerce as being major NGO enforcement
agents of the boycott).
41. Id. at 40. While there are only twenty-two members of the Arab
League, Sarna points to far more than twenty-two entities that enforce the
boycott internationally. See id. at 38–40.
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League Boycott had always been presented as “one of the Arab
weapons in confronting the Zionist entity . . . .”42 Just as the
Palestine Liberation Organization, Hamas, and other non-state
paramilitary terror organizations have carried out the majority of
acts constituting the violent resistance prong of the Arab League’s
Palestine agenda, non-governmental organizations have carried
out a significant portion of the economic and political resistance
prong of that agenda.
The Arab League Boycott blacklist has had extensive and
crippling consequences for companies that refuse to comply with
the boycott. Among the first companies to succumb to the
blacklist threat and comply with the Arab League Boycott by
terminating business operations in Israel were American Express,
Brown and Williamson, Shell Oil, British Petroleum, Standard
Oil, Socony Mobil, Texaco, British Overseas Airways, Japan Air
Lines, Iberia, Qantas, Mitsubishi, Suzuki, Yamaha, Toyota,
Honda and Nissan.43 Companies that refused to comply with the
Arab League Boycott and were thus placed on the blacklist include
Renault, TWA, Coca Cola, Ford Motor Company, and RCA
Limited.44 At its height in the mid-1970s, the Arab League
Boycott’s blacklist applied to over 6,300 entities from nearly 100
countries as well as over 600 cargo ships.45 The number of
companies and entities that chose to comply with the boycott is
impossible to know but must surely have been more than the
6,300 entities that are known to have refused to comply.
The original Arab League Boycott continues to this day,
though at this point it has been described as frequently ineffectual
due to the varied and, at times, conflicting interests of its
members.46 Indeed, the Arab League Boycott has always been
something of a hydra. On the one hand, the boycott is the child of
42. FEILER, supra note 15, at 40 (quoting the CBO Commissioner
General).
43. SARNA, supra note 12, at 15–27.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 34–35.
46. WEISS, supra note 18, at 2 (“Overall enforcement of the boycott by
member countries appears sporadic. Some Arab League members have
limited trading relations with Israel. The Arab League does not formally or
publicly state which countries enforce the boycott and which do not. Some
Arab League member governments have maintained that only the Arab
League, as the formal body enforcing the boycott, can revoke the boycott.
However, adherence to the boycott is an individual matter for each Arab
League member and enforcement varies by state.”).
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Arab world bigotry, particularly against Jews who accede to the
position of a political ruling class. The treatment of Jews (among
others) as “dhimmis” (a minority group allowed to continue his or
her faith in exchange for the payment of a tax and the acceptance
of second-class status within Arab society) is a well-documented
historical example of the antipathy directed against non-Muslims
generally, and against Israel’s existence as a Jewish state in a
region dominated by Muslim Arab states, specifically.47 From this
perspective, Israel is not an existential threat, but rather, a
“blight upon the neighborhood” and an affront to the dignity of the
Arab ego.
On the other hand, Palestinian Arabs see boycotts as a means
to an end: the destruction of Israel and corresponding
establishment of a Palestinian Arab state that supplants it.48
Just as two people cannot simultaneously occupy the same space,
two countries cannot simultaneously exist within the same
territory. Israel’s existence is an existential impediment to the
creation of a Palestinian Arab state.49 Consequently, for those in
Arab states who do not put the issue of Palestinian Arab
statehood as a primary cause, the Arab League Boycott is a
tangential matter at best. For nationalistic Palestinian Arabs and
their supporters, however, the perceived lack of progress being
made through the existing enforcement of the Arab League
Boycott has been untenable.
As a result, more radical supporters of the Palestinian Arab
cause sought a way to return the Arab League Boycott to its
foundational principle of weakening and isolating Israel (with the
47. For an overview of the concept of the dhimmi and its treatment in
Islamic countries, see generally BAT YE’OR, THE DHIMMI: JEWS AND CHRISTIANS
UNDER ISLAM (1985). Even though there are states with Islamic governments
or populations that are not Arab states, such as Iran, terms that refer to
Islamic states generally are discussed herein in the context of Arab states as
members of the Arab League.
48. There are some Palestinian Arabs who accept the right of Israel to
exist as a Jewish state and seek a two-state solution, see infra Part I.A, but
neither the BDS Movement nor its affiliates take this position.
49. Though there are some who argue that a Palestinian Arab state
already exists in the form of Jordan, for purposes of this Article the argument
that Jordan is not Palestine, favored by many in the Arab world, will be
adopted. For an overview on the topic of Jordan as the Palestinian Arab
state, see generally Daniel Pipes and Adam Garfinkle, Is Jordan Palestine?,
DANIEL PIPES MIDDLE EAST FORUM (Oct. 1988), http://www.danielpipes.org
/298/is-jordan-palestine.
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ultimate goal of creating a Palestinian Arab state in the stead of
Israel).50 This internal conflict came to the fore in 2001 at the
United Nations-authorized “2001 World Conference against
Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance” held in Durban, South Africa (Durban I).
1. The Durban Conference and the Rise of the NGO Arm of the
Arab League
Durban I consisted primarily of two facially separate but
parallel and concurrent conferences. At one of the conferences
(Governmental Durban Conference), recognized governments and
related entities met51 while literally across the street from the
50. This goal, from the original Arab League Boycott declaration,
KHALIL, supra note 19, at 162–63, is regularly championed by more militant
supporters of Palestinian Arabs, such as the government of Iran. See, e.g.,
Michael Segall & Daniel Rubenstein, Sworn to Destruction: What Iranian
Leaders Continue to Say about Israel in the Rouhani Era, JERUSALEM CTR.
FOR PUB. AFFAIRS (Jan. 7, 2014), http://jcpa.org/article/20-threats-iranianleaders-made-in-2013 (“In 2012, the Jerusalem Center published a collection
of Iranian leaders’ statements from 2009–2012. The study proved that antiIsrael incitement was never confined to Ahmadinejad, who in any event is no
longer in power. The entire Iranian leadership, which takes its cues from
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his predecessor, the late Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, yearns for the day when Israel will be destroyed.”).
Additionally, Hamas, the entity that governs the Gaza portion of the
Palestinian territories, was formed with the destruction of Israel as an
explicit goal. That goal was sanitized in recent years so that statement is
less certain, but the generally accepted understanding is that the softening of
language calling for the destruction of Israel was for political posturing and
did not reflect an actual change in purpose. See Chris McGreal, Hamas
Drops Call for Destruction of Israel from Manifesto, GUARDIAN (Jan. 11,
2006),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jan/12/israel;
see
also
Khameni Manifesto, infra note 444 (a proclamation calling for the destruction
of Israel from the supreme leader of Iran).
51. According to the United Nations, the following is a list of
participants at Durban I:
All Member States of the United Nations; [a]ll regional organizations
and commissions involved in the preparation of regional meetings;
[r]epresentatives of organizations which have received a standing
invitation from the General Assembly to participate as observers;
UN specialized agencies, regional commissions, bodies and
programmes; [r]epresentatives of UN mechanisms in the field of
human rights; [i]nterested non-governmental organizations to be
represented by observers, in accordance with UN Economic and
Social Council resolution 1996/31; [o]ther interested governmental
organizations, to be represented as observers.
Participation in the Conference, WORLD CONFERENCE AGAINST RACISM,
http://www.un.org/WCAR/particip.htm (last visited July 6, 2016).

2017]

THE BDS MOVEMENT

15

Governmental
Durban
Conference,
non-governmental
52
organizations (NGOs)
held their conference (NGO Durban
Conference).
Durban I was widely considered to have been a debacle, a
conference against racism that had, as its primary focus, the
promulgation of racism against Israel and Jews.53 Durban I did
not start out with that focus, though. Prior to Durban I, a series
of regional meetings were held to formulate an agenda and plan of
action that would be the focus of the conferences at Durban I.54
Initially, the regional meetings appeared to have made progress in
moving away from the racist and discredited “Zionism-is-racism”
theme that had infected the international body for decades.55
This period of comity ended at the fourth and final regional
meeting held in Tehran, Iran, as Islamic states commandeered the
agenda and turned it on its head. What had started as a
repudiation of the international community’s past anti-Israel
activities turned into an agenda that was focused upon reiterating
and expanding upon prior anti-Israel screeds, complete with
repeated accusations that Israel was in the process of “ethnically
cleansing” its Arab population.56 In fact, by the end of the
meeting in Tehran, the Durban I Declaration and Plan of Action

52. Though a complete list of NGOs attending Durban I is too long to
include in this Article, the United Nations reported that approximately 4,000
separate NGOs were in attendance. Press Release, World Conference
Against Racism, Call to Eradicate Discrimination and Intolerance Marks
Conclusion of World Conference Against Racism, Agrees on Need for
Remedial Measures; Urges End to Middle East Violence, U.N. Press Release
RD/D/45 (Sept. 8, 2001), http://www.un.org/WCAR/pressreleases/rd-d45.htm.
53. Tom Lantos, The Durban Debacle: An Insider’s View of the UN World
Conference Against Racism, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 31, 31 (2002).
Congressman Lantos, a United States delegate to Durban I and the founder
of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, described Durban I as “an antiAmerican, anti-Israel circus” that was organized as “a transparent attempt to
de-legitimize the moral argument for Israel’s existence as a haven for Jews.”
Id. at 31, 37.
54. Id. at 34.
55. Id. (“The documents that emerged from [the first three regional
meetings] attempted to tackle a range of vexing issues from the legacy of
slavery to the need to confront the global resurgence of anti-Semitism.
Significantly, the Europe and Latin American regional conferences took
concrete steps to prevent the return of the anti-Israel ‘Zionism-is-racism’
language that doomed the two previous World Conferences. Further, they
explicitly condemned anti-Semitism in their draft documents.”).
56. Id. at 36.
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deemed Israeli policies to be a “crime against humanity,”57 a
theme which would become a central plank of the BDS
Movement’s attack on Israel.
It is important to note here that the propaganda agenda
agreed upon at the regional meeting in Iran was exactly the type
of propaganda that the Arab League Boycott Declaration of 1945
ordered non-government actors to disseminate.58
Not
coincidentally, after the conclusion of Durban I in October 2001,
the Arab League’s Central Boycott Office met and an
overwhelmingly majority of member-states called for the
revitalization of the Arab League Boycott.59
While the Governmental Durban Conference started with the
same anti-Israel agenda that infected the regional meeting in
Iran, the withdrawal of the United States and Israeli delegations
early on led to a minor retrenchment away from overt bigotry and
anti-Israel propaganda by the remaining Governmental Durban
delegations.60
Nonetheless, until the last minutes of the
Governmental Durban Conference, Islamic states that had
historically supported the Arab League Boycott attempted to force
amendments that mirrored the extremist anti-Israeli language
which would be formalized in the NGO Durban Conference
documents, including the new thematic demonization of Israel as
an “apartheid” state.61

57. Id.
58. KHALIL, supra note 19, at 163.
59. Towards a Global Movement: A Framework for Today’s AntiApartheid Activism, BDS MOVEMENT 24 (June 2007), https://www.bds
movement.net/files/bds%20report%20small.pdf [hereinafter BDS Manifesto];
see also Dina Ezzat, A Peaceful Weapon, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY (Oct. 18–24,
2001).
60. It may be too charitable to describe the final statement of the
Governmental Durban Conference as less bigoted, but some progress was
made in toning down the rhetoric. As Congressman Lantos described the
document, “[t]he compromise . . . removed some of the anti-Israeli
language . . . . Not only does the final document single out one regional
conflict for discussion, it does so in a biased way: the suffering of the
Palestinian people is highlighted, but there is no discussion of the Palestinian
terrorists attacks on Israeli citizens.” Lantos, supra note 53, at 48.
61. Id. According to Congressman Lantos, the Islamic state delegates
“continued to show the intransigence they had demonstrated in negotiations
with the United States, launching a last minute parliamentary maneuver to
salvage three of the most extreme paragraphs of anti-Israeli language that
they had inserted into the conference documents in Geneva. [They] lost on a
procedural motion offered by Brazil.” Id.
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The NGO Durban Conference became, as expected, an orgy of
anti-Semitism on a global scale. That conference hewed to the
extremist propaganda campaign against Israel and Jews rooted in
the Arab League Boycott Declaration of 1945. It was as though
Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa, who was described
as being the ringleader of the anti-Israel agenda at Durban I, had
declared a rebirth of the Arab League’s campaign against Israel,
all the way down to the use of non-governmental forces to
spearhead the hitherto near-dormant Arab League Boycott.62
Like the Arab League Boycott, the NGO Durban Conference
resulted in a forum declaration that included an explicit call for “a
policy of complete and total isolation of Israel as an apartheid
state . . . which means the imposition of mandatory and
comprehensive sanctions and embargoes, the full cessation of all
links (diplomatic, economic, social, aid, military cooperation, and
training) between all states and Israel.”63
Both conferences at Durban I also witnessed the official
unveiling of a new tactic: the attempt to institutionalize antiapartheid language against Israel. This tactic, which has its roots
in the Iranian regional meeting (where the member-states of the
Arab League had significant influence), is now the centerpiece of
the BDS Movement’s agenda against Israel. While the NGO
Durban Conference declaration was clearly a continuation of the
Arab League Boycott Declaration of 1945, it did not directly take
on a life of its own upon the conclusion of Durban I. In the wake
of Durban I there was strong condemnation of its anti-Semitic
focus. Even the then-UN High Commissioner on Human Rights,
Mary Robinson, could not deny that the conference had been
hijacked by anti-Jewish extremists:
I also admit that it was an extremely difficult conference.
62. Dalia Shehori & Yair Sheleg, Israel, U.S. Leave Durban; Peres Dubs
Meet a Farce, HAARETZ (Sept. 4, 2001, 12:00 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/
print-edition/news/israel-u-s-leave-durban-peres-dubs-meet-a-farce-1.68858
(“Foreign Ministry sources said the Muslim bloc’s rejectionism was
spearheaded by Arab League Secretary-General and former Egyptian foreign
minister Amr Moussa and current Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher.
Though the U.S. did not publicly blame anyone, off the record, American
government sources also said that Amr Moussa had been the main
troublemaker.”).
63. NGO Forum Declaration, Article 425, WORLD CONFERENCE AGAINST
RACISM (Sept. 3, 2001), http://ipo.org/racism-ngo-decl.htm [hereinafter
Durban NGO Declaration] (emphasis added).
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That there was horrible anti-Semitism present—
particularly in some of the NGO discussions. A number
[of] people came to me and said they’ve never been so
hurt or so harassed or been so blatantly faced with an
anti-Semitism.64
Commissioner Robinson’s choice of words should not be
overlooked. What went on at Durban I was not just anti-Israel
venom. It transcended the political issue of the State of Israel and
descended into anti-Jewish hate. This was the mindset behind the
birth of the BDS Movement. So while the extremist Islamic states
had their way with the agenda at Durban I, the western world
saw Durban I as a festival of bigotry and extremism. This,
combined with the Islamic terror attacks against the United
States on September 11, 2001—mere days after the conclusion of
Durban I—tainted any immediate attempts to advance the
movement against Israel that was at the core of the NGO Durban
Conference’s declaration.
The Durban I boycott movement sat fallow for several years
after the September 11th terrorist attacks, but as time passed, the
landscape once again changed. In the wake of the United States’
2003 invasion of Iraq, a large anti-war movement had taken hold
throughout the western world. This movement was, in many
ways, co-opted by, or operating in conjunction with, pro-Islamic,
and, in particular, anti-Israel groups.65 As the American public’s
distaste for the war in Iraq grew, and the influence of anti-war

64. Talking Point Special, BBC NEWS (Nov. 21, 2002, 9:48 AM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking_point/forum/1673034.stm.
65. For example, International A.N.S.W.E.R. was exceedingly active in
anti-war protests in the United States after the September 11th Islamic
terror attacks. These protests frequently were dominated by pro-Palestinian
Arab, anti-Israel and anti-Semitic themes. See, e.g., International Action
Center & ANSWER: An ADL Backgrounder, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (Jan.
5, 2009), http://archive.adl.org/main_anti_israel/iac_answer_backgrounder
2cb9.html#.U_-4SzKwI3h (“ANSWER has consistently linked its anti-war
initiatives and campaigns with an anti-Israel agenda. ANSWER considers
Israel to be a capitalist outpost for the West, and regards terrorist
organizations that advocate for Israel’s destruction, including Hamas and
Hezbollah, to be legitimate resistance organizations. During a July 31, 2006,
interview with FOX News, ANSWER’s national director, Brian Becker, said:
‘Do I consider Hezbollah a terrorist organization? The answer is no.’
ANSWER’s rallies opposing the United States wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
often include signs condemning Israel and praising anti-Israel terrorist
groups.”).
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movements spread, there was a greater acceptance for the antiwar movement’s anti-Israel message.
2. Rebranding the Arab League Boycott, Post-Durban: The
Ascension of the BDS Movement
The genesis of the BDS Movement, much like the workings of
the Arab League Boycott that spawned it, is somewhat
amorphous. In July 2005, the NGO Durban Conference’s spirit, if
not body, was reanimated by over 100 non-governmental
organizations that reasserted the call for a global movement
against Israel.66 The movement that they called for had the same
essential goals and means as the NGO Durban Conference’s
declaration, and the Arab League Boycott Declaration of 1945
before it: the use of boycotts to isolate and weaken Israel.67 From
this call, the BDS Movement was publicly unveiled.
By design, the BDS Movement is not an organization with a
clear and identifiable body. That is not to say that there is no
such body; rather, in an attempt to avoid the reach of, inter alia,
anti-boycott laws in the United States and elsewhere, the BDS
Movement, as the latest iteration of the Arab League Boycott,
simply presents a disembodied face to the world. Notwithstanding
its claim to be a grassroots organization, the BDS movement’s
primary website shows that it is a thinly-veiled organ of the
longstanding Arab League Boycott.68 Indeed, a review of the
66. Palestinian
BDS
National
Committee,
BDS
MOVEMENT,
http://www.bdsmovement.net/bnc (“The broad consensus among Palestinian
civil society about the need for a broad and sustained Campaign for Boycott,
Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) resulted in the Palestinian Call for boycott,
divestment and sanctions against Israel that was launched in July 2005 with
the initial endorsement of over 170 Palestinian organizations.
The
signatories to this call represent the three major components of the
Palestinian people: the refugees in exile, Palestinians under occupation in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip and the discriminated Palestinian citizens of the
Israeli state.”).
67. Id. (“The BNC’s mandate and role is: [t]o strengthen and spread the
culture of boycott as a central form of civil resistance to Israeli occupation,
colonialism and apartheid; [t]o formulate strategies and programs of action in
accordance with the 9 July 2005 Palestinian Civil Society BDS Call; [t]o serve
as the Palestinian reference point for BDS campaigns in the region and
worldwide; [t]o serve as the national reference point for anti-normalization
campaigns within Palestine; [and to] facilitate coordination and provide
support [and] encouragement to the various BDS campaign efforts in all
locations.”).
68. See id.
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original Arab League Boycott Declaration of 1945 reveals that the
BDS movement’s formal boycott apparatus—a Palestinian Arab
group with the goal of spreading propaganda against and fostering
a boycott of Israel—was modeled after the Arab League Boycott.
At the time of the Arab League Boycott Declaration of 1945,
as is the case today, there was no internationally recognized state
of Palestine, and there was no Arab League member state that
purported to represent the Palestinian Arabs. Consequently,
when the 1945 Arab League Boycott declaration was made,
several non-governmental Palestinian Arab representatives were
designated to sit on the Arab League Council to facilitate the Arab
League Boycott.69 In addition to the Palestinian Arab delegates,
the Arab League explicitly determined that the boycott would
have other non-governmental actors.70
From its inception, the Arab League Boycott insisted on
action not only by the “States of the League,” but also by all
individuals and other entities that were not members of the Arab
League or represented on the Arab League’s council.71 Though
the language of the declaration is a bit archaic, it is also an
irrefutable directive to create parallel state-level and “grassroots”
non-state level apparatuses to coordinate and cooperate on the
implementation of the boycott of Israel.72 While it did distinguish
between state and non-state actors in terms of identifying the
participating groups, the Arab League Boycott did not otherwise
draw distinctions between those who were represented by a
recognized state and those who were acting at a non-state level.
The similarities between the BDS Movement’s “Palestinian
BDS National Committee” and the Arab League’s “Higher Arab
Executive Committee” (which consisted of Palestinian Arab
delegates to the Arab Council for purposes of the Arab League

69. KHALIL, supra note 19, at 161 (“The Council resolves that there
should be one or more representatives of Palestine, provided that the number
of the (members of) the Palestine delegation does not exceed three. The
delegation shall participate in all of the activities of the Council in accordance
with the provisions of the Palestine Annex of the Pact of the League of Arab
States. It shall be understood that the participation of the Palestine
delegation means that it shall have the right to vote on the Palestine
question and on those (matters) which Palestine can be bound to
implement.”).
70. Id. at 163.
71. Id. at 161.
72. See id. at 163.
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Boycott) are not coincidental. In name, in function, in tasks, in
methodology and in goals, they are one and the same, separated
only by the passage of time. What is today called the BDS
Movement was always a recognized and required component of
the Arab League Boycott. Prior to 2005, the BDS Movement was
disorganized and operated without a declared name, but its role in
the Arab League Boycott had been established in 1945.
Furthermore, the Arab League Boycott was also a secondary
boycott and the role of the BDS Movement was specifically
designed to foster this purpose.73
3. The BDS Movement Today
Perhaps the best source of information on the BDS Movement
today is the manifesto published on its self-proclaimed official
website, www.bdsmovement.net (BDS Manifesto).74
This
unsigned document, which is attributed to an organization
referred to as “Grassroots Palestinian Anti-Apartheid Wall
Campaign” (Wall Campaign) and titled “Towards a Global
Movement: A Framework for Today’s Anti-Apartheid Activism,” is
a bit of a mystery in its origins. The Wall Campaign website
contains what appears to be the original draft of the BDS
Manifesto,75 (Original BDS Manifesto) but that document is
significantly less detailed than the BDS Manifesto and makes no
attempt to hide the fact that the BDS Movement is the successor
to the Arab League Boycott.76
For example, the Original BDS Manifesto critiques the
problems with the existing Arab League Boycott and suggests that
greater participation by non-governmental organizations and a
more refined media campaign would make the Arab League
73. The primary boycott was the Arab League, its member states, and
individuals in the Arab states refusing to engage in commerce with Israel.
The secondary boycott was the collaboration to force the “institutions,
organizations, merchants, commission agents, and individuals” to abide by
the boycott. Id. at 161. In fact, by the wording of the declaration, it would
appear that non-state actors were primarily tasked with working to spread
the secondary boycott i.e., “collaborate and co-operate . . . so that [the other
businesses and entities] will refuse to deal in” Israeli goods. Id.
74. BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at ii.
75. Towards a Global Movement: A Framework for Today’s AntiApartheid Activism, STOP THE WALL 1 (June 2007), https://www.stop
thewall.org/downloads/pdf/bds-s.pdf [hereinafter Original BDS Manifesto].
76. See id. at 6–8.
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Boycott more successful.77 Far from disclaiming its affiliation
with the Arab League Boycott, the Original BDS Manifesto
acknowledges that the BDS Movement is an attempt to make the
Arab League Boycott a more successful weapon against Israel’s
existence.78
Both the Original BDS Manifesto and the BDS Manifesto are
dated
June
2007,
and
both
documents
refer
to
www.bdsmovement.net as the coordinating body for the BDS
Movement.79 The BDS Manifesto departs from the Original BDS
Manifesto, however, by attempting to position the BDS Movement
as a “grassroots” movement.80 Section 2.5 of the BDS Manifesto is
even titled “The Boycott is Grassroots,”81 yet as is the case with
any attempt to deny that which is obvious, this section of the BDS
Manifesto trips over its own argument and shows that the BDS
Movement is really nothing more than a rebranding and
refocusing of the Arab League Boycott.
For example, Section 2.5 of the BDS Manifesto tells the story
of Bahrain, which officially ended its participation in the Arab
League Boycott in September 2005.82 To purportedly show that
the BDS Movement is grassroots, the BDS Manifesto presents the
fact that shortly after Bahrain ended its participation in the Arab
League Boycott, the BDS Movement forced the government of
Bahrain to reinstate its participation in the boycott.83 While this
may be a form of grassroots activism, the fact that the
continuation of the Arab League Boycott, instead of the
implementation of a unique BDS Movement objective, was the
goal of the BDS Movement in Bahrain, indicates that the BDS
Movement is simply a non-state enforcement arm of the Arab
League Boycott apparatus, as was originally intended under the
77. Id. at 8.
78. Id. at 9 (Discussing the goals of various BDS Movement actors, the
manifesto dismisses those who would accept a goal of coexisting with Israel
by saying, “[t]his is clearly at odds with the Palestinian position in which the
opposition to Zionism as an ideology forms the major impetus for the
struggle.” In other words, the very existence of Israel as a Jewish state is
anathema to the BDS Movement’s Palestinian Arab core constituency.).
79. Original BDS Manifesto, supra note 75 at 1; BDS Manifesto, supra
note 59, at i, viii.
80. See BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at 27–29 (providing examples of
how local communities took action advancing the boycott).
81. Id. at 27.
82. Id. at 28.
83. Id.
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Arab League Boycott Declaration of 1945. Indeed, in many ways
the BDS Manifesto was—and still is—a call for the reradicalization of the Arab League Boycott and a rejection of the
normalization process between Arab states and Israel that was
formalized in the 1993 Oslo Accords.
a. The Ties that Bind: The Oslo Accords, Radical Rejectionism,
and the BDS Movement
The Oslo Accords were the result of intensive negotiations
between Israeli and Palestinian Arab representatives. Pursuant
to the Oslo Accords, Israel recognized the Palestine Liberation
Organization as the representative of the Palestinian Arab people,
and the Palestine Liberation Organization, in turn, was to
recognize the right of Israel to exist and renounce the use of
terrorism against Israel.84 The ultimate objective of the Oslo
Accords was to implement a “two-state” solution, wherein Israel
would cede territory for the establishment of a new Palestinian
Arab State.85 Upon the conclusion of the peace negotiations under
the Oslo Accords, the newly created Palestinian Arab state was to
coexist peacefully alongside the existing State of Israel.86
While history has shown that the Oslo Accords did not fulfill
their promise,87 the fact that Arabs, and in particular, Yasser
Arafat—the man who was selected to use violence to carry out the
Arab League Boycott’s mandate that “Palestine should remain an
Arab country”88—were willing to renounce the use of terror and to
accept the existence of Israel constituted an egregious betrayal of
the foundational principles of the Arab League’s Palestinian Arab
agenda and those it represented.89
84. Orde F. Kittrie, More Process than Peace: Legitimacy, Compliance
and the Oslo Accords, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1661, 1667 (2003).
85. Id. at 1668.
86. Id. at 1667–68.
87. Id. at 1668 (concluding that “[t]he Oslo Accords were largely, if not
entirely, a failure . . . . By mid-2003, the decade since the September 1993
signing [of the Oslo Accords] had seen the renewal of the Palestinian terrorist
campaign against Israel, hundreds of dead on both sides, the reoccupation of
most of the West Bank, enormous damage to both the Israeli and Palestinian
economies, and the missing of practically every Oslo deadline.”).
88. KHALIL, supra note 19, at 558–59.
89. SARA ROY, HAMAS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN GAZA: ENGAGING THE ISLAMIST
SOCIAL SECTOR 33 (2011) (“Hamas (in alliance with ten other Palestinian
factions based in Damascus) vehemently rejected and condemned the Oslo
Accords because Hamas considered them a betrayal of Palestinian national
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The BDS Manifesto’s position, in fact, mirrors the reaction of
Hamas and other militant Arab groups at the time of the signing
of the Oslo Accords:
[T]he failure of Oslo to bring about any of the goals of the
Palestinian liberation struggle catalyzed new forms of
resistance. Not all parties remained blind to the realities
on the ground in which the ghettoization and expulsion of
Palestinians from their lands today threatens a fresh
catastrophe. Palestinians themselves confirmed the
rejection of an illusionary peace process, notably in the
second intifada and the recent elections in the [West
Bank and Gaza Strip]. Furthermore, despite the euphoria
of the Oslo Process and continual “peace” initiatives up
until the Roadmap, normalization policies were not
mirrored in the activities and calls from civil society and
Palestinian solidarity movements in the Middle East.
While governments shunned taking measures against
Israel for its ongoing crimes—choosing to quietly reward
the occupation with diplomatic ties, cooperation and
trade—pressure groups pushed for reinvigorating the
isolation of Israel in the understanding that the
Palestinian struggle was hindered rather than aided by
Oslo.90
How can it be that a process whereby the Israeli and
Palestinian Arab people were to formalize agreements that would
result in their peaceful coexistence and mutual recognition could
be considered a hindrance to the “Palestinian struggle”? The
unfortunate answer is the goal of that struggle is not peace;
rather, it is, as the Arab League Boycott Declaration of 1945,
Hamas, and the BDS Manifesto reiterate, the destruction of Israel
and the creation of an Arab state on its ruins.91
Even if the Oslo Accords did not represent a durable solution
to the Palestinian Arab/Israeli issue, the Oslo Accords did

and historic rights.”).
90. BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at 27 (emphasis added).
91. KHALIL, supra note 19, at 159–61; see also BDS Manifesto, supra
note 59, at 18 (“[T]he [Arab League] [B]oycott was deployed as a means to
cripple the Zionist movement within Palestine and, immediately after 1948,
to bring about Israel’s demise.”).
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normalize Israel’s status in global markets.92 While the memberstates of the Arab League may have lost interest in actively
participating in the Arab League Boycott (or perhaps it was
politically expedient to allow a non-state actor to take over its
boycott duties) the non-state actors within the Arab League and
its affiliates wanted to unsheathe the boycott as a means of rolling
back the post-Oslo integration of Israel’s role in the world
economy.93
If there were any doubts as to this conclusion, the BDS
Manifesto repeatedly speaks clearly of its roots in, and intention
to reinvigorate, the Arab League Boycott, for “boycott activities
are not a new phenomenon, but operated in one form or another
for many decades only to subside during the 1990s.”94 For
example, the BDS Manifesto, in its introductory pages, indicates
that “[r]eflections upon previous BDS strategies used to isolate
Israel, from within and outside the Middle East, are explored . . . .
An evaluation seeks to learn from past BDS experiences and the
implications for Palestine campaign work today.”95 In addition, a
“reinvigoration” is then mentioned:
An analysis of the Arab League boycott highlights the
strengths and drawbacks of strategies pursued by League
states and promoted by what became increasingly
authoritarian governments. We compare this to the
reinvigoration of the call to boycott Israel in the Middle
East, driven from below in recent years, and coming at a
time when the majority of states and leaders in the region
pursue normalization with the occupation.96
A similar point is made again later in the document:
92. BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at 24 (“[The Oslo Accords] triggered a
chain of events, which brought about the integration of Israel into the global
community . . . .”).
93.
See id. at 27–29.
94. Id. at 13.
95. Id. at ii (emphasis added). References to “previous” BDS strategies
can only mean the Arab League Boycott in the context of this statement. See
id.
96. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). As a logical matter, one cannot
reinvigorate something that is new; therefore, the object of reinvigoration
here is the Arab League Boycott. See id. Furthermore, the distinction
between state level action and action “driven from below” highlights the
reversion to the NGO-focused strategy set out in the original Arab League
Boycott declaration. Id.
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After the failure of Oslo and the “peace process[,]” BDS
initiatives are often presented as an innovative and
effective means to pressure Israel. Yet, the isolation of
Israel through a comprehensive boycott campaign is not a
new concept. It dates back to Israel’s creation from the
destruction of over 450 towns and villages together with
the forced exodus of more than 750,000 Palestinians from
their lands. Boycotts and sanctions characterized the
relations of states across the Middle East with Israel from
1948 until the Oslo Process, continuing today, albeit as
weakened
and
largely
ineffective
mechanisms.
Strengthening today’s BDS efforts and advocating
strategies to take solidarity action forward requires
exploration and understanding of previous boycott work.
....
. . . [C]ampaigns outside [of] the ruling structures across
the Middle East continue the tradition of the boycott as a
means to support the Palestinian struggle.97
But, perhaps the clearest reason the Arab League Boycott has
been resurrected comes from non-governmental actors themselves:
While boycott offices are still retained by many League
countries, they are redundant institutions in the majority
of cases. Individual companies still request adherence to
the boycott, at secondary and tertiary levels, including
businesses from Bahrain, Bangladesh, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates
and Yemen.
It is here, and within the grassroots
movements, where BDS continues to work towards the
isolation of Israel in the Middle East.98
And even if active boycotters were merely “grassroots,” “[t]he

97. Id. at 15–16 (emphasis added). The BDS Manifesto explicitly rejects
that its call for a boycott of Israel is new and directly links its boycott to the
Arab League Boycott. Id.
98. Id. at 27 (emphasis added). The key element of this passage is the
reference to “it is here.” Id. The “here” is the secondary and tertiary boycotts
promoted from within the various Arab countries as part of the overall Arab
League Boycott apparatus. Id. at 16–17. The BDS Movement has thus
explicitly acknowledged that it is an arm of the Arab League Boycott which
promotes the secondary and tertiary boycotts specifically prohibited by the
EAA Anti-Boycott Law.

2017]

THE BDS MOVEMENT

27

setback to Israel’s trade and investment program was
considerable until anti-boycott legislation and policies were
adopted, specifically in the United States.”99 But even so,
Israel’s economic boom can be viewed as far less resilient
and strong than assumed by many commentators,
providing hope that a reinvigorated BDS movement can
have some impact.
....
A BDS movement must be aware that the way in which
the boycott is pursued can be more important than the
attainment of specific goal[s] . . . .
It shows that
governments and states cannot be relied upon to be the
enforcers of a boycott, even though they may be a useful
component in institutionalising it.
Moreover, it
demonstrates that today’s boycott movement must clearly
articulate its aims and goals and until what point the
boycott is to be maintained. Whereas the Arab League
has highlighted a variety of motives for the boycott, lack
of overall clarity and purpose has not won it sympathy in
the rest of the world.100
The only way to interpret the above-quoted passage is as a
parsing of responsibilities: member-states of the Arab League
institutionalize the boycott, while non-state actors such as the
BDS Movement act to sanitize and propagandize the boycott, just
as the Arab League Boycott Declaration of 1945 required.101
The above-quoted passages are just a sample of the
connections between the BDS Manifesto (and thus the BDS
Movement as a whole) and the Arab League Boycott Declaration
of 1945, not only in terms of goals and tactics but also in terms of
99. Id. at 32 (reviewing the effectiveness of the Arab League Boycott by
analyzing its economic impact on Israel). For example, the BDS Manifesto
describes how Barclays was pressured by Arab League states to liquidate its
fifty percent holding in Barclays Discount Bank in Israel or face termination
of its business in Egypt and several other League states. Id. Initially,
Barclays ignored the threat but complied a year later after suffering
outstanding losses. Id.
100. Id. at 37 (emphasis added). Again, the reference to “reinvigoration”
clearly connects the BDS Movement with the Arab League Boycott. In order
for something to be reinvigorated, the subject would have first needed to exist
in a previous, related form.
101. See KHALIL, supra note 19, at 162–63.
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the underlying raison d’être for each movement: to isolate,
weaken, and ultimately eliminate the Zionist presence in
Palestine.102 Time after time, the BDS Manifesto positions itself
as the “reinvigoration” of the Arab League Boycott, or the
historical continuation of the Arab League Boycott.103 These
words were carefully selected to remind participants that the BDS
Movement is sanctioned by the Arab and Islamic world and has a
long history of operations against Israel. The BDS Manifesto
makes this clear in its description of the Arab League Boycott:
“the boycott was deployed as a means to cripple the Zionist
movement within Palestine and, immediately after 1948, to bring
about Israel’s demise.”104
b. Is the BDS Movement a Grassroots Peace Movement or Another
Face of Radical Islam?
The BDS Movement claims that it is a grassroots movement
that fights injustice, yet behind its revolutionary slogans and
xenophobic105 rhetoric, its true objectives are laid bare. We know
that the BDS Movement, by its own words, is the reinvigoration of
the Arab League Boycott.106 By its own guiding principles, the
BDS Movement is a rejectionist organization that has repudiated
the two-state solution’s peace process.107 Using sophisticated and
decentralized management structures (to ensure the movement is
not affiliated with other organizations and to make it more
difficult to prosecute for its unlawful activities) and a slick
propaganda campaign, the BDS Movement mimics other radical
Islamic groups in claiming virtue while propagating hate and
destruction.
It is no coincidence that the BDS Movement ties its rise to the
same period in which Hamas rose to political power in the region.
Hamas, founded in the late 1980s as a military and political
organization with the goal of eliminating Israel and replacing it

102. See BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at 18.
103. See id. at 2.
104. Id. at 18.
105. Although the BDS Manifesto claims to be a Palestinian-led
movement for freedom, justice, and equality, it is primarily a xenophobic
screed against Israel—the only sovereign minority constituency in the Arabdominated Middle East.
106. See BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at 2.
107. Id. at 27.
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with an Islamic Palestinian Arab state, won a majority of seats in
the Palestinian parliamentary elections in January 2006,108 mere
months after the BDS Movement’s July 9, 2005, call for the
reinstitution of the Arab League Boycott. Through this electoral
victory, Hamas replaced Fatah109 as the seat of power for the
Palestinian authority in Gaza.110 Like the BDS Movement,
Hamas rejects the Oslo Accords entirely as well as the
corresponding two-state peace process and normalization of
relations with Israel.111 In fact, Hamas’ rise to power was widely
seen as a repudiation of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s
Fatah wing, which was Israel’s Palestinian Arab counterpart in
the Oslo Accords.112
Both Hamas and the BDS Movement call for the destruction
of Israel as a Jewish state.113 However, Hamas, as a political and
military organization, is nominally a separate entity. At times
there may be internecine disputes between the two affiliated
organizations, especially when it comes to matters that swing the
scales of power and influence between the two. However, this is
true of virtually all non-state actors in Palestinian Arab affairs
(and the Islamic world generally). That the two organizations
may be at odds on occasion does not affect their underlying ties
and affiliations, especially on the strategic goal of establishing a
Palestinian Arab state atop the ruins of Israel.114
108. JIM ZANOTTI, CONG. RESEARCH
AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 43 (2010).

SERV., R41514, HAMAS: BACKGROUND

109. Fatah is the dominant political arm within the Palestine Liberation
Organization. While Fatah is nominally secular, its rival, Hamas, is
unquestionably Islamic. See id. at 3.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 14, 41.
112. Id. at 3.
113. See id. at 13–14; BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at 162.
114. See, e.g., Haidar Eid, Tough Questions for Hamas, ELEC. INTIFADA
(Nov. 2, 2010), http://electronicintifada.net/content/tough-questions-hamas/
9095.
Eid, a policy advisor for the Palestinian Policy Network (an
organization formed in connection with the BDS Movement) and an
influential voice in the BDS Movement, took issue with Hamas’ choice to
engage in the elimination of Israel in stages saying:
[I]t is obvious that Hamas is unable to realize that the war on Gaza
in 2009 has created a new political reality whereby Israel pulled the
trigger on the racist two-state/two-prison solution. Hamas insists on
adopting this approach and claims it is a temporary tactic until the
balance of power shifts, as the movement assumes it will within the
truce period of ten or twenty years. During this time, it plans to
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If we view the early to mid-2000s from a more global
perspective, the BDS Movement’s place in the Islamic world
becomes clear. The 2001 call for the re-radicalization of the Arab
League and its boycott against Israel at Durban I, as well as the
globalization of radical Islamic terror operations under the alQaeda and other brands (in particular, the September 11th terror
attacks) unveiled a more aggressive and ideologically pure
international Islamist movement. Unlike the 1990s where the
Oslo Accords appeared to signal the formalization of the
Arab/Israeli peace movement that prominently began with
normalization of ties between Egypt and Israel in the late 1970s,
the 2000s witnessed a vengeful return to the pinnacle of Arab
League radicalism and anti-Israel ideology. Indeed, this period
closely resembles the infamous Arab League’s 1967 “Three No’s”
declaration of principles: no peace with Israel, no recognition of
Israel, and no negotiations with Israel.115
While the resurgence of Arab radicalism that began in the
2000s closely resembles the ideology from earlier periods in Arab
League history with regard to Zionism and Israel, there is a
significant difference with the new radicalism. Rather than being
formalized at the state level, the new radicalism has taken root
and spread at the non-state level.116 The member states of the
Arab League, with the exception of several such as Libya and
Syria, have largely continued the facial normalization process
with Israel.117 Perhaps as a reaction to this “betrayal,” the nonstate members of the Arab League (and Islamic world as a whole)
retrenched to the principles set out in the Arab League Boycott
Declaration of 1945: a racist, rejectionist anti-Israel agenda.118
build a state after its model in Gaza.
Id. The dispute between this voice of the BDS Movement and Hamas was not
over whether Israel should be allowed to exist as part of the realization of a
Palestinian Arab state; rather, Eid condemned Hamas’ deceitful
consideration of a two-state solution as part of its overall strategy to weaken
and then destroy Israel. Id.
115. In 1967, the Arab League met in Khartoum, Sudan, and issued a
resolution at the conclusion of its summit. The third point of the resolution is
now known as the principle of the “Three No’s.” Khartoum Resolution,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, http://www.cfr.org/world/khartoumresolution/p14841?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fpublication_list%3Ftype
%3Dessential_document%26page%3D69.
116. See BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at 27–29.
117. See id. at 16, 26–27.
118. See KHALIL, supra note 19, at 162–63.

2017]

THE BDS MOVEMENT

31

Each of the anti-Israel actors today has a different structure
and public persona. Hamas is a formal political and military
entity with a centralized governing body and a territory under its
control; al-Qaeda and the Islamic State119 are primarily militant
terror organizations with very little centralization or formal
political apparatus; the BDS Movement is primarily a propaganda
organization with a decentralized governing structure. All of
these organizations, however, strictly hew to the original Arab
League “Three No’s” position that Zionism is incompatible with
the Palestinian Arab identity and all strive to replace the Jewish
state with a Palestinian Arab state.
The important point in considering any and all of these
groups is that they, and their individual members, tend to be
fungible when it comes to the issue of Israel. Groups may splinter
from each other and operate under a different name with different
strategies: one group may focus on violence while another may
focus on propaganda.120 Nominally peaceful groups may have
119. While al-Qaeda is widely known as an Islamic terror organization,
the Islamic State is a relatively new iteration of radical Islamist ideology.
The distinction is somewhat uncertain, but the landscape has been described
as:
[T]he post-9/11 jihadi movement . . . split into two major groups—alQaeda and its declared affiliates, under the leadership of bin Laden
and now Zawahiri—and everyone else, a motley collection of more or
less like-minded insurgents and terrorists around the world who
have maintained their independence, even though many were
friendly or linked to al[-]Qaeda through shared resources or
personnel.
J.M. Berger, The Islamic State vs. al Qaeda, FOREIGNPOLICY.COM (Sept. 2,
2014), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/02/islamic_state_vs_al_
qaeda_next_jihadi_super_power. The Islamic State is one of the “motley
collection” of other non-al-Qaeda radical Islamic groups. Id. Certainly, the
anti-Israel, anti-Jewish agenda is not the only agenda for al-Qaeda and the
Islamic State, but it serves as a prominent and binding role in each
organization’s ideology and actions. Id.
120. The BDS Manifesto explicitly acknowledges this separation of tactics
among the various anti-Israel groups, united by the overarching goal to
destroy Israel:
[C]haracterizing the struggle as a whole as “non-violent” does not
necessarily equate with the values of the oppressed for whom BDS
forms one part or mechanism of support for their struggle. This
raises important questions over the right to resist . . . . [T]he
Palestinian struggle has evolved over the decades as an expression of
the Palestinians, who challenge the occupation and use the means
available to a subjugated people to seek the attainment of their
rights. The Palestinian struggle cannot be so simply defined as
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overlapping membership with groups committed to violence, but
at their core, notwithstanding any moniker they adopt or flag they
may fly, they are all part of the non-state apparatus that the Arab
League Boycott Declaration of 1945 established: to eliminate
Zionism.
Furthermore, the BDS Movement is but one part of the
ascension of non-state actors in the global Palestinian Arab
nationalist movement. As the importance of the Arab League121
has declined over the decades, the void has been filled by any
number of other non-state actors that populate the spectrum from
purely humanitarian to resolutely militant. While the names
change, the group’s objective remains the same: the demonization,
marginalization, and destruction of Israel.122
The BDS Movement may claim that it is not a racist
organization, but brushing aside its oft-repeated and empty claims
to be fighting against “colonialism” and an “apartheid” state, one
finds that the substance of the BDS Movement’s aims are rooted
in racism, bigotry, and a desire to ethnically cleanse the only nonArab Middle Eastern state from the map.123 The BDS Movement,
like its predecessors and affiliates, frames its goals as the

violent or non-violent; it brings together a variety of strategies in its
path of resistance to advance national goals.
BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at 11 (emphasis added).
121. The Arab League is something of a hybrid organization. As defined
by the United Nations, the Arab League qualifies as a “non-governmental
organization.” See James Hall, Economics of Non-governmental
Organizations, BREAKING ALL THE RULES (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.
batr.org/negotium/111313.html (“A non-governmental organization (NGO
also often referred to as ‘civil society organization’ or CSO) is a not-for-profit
group, principally independent from government, which is organized on a
local, national or international level to address issues in support of the public
good.”). The Arab League can also be seen as a regional political organization
or an intergovernmental organization. Whatever the case is, neither the EAA
Anti-Boycott Law nor the other laws discussed herein refer specifically to
non-governmental organizations or grants them unique treatment.
Furthermore, there is no definitive legal definition of the term “nongovernmental organization.”
To simplify the discussion on this nonsubstantive point, I refer herein at times to the Arab League as a nongovernmental organization.
122. See Gerald M. Steinberg, The Centrality of NGOs in Promoting AntiIsrael Boycotts and Sanctions, 21 JEWISH POL. STUD. REV. 1, 18 (2009)
(documenting the creation of hundreds of “human rights” NGOs devoted to
anti-Israel advocacy).
123. See BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at viii.
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“liberation of Palestine”124 and has abjectly rejected the principles
of the Oslo Accords or any other bona fide peace process. This can
only mean that like Hamas, al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and a
long line of other Islamist non-state actors spawned by the Arab
League, the BDS Movement is neither grassroots nor interested in
coexistence with Israel as a Jewish state in any form.125
Indeed, a co-founder of the BDS Movement, Omar Barghouti,
was a signatory to a 2007 declaration titled “The One State
Solution” that explicitly rejected the idea of a two-state solution
and demanded the destruction of the State of Israel.126 Barghouti
has also stated on record that most Palestinian Arabs support a
one-state solution (i.e., Palestine replacing Israel) and that
solution would logically mean the elimination of Israel as a
functioning state:
Two polls in 2007 showed two-thirds majority support for
a single state solution in all flavors—some of them think
of a purely Palestinian state without Israelis and so on—
in exile it’s even much higher because the main issue is
that refugees in particular, and people fighting for
refugee rights like I am, know that you cannot reconcile
the right of return for refugees with a two state solution.
That is the big white elephant in the room and people are
ignoring it—a return for refugees would end Israel’s
existence as a Jewish state. The right of return is a basic
right that cannot be given away; it’s inalienable. [] A two124. Section 1.4 of the BDS Manifesto is titled “Strengths and
Weaknesses of BDS in Support of the Palestinian Liberation Struggle,” and
there are numerous references to the BDS Movement’s goal to liberate
Palestine throughout the document. See, e.g., BDS Manifesto, supra note 59,
at 159.
125. The two-state solution, which was the basis for the Oslo Accords and
has been the resolution sought by the United States and most other
international entities, would have the Israeli/Palestinian Arab dispute
resolved through the creation of a Palestinian Arab state that coexists with
the existing state of Israel. See Karl Ritter, New Swedish Government to
Recognize Palestinian State, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.usnews.
com/news/world/articles/2014/10/03/sweden-to-recognize-palestinian-state
(“[W]e believe that the process is one that has to be worked out through the
parties to agree on the terms of how they’ll live in the future of two states
living side-by-side.”).
126. See Ali Abunimah, et al., The One State Declaration, ELEC. INTIFADA
(Nov. 29, 2007), http://electronicintifada.net/content/one-state-declaration/
793.
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state solution was never moral and it’s no longer
working—it’s impossible with all the Israeli settlements
and so on.127
Even Norman Finkelstein, a prominent academic critic of
Israel,128 has deemed the BDS Movement to be a “cult” that seeks
the destruction of Israel:
“They don’t want Israel,” Finkelstein declared, “They
think they’re being very clever. They call it their three
tiers . . . . We want the end of the occupation, we want
the right of return, and we want equal rights for Arabs in
Israel. And they think they are very clever, because they
know the result of implementing all three is what?
What’s the result? You know and I know what’s the
result: there’s no Israel.”129
BDS Movement supporters go to great lengths denying the
obvious intentions of their movement’s goals and claim that they
would support the continued existence of Israel as a state within
the pre-1967 war borders.130 BDS Movement supporters, however,
put so many conditions on their “support of Israel”—such as the
right of every Palestinian Arab to become a citizen of Israel and
the elimination of Israel’s status as a Jewish state131—that these
supporters endorse an Israel that is vastly different from the
Jewish state approved by the United Nations pursuant to United
Nations Resolution 181132 or the Jewish state recognized by the
127. Ali Mustafa, “Boycotts Work”: An Interview with Omar Barghouti,
ELEC. INTIFADA (May 31, 2009), http://electronicintifada.net/content/ boycottswork-interview-omar-barghouti/8263 (emphasis added).
128. See, e.g., Matthew Abraham, The Case for Norman Finkelstein,
GUARDIAN (June 14, 2007), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2007/jun/14/abattleforacademicfreedom.
129. Ali Abunimah, Finkelstein, BDS and the Destruction of Israel, AL
JAZEERA (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/02/
2012227111759385177.html. After extreme pressure from the BDS
Movement and others, Finkelstein eased on his approach but did not
repudiate its substance.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See G.A. Res. 181 (II) I–A ¶ 3 (Nov. 29, 1947) (calling for a partition
of the British Mandate of Palestine into two-states: a Jewish state and an
Arab state). This resolution was adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly on November 29, 1947, accepted by the putative representatives of
the to-be-formed Jewish state, but rejected outright by the Arab states. UN
General Assembly Resolution 181, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
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United Nations in 1948. Instead, clinging to the Arab League’s
rejectionist and Arab supremacist positions from the earlier
Zionist movement in Israel, the BDS Movement seeks to
fundamentally transform Israel into a Palestinian Arab state that
would also likely be Islamic.
It should not be forgotten that the history of Arab and Islamic
states demonstrates a dual class society consisting of—using the
BDS Movement’s own terms—racism and apartheid.133 For
example, in the relatively liberal Kingdom of Jordan, which has a
large Palestinian Arab population, Islam is the sole state religion
and individuals are not allowed to either promote any other
religion or, if they are Muslim, convert to any other religion.134
The conditions for non-Muslims in other Arab countries, such as
Saudi Arabia, are even less hospitable.135 It is therefore easy to
question the credibility of the BDS Movement’s stance that
Israel’s actions as a Jewish state are racist and a form of

http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/un%20general%20
assembly%20resolution%20181.aspx. Seeing that there would be no Arab
recognition of the Jewish state recommended by the United Nations, Israel
declared its statehood shortly after the expiration of the British Mandate,
which was followed by Arab states declaring war on the newly-constituted
Jewish state. See Establishment of Israel: Declaration, JEWISH VIRTUAL
LIBRARY, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/Dec_of_Indep.h
tml.
133. See, e.g., Karrie Kehoe, Factbox-Women’s Rights in the Arab World,
THOMSON REUTERS FOUND. (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.trust.org
/item/20131111115632-hn9t2/?source=spotlight-writaw (documenting the
rampant denial of basic human rights towards women in Arab states); see
also Alan Dershowitz, Let’s Have a Real Apartheid Education Week,
WORLDPOST (May 4, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alan-dershowitz
/lets-have-a-real-aparthei_b_ 485399.html (last updated May 25, 2011)
(documenting state sponsored religious, sexual, gender and racial
discrimination throughout the Arab world).
134. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS., AND LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT (2007).
135. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS., AND LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT (2013) (“[In Saudi Arabia,]
[f]reedom of religion is neither recognized nor protected under the law . . . .
The public practice of any religion other than Islam is prohibited . . . . Shia
and other Muslims who did not adhere to the government’s interpretation of
Islam faced political, economic, legal, social, and religious discrimination . . . .
The government detained individuals on charges of insulting Islam,
encouraging or facilitating conversion from Islam, ‘witchcraft and sorcery,’
and for engaging in private non-Muslim religious services . . . . Mosques are
the only public places of worship, and the construction of churches,
synagogues, or other non-Muslim places of worship is not allowed.”).
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apartheid when in reality most, if not all, Arab states exist as
repressive Muslim states.
What is more, the BDS Movement roots its anti-Israel creed
in opposing alleged Israeli apartheid policies, yet the end result of
the BDS Movement’s activities, if successful, would be eliminating
the only liberal democracy in the region (one whose respect for
women’s, minority and gay rights is inapposite to the neighboring
Arab theocracies) and imposing an Islamic apartheid state in its
stead. This is exactly the same result called for by Islamist groups
like al-Qaeda and Hamas who are ideologically aligned with the
BDS Movement. This comparison has also been made by Scholars
for Peace in the Middle East, an international organization of
scholars
working
for
a
peaceful
resolution
of
the
Israeli/Palestinian Arab dispute. In criticizing the BDS
Movement’s affiliation with Hamas and other radical terror
organizations, Scholars for Peace in the Middle East stated:
A careful look at the BDS movement and its methodology
shows not legitimate criticism but a movement that is
racist and anti-Semitic . . . .
....
Overall, the BDS campaign is contrary to the search for
peace, since it represents a form of misguided economic
warfare.
It is directly in opposition to decades of
agreements between Israeli and Arab Palestinians, in
which both sides pledged to negotiate a peaceful
settlement and a commitment to a two-state solution . . . .
....
Scholars for Peace in the Middle East (SPME) urges those
committed to peace and justice for the people of a region
which has had too much war and violence to join with us
in rejecting the politics of hatred that the BDS movement
represents . . . .136
In this context, it must be noted that the two-state solution is
a compromise for both Israel and the Palestinian Arabs. Under
the two-state solution, Israel’s territorial integrity would be
136.
Israel’s War with Hamas Reinvigorates BDS Movement, SCHOLARS
PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST (Sept. 11, 2014), http://spme.org/spmestatements/updated-statement-condemning-current-calls-boycott-divestmentsanctions-bds-israel/18453/.
FOR
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compromised and its available land would be significantly reduced
(which, in fact, has already been compromised as a result of the
Israeli disengagement from Gaza in 2005). Naturally, this would
have negative economic, social, and security ramifications on
Israel. A smaller Israel with an armed and historically hostile
new neighbor would mean that the buffer zones currently in
existence and which protect against mortar and rocket attacks
and border incursions would disappear.137 As recent conflicts
between Hamas and Israel have shown, the existing buffer zones
provide a significant security benefit to Israel and allow Israel to
defend its citizens against indiscriminate mortar and rocket fire
directed at civilian populations. Defensive anti-missile systems
and warnings will only be effective so long as there is sufficient
time between a threat’s detection and the projectile’s impact.
Oftentimes, this time is under one minute, as was the case in the
2014 war between Hamas and Israel.138 During times of war or
terrorism, a larger territory brings better odds to prevent
casualties and prepare a defense, so any territorial concessions by
Israel will have a significant harmful effect on its security.
Furthermore, the two-state solution represents Israel’s
recognition of a unique Palestinian Arab identity and state, a
political compromise of historic proportions, and an implicit
compromise that jeopardizes Israel’s historic claims to the entirety
of the land.139 Some of Israel’s proponents argue that the
137. See, e.g., BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, A DURABLE PEACE: ISRAEL AND ITS
PLACE AMONG THE NATIONS 261–285 (1993) (explaining the heightened
importance of territory for Israel due to the small size of the country and the
presence of hostile entities at its borders). Mr. Netanyahu’s book, first
published in 1993 shortly before the Oslo Accords, accurately warned that the
military buffer provided by the West Bank and, to a lesser extent, Gaza,
would become ever more important as Israel’s enemies acquired greater
stores of short and long range missiles. See id. Mr. Netanyahu also opined
that “[i]n the age of missiles territory counts more, not less. Long-range
missiles increase the need for mobilization time, and short range missiles can
destroy strategic targets within their reach. For both reasons, the control of
a contiguous buffer area becomes more, not less, important.” Id. at 278.
138. See, e.g., Alessandra Ram, An Actually Useful Version of Yo is
Warning Israelis of Rocket Strikes, WIRED (July 16, 2014, 12:00 PM),
http://www.wired.com/2014/07/an-actually-useful-version-of-yo-is-warningisraelis-of-rocket-strikes/ (discussing the Israeli Red Alert missile warning
system: “[t]he user typically receives a warning via smartphone 15 to 90
seconds before a rocket hits.”).
139. See Dore Gold & Jeff Helmreich, An Answer to the New Anti-Zionists:
The Rights of the Jewish People to a Sovereign State in Their Historic
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Palestinian Arab compromise in the context of a two-state solution
is illusory, since the Palestinian Arabs would give up no territory
(no Palestinian Arab state currently exists) and there is ample
documentation indicating that the Palestinian Arab strategy has
always been to destroy Israel with the only nuance being the use
of “stages” to chip away at Israel’s security in preparation of a
final battle.140
Dr. Michael Widlanski summarized the
Palestinian Arab strategy in the following terms:
From 1968 through 1974, Fatah/PLO made it clear that it
wanted to replace Israel with a “democratic Palestine.”
This was a euphemism for what former PLO leader
Ahmad Shukeiry had declared: “ . . . destroying Israel and
driving the Jews into the sea.” Beginning in 1974, the
PLO further “moderated” its tone, but not its real goal. It
adopted the “Strategy of Stages” and declared that it
would try to gain parts of Palestine/Israel via peaceful
means. Thereafter it would employ arms for the final
battle. Arafat and Abbas refined this strategy further
over the years.141
The strategy of eliminating Israel in stages is one that has
also been adopted by Hamas.142
While it is undeniable that both sides to a two-state solution
will make significant compromises, the existential threat to Israel
must not be underestimated. In this context, the fact that Israel
has adopted the two-state solution as its objective in negotiations
with the Palestinian Arabs carries great weight and should be
viewed as evidence of Israel’s desire to achieve a peaceful
coexistence with Palestinian Arabs in their own sovereign state.
Hamas, al-Qaeda, many Arab states, and the BDS Movement, on
Homeland, JERUSALEM CTR. FOR PUB. AFFAIRS (Nov. 16, 2003),
http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp507.htm. I present this point of view only to compare
the mainstream Israeli diplomatic approach, which accepts as a political
reality that historic claims to the entire land of Israel will be compromised if
there is to be peace with the Palestinian Arabs, to the Palestinian Arab
approach, which generally refuses to make such a compromise since they
claim the lands are historically Palestinian Arab.
140. Dr. Manfred Gerstenfeld, Deceitful Palestinian Statements as
Strategic Weapons, ISRAEL NAT’L NEWS (Sept. 23, 2013, 12:30 PM),
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/13863#.VE6JOPnF_
nh (op-ed interview with Dr. Widlanski).
141. Id.
142. Eid, supra note 114.
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the other hand, can make no such claim with regard to peaceful
coexistence with a sovereign Israel. Their position has always
been that Israel, as a Jewish state, must be eliminated. From this
perspective, the extremist nature of the BDS Movement comes
into focus and its place alongside the most virulent enemies of
peace is incontrovertible.
The Arab League Boycott Declaration of 1945 called for a nonstate actor to represent Palestinian Arabs as part of the
propaganda and economic campaign against Israel. This is the
BDS Movement. The BDS Movement is also ideologically aligned
with radical Islamist groups. The BDS Movement is not a grass
roots movement, nor is it a peace movement. In charitable terms,
the BDS Movement is simply the latest iteration of the
longstanding Arab League mandate to eliminate the only nonArab state from the Middle East. In less charitable terms, the
BDS Movement is the non-violent propaganda arm of the modern
Islamist terror movement.
II. THE BDS MOVEMENT UNDER UNITED STATES LAW

A. Anti-Boycott Provisions of United States Laws
As the Arab League Boycott matured and developed a
sophisticated bureaucratic structure, the United States responded
with a series of increasingly broad and powerful laws meant to
blunt its impact and reach in the United States. United States’
opposition to the Arab League Boycott was (and is) multi-faceted.
First, the Arab League Boycott has had commercial ramifications
in the United States. Companies that violate the secondary and
tertiary boycott are put on a “black list” maintained by the Arab
League’s Office of Boycott Compliance.143 Those companies lose
access to markets in member states of the Arab League and
supporting states/entities. Solely in economic terms, the Arab
League Boycott has had negative financial consequences for the
United States.144 Second, as a matter of policy under both
143. SARNA, supra note 12, at 2.
144. The House Boycott Report indicated that it was impossible to
quantify the amount of commercial activity affected by the Arab League
Boycott in the 1970s, but the report estimated that hundreds of millions of
dollars in trade was lost as a result of the boycott and billions of dollars were
likely affected. H. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE H.
COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., REP. ON THE
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domestic and international law, the interference of a foreign entity
in the domestic affairs of a country is prohibited.145 By using
United States individuals and companies to further the boycott of
Israel, the Arab League Boycott impermissibly interferences in
United States internal affairs.146
In the early days of the Arab League Boycott, when it was
focused on the primary boycott of Israel by Arab states, United
States’ policy was one of non-partisan acceptance of the right of
the Arab states to conduct their domestic affairs without third
party interference.147 As the nature of the Arab League Boycott
became better known, however, and allegations of its racist
objectives spread, the United States Senate initially took action by
means of a resolution condemning religious discrimination
introduced into the United States by foreign entities.148
ARAB BOYCOTT AND AMERICAN BUSINESS, H.R. DOC. NO. 75–384, at 30–36
(1976) [hereinafter HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT].
145. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7 (“Nothing contained in the present
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter. . . .”). This provision has been interpreted to prohibit any state from
interfering in the domestic affairs of another state, including by use of
economic coercion. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 181, ¶¶
210–11 (June 27) (“The Court then considers the question whether, if one
State acts towards another in breach of the principle of non-intervention, a
third State may lawfully take action by way of counter-measures which
would amount to an intervention in the first State’s internal affairs. This
would be analogous to the right of self-defense in the case of armed attack,
but the act giving rise to the reaction would be less grave, not amounting to
armed attack. In the view of the Court, under international law in force
today, States do not have a right of ‘collective’ armed response to acts which
do not constitute an ‘armed attack.’”); see also HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra
note 144, at 11–12 (regarding American policy to prevent foreign interference
with domestic commercial affairs).
146. FEILER, supra note 15, at 68.
147. Id. at 151.
148. S. Res. 323, 84th Cong. (1956) (“Whereas it is a primary principle of
our Nation that there shall be no distinction among United States citizens
based on their individual religious affiliations and since any attempt by
foreign nations to create such distinction among our citizens in the granting
of personal or commercial access or any other rights otherwise available to
United States citizens generally is inconsistent with our principles; Now,
therefore, be it Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that it regards any
such distinctions directed against United States citizens as incompatible with
the relations that should exist among friendly nations, and that in all
negotiations between the United States and any foreign state every
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It was, in a point of historic irony,149 dockworkers that set in
motion action by the Executive Branch of the United States
Government to combat the secondary and tertiary effects of the
Arab League Boycott. In 1960, the Seafarer’s International Union
and other dockworkers’ organizations handling Israeli cargo and
ships voiced their concern that supporters of the Arab League
Boycott were harassing dockworkers and interfering with
international commerce, which had a direct economic impact on
the dockworkers.150
In response to the concerns of the dockworkers, the United
States Department of State condemned the discriminatory Arab
League Boycott and the United States Senate adopted a resolution
that authorized the President of the United States to withhold aid
and assistance to Arab states for as long as the Arab League
Boycott interfered with shipping and cargo handling.151 While
this authorization did not result in direct action against the
boycott, it was a significant crystallization of United States’ policy
that would lead to tangible anti-boycott legislation.
By the mid-1960s, bills were introduced in the United States
Congress to prohibit domestic compliance with the Arab League
Boycott and, through an amendment to the then-existing Export
Control Act, the first legislative response to the Arab League
Boycott was enacted in 1965.152
The amendment, without
prohibiting domestic compliance with the Arab League Boycott,
stated that it was United States’ policy to oppose boycotts
“fostered or imposed” by foreign countries against other countries
that were friendly to the United States.153 While the amendment
did not make compliance with foreign boycotts illegal, it did, for
the first time ever, require anyone who had received a boycott
request to report the same to the United States Department of
Commerce.154
Notwithstanding legislative policy statements, until the midreasonable effort should be made to maintain this principle.”).
149. See infra Part II.C for an overview of how dockworkers went from
condemning boycotts of Israeli in the 1960s to being primary actors in the
BDS Movement’s boycott propagation efforts in 2010–2014.
150. FEILER, supra note 15, at 152.
151. Id. at 152–53.
152. Pub. L. No. 89–63, 79 Stat. 209 (1965); see also FEILER, supra note
15, at 155–56.
153. Id.
154. FEILER, supra note 15, at 156.
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1970s the United States’ response to the Arab League Boycott was
primarily disapprobation rather than affirmative action against
the boycott. In fact, a House of Representatives Committee report
found that as late as 1975 the United States was not only not
rolling back the Arab League Boycott, but “the Commerce
Department actually served to encourage boycott practices
implicitly by condoning activity declared against national policy or
simply by looking the other way . . . .”155
Were it not for the aggressive economic warfare embarked
upon by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC)156 in 1973 there likely would have been no change in the
United States’ “look the other way” response to the Arab League
Boycott. As the 1976 House Boycott Report acknowledged:
The boycott’s impact has, however, changed substantially
in recent years. This change is a direct result of the
fivefold increase in the price of oil which followed the
Arab-Israeli war of October 1973. Due to the normal time
lags in oil payments, massive accumulation of oil
revenues did not begin until 1974. That year, the
combined current account surpluses of the OPEC
nations . . . was $62 billion.157
1. The Legislative Tide Turns: Enactment of the EAA Anti-Boycott
Law
In the waning months of the Gerald Ford administration, the
United States Congress commenced drafting and debating
legislation to finally confront the pernicious Arab League Boycott.
The Ford administration had signaled its opposition to antiboycott legislation, fearing that it would further antagonize the
Arab League into punitive economic action against American

155. See HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144, at viii. The HOUSE
BOYCOTT REPORT was a comprehensive study of the background and effects of
the Arab League Boycott prepared in the wake of the OPEC oil crisis of 1973.
This report was the primary source of information for Congressional
consideration of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, which was enacted the year after
the HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT was published.
156. OPEC is a cartel focused on controlling the price of petroleum
exports globally. Though its membership is not exclusively Middle Eastern,
its agenda is dominated by the oil producing states of the Middle East. See
About Us, OPEC, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/24.htm.
157. HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144, at 10.
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companies.158 Nonetheless, the United States Congress saw the
shocking increase in economic clout of Arab League states
resulting from OPEC oil supply manipulation as the greater
threat. This was, perhaps, the tipping point in terms of action;
there had been longstanding concerns in the United States that
the boycott was an unacceptable and racist intervention in
domestic affairs, but until the OPEC oil crisis the boycott had very
little direct impact on American consumers.159
In light of OPEC’s new and dramatic influence on the global
economy, the United States considered the affiliated Arab League
Boycott to be “an aspect of the larger Arab-Israeli conflict” that
continued to have a “significant impact within the United States
and [raised] fundamental issues concerning our commitment as a
people to principles of free trade and freedom from religious
discrimination.”160
The legislative response with the first tangible enforcement
provisions161 was an amendment to the 1976 Tax Reform Act.
This legislation, known as the “Ribicoff Amendment,” was a fairly
discrete policy implementation that denied tax benefits to
companies that participated in the Arab League Boycott.162
Because the Ribicoff Amendment did not prohibit companies from
complying with the Arab League Boycott (that is, a company that
felt that the loss of tax benefits was worth the additional revenue
gained from working with Arab League members could simply lose
the tax benefits and continue complying with the boycott), it is not
a focus of this Article, even though the provisions of the Ribicoff
Amendment are still in effect.163 As an indication of United
158. SARNA, supra note 12, at 92 (“President Gerald Ford had been
convinced by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that the goodwill of Arab
nations needed to be cultivated on behalf of U.S. efforts to facilitate a Middle
East peace settlement. This meant that new legislative measures against the
Arab trade boycott would be opposed by the administration since it was
feared they could provoke Arab hostility toward the U.S.”); see also FEILER,
supra note 15, at 163.
159. See generally HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144.
160. Id. at vii.
161. In late 1975, though President Ford prohibited compliance with
certain boycott requests by exporters in the United States, this action
(authorized under the Export Administration Act) had a limited effect and
was not specific to the Arab League Boycott. See SARNA, supra note 12, at 93.
162. See id.
163. See Enforcement–Office of Antiboycott Compliance (OAC), BUREAU OF
INDUS. AND SEC., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, http://www.bis.doc.gov/
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States policy, though, the Ribicoff Amendment stands alongside
the EAA Anti-Boycott Law as a resounding pronouncement that
foreign boycotts imposed in the United States on friendly
countries were contrary to United States’ interests and would not
be tolerated.
Though amendments to the Export Administration Act were
also on the table in Congress at the time, the Ford
administration’s desire to avoid political conflict with Arab
countries on the eve of the 1976 presidential election ultimately
resulted in the abandonment of any new anti-boycott
legislation.164 At the same time, however, the economic impact of
the Arab League Boycott was revealed to Congress. In 1975, the
House Boycott Report estimated that transactions with an
aggregate value of over $4 billion (in 1975 dollars) had been
subject to boycott requests in that year alone.165
Moreover, while the quantifiable effects of the boycott were
enormous, its disruptive impact on trade involving American
companies was even more alarming. The House Boycott Report
examined the case of the Xerox Corporation, which had been
placed on the Arab League Boycott’s blacklist simply because it
had sponsored a television series about United Nations members,
which included one episode on Israel.166 For this, the Arab
League deemed Xerox to be “pro-Zionist” and Xerox was excluded
from virtually all trade with Arab League states.167
What this showed Congress was that the Arab League Boycott
was far more than requests for certificates of origin or
questionnaires regarding factory locations; it was a wide ranging
attack on any American business or individual who was seen as
being sympathetic to, or supportive of, Israel. Indeed, the reach of
the Arab League Boycott was so great that American entertainers
with abstract ties to Israel (such as through the purchase of State
of Israel bonds) were banned from entry to Arab League states
and their works were boycotted.168 The Arab League Boycott of
index.php/enforcement/oac for an overview of the Ribicoff Amendment and
enforcement thereof; see also FEILER, supra note 15, at 162–63.
164. See SARNA, supra note 12, at 98.
165. HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144.
166. Id. at 37.
167. Id. at 37–38.
168. SARNA, supra note 12, at 57–58. The Arab League Boycott resulted
in bans on the works of, among others, Elizabeth Taylor, Danny Kaye, Eartha
Kitt, Edward G. Robinson, Harry Belafonte, Paul Newman, and Sophia
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American entertainers continues to this day, with the BDS
Movement claiming in 2014 that it coerced Elvis Costello and
Carlos Santana to cancel scheduled performances in Israel;169
other entertainers, such as the Rolling Stones, have defied the
BDS Movement’s threats.170
With an ailing economy in the United States and the Arab
world aggressively using its new commercial strength to force
foreign conflicts into American domestic affairs as a backdrop, the
victory of Jimmy Carter in the 1976 presidential election ushered
in a new push by business and political groups for comprehensive
anti-boycott legislation. Though in later years Jimmy Carter
would become known for his vehement anti-Israel, pro-Arab views
and policies,171 in the early days of his administration he
welcomed the legislation already under consideration in Congress
to curb the effects of the secondary and tertiary aspects of the
Arab League Boycott. In fact, during the 1976 presidential debate
between Mr. Carter and President Ford, Mr. Carter attacked
President Ford’s record on the boycott and declared:
I believe that the boycott of American businesses by the
Arab countries . . . is an absolute disgrace . . . . This is
the first time that I remember in the history of our
country when we’ve let a foreign country circumvent or
change our Bill of Rights . . . it’s a disgrace that so far Mr.
Ford’s administration has blocked passage of legislation
that would have revealed by law every instance of the
boycott, and it would have prevented the boycott from
Loren. Even Walt Disney films were banned due to the inclusion of the
Hebrew name “Samson” for a horse in Sleeping Beauty.
169. Cultural Boycott, BDS MOVEMENT, https://bdsmovement.net/culturalboycott (last visited Sept. 10, 2016).
170. BDS campaigners call on Rolling Stones to cancel Israel concert,
HAARETZ (Mar. 26. 2014) http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense
/1.582182.
171. Professor Alan Dershowitz recently described Jimmy Carter as a
“cheerleader for Hamas.” Molly Wharton, Dershowitz: Jimmy Carter Is a
‘Cheerleader’ for Hamas, NAT’L REV. THE CORNER (Aug. 8, 2014),
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/384980/dershowitz-jimmy-carter-cheer
leader-hamas-molly-wharton. See also Ethan Bronner, Jews, Arabs and
Jimmy Carter, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2007 (In a review of Jimmy Carter’s book
PALESTINE: PEACE, NOT APARTHEID, the deputy foreign editor of the New York
Times, a newspaper that is generally considered to have an anti-Israel bias,
describes Carter as offering “a narrative that is largely unsympathetic to
Israel” and disputes Carter’s claim that Israel is an apartheid state.).

46

ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:1

continuing.172
With a willing executive branch in place, the legislative
branch’s strong desire173 to take decisive action against the Arab
League Boycott was reinvigorated and legislative efforts to
resurrect the stillborn amendments to the Export Administration
Act began almost immediately upon President Carter’s
inauguration.174 Between January and June of 1977, the House of
Representatives and Senate worked their way through the
technical aspects of the nascent legislation, dealing with issues
such as the duration of waivers and availability of exemptions,175
and by late June a bill emerged from Congress ready for
consideration by the President.176 On June 22, 1977, President
Carter signed the bill into law. In his public statement upon
signing the EAA Anti-Boycott law, President Carter
proclaimed:177
For many months I’ve spoken strongly on the need for
legislation to outlaw secondary and tertiary boycotts and
discrimination against American businessmen on
172. October 6, 1976 Presidential Debate, COMM’N ON PRESIDENTIAL
DEBATES, http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-6-1976-debate-tran
script.
173. On the Ford administration’s reluctance to enact comprehensive
anti-boycott legislation, then-Congressman Jonathan Bingham said, “I get a
little bit tired of hearing the executive departments say that they are opposed
to the boycott and the opposition does not translate itself into much action.”
Discriminatory Arab Pressure on U.S. Business: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Int’l Trade and Commerce of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations,
94th Cong. 110 (1975).
174. SARNA, supra note 12, at 100–01 (“The 95th Congress lost no time in
resuming consideration of the anti-boycott legislation. In the space of one
week from January 4 to 10, 1977, five such bills were introduced.”).
175. Id. at 101–02.
176. David Cain, International Business Communication and Free Speech:
Briggs and Stratton v. Baldridge, 9 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 131, n.55
(1986) (“The Senate Banking Currency and Housing Committee adopted the
bill 90–1 (123 Cong. Rec. 13812 (May 5, 1977)), while the appropriate House
Committee adopted the bill by a vote of 364–43 (123 Cong. Rec. 11450 (April
20, 1977)). The Conference Report was adopted by voice vote of the Senate
(123 Cong. Rec. 17832 (June 7, 1977)) and by a vote of 306–41 in the House
(123 Cong. Rec. 18382 (June 10, 1977)”). See also Export Administration
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95–52, 91 Stat. 235 (1977) (amending the
Export Administration Act of 1969).
177. Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Remarks on Signing
H.R. 5840 Into Law (June 22, 1977), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/index.php?pid=7704.
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religious or national grounds . . . . My concern about
foreign boycotts stemmed, of course, from our special
relationship with Israel, as well as from the economic,
military and security needs of both our countries. But the
issue also goes to the very heart of free trade among all
nations. I am, therefore, particularly pleased today to
sign into law the 1977 amendments to the Export
Administration Act, which will keep foreign boycott
practices from intruding directly into American
commerce. The new law does not threaten or question
the sovereign right of any nation to regulate its own
commerce with other countries, nor is it directed toward
any particular country. The bill seeks instead to end
the divisive effects on American life of foreign
boycotts aimed at Jewish members of our society.
If we allow such a precedent to become established, we
open the door to similar action against any ethnic,
religious, or racial group in America.178
President Carter’s admonition against bigoted foreign boycotts
could easily be applied to the BDS Movement’s activities today.
The EAA Anti-Boycott Law, as enacted,179 is among the most
straightforward and comprehensible examples of federal
legislation extant. It is logically ordered with a minimum of
internal or external cross references, fairly short in length, and
unadorned by complicated or counterintuitive defined terms.180
Though the EAA Anti-Boycott Law has statutorily lapsed by its
own terms pursuant to its sunset provision, as the Congressional
Research Service Report states, “its provisions are continued
under the authorization granted to the President in the National
Emergencies Act and the International Economic Emergency
Powers Act, most recently under Executive Order 13222 signed
August 17, 2001.”181 Under this authority, the provisions of the
178. Id. (emphasis added).
179. The EAA Anti-Boycott Law was subsequently reenacted without
alteration in the Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96–72, 93
Stat. 503 (1979) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 4601–4623 (Westlaw through Pub.
L. No. 114–244)).
180.
Only eight terms were defined in the law: “person,” “United States
person,” “good,” “technology,” “export,” “controlled country,” “United States,”
and “Secretary.” 50 U.S.C.A. § 4618 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244).
181. WEISS, supra note 18, at 5. Executive Order 13222 was amended by
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EAA Anti-Boycott Law remain in effect as though its sunset
provisions had not yet become effective.
The law directed the President to issue regulations that would
effectuate its provisions—to wit, the law first prohibits:
[A]ny United States person, with respect to his activities
in the interstate or foreign commerce of the United
States, from taking or knowingly agreeing to take any [of
the enumerated] actions with intent to comply with,
further, or support any boycott fostered or imposed by a
foreign country against a country which is friendly to the
United States and which is not itself the object of any
form of boycott pursuant to United States law or
regulation.182
The prohibited actions under the law include:


Refusing, or requiring any other person to refuse,
to do business with or in the boycotted country,
with any business concern organized under the
laws of the boycotted country, with any national
or resident of the boycotted country, or with any
other person, pursuant to an agreement with, a
requirement of, or a request from or on behalf of
the boycotting country . . . .



Refusing, or requiring any other person to refuse,
to employ or otherwise discriminating against any
United States person on the basis of race, religion,
sex, or national origin of that person or of any
owner, officer, director, or employee of such
person.



Furnishing information with respect to the race,
religion, sex, or national origin of any United
States person or of any owner, officer, director, or
employee of such person.



Furnishing information about whether any person

President Barack Obama on March 8, 2013 in Executive Order 13637. Exec.
Order No. 13637, 78 Fed. Reg. 49, 16129 (Mar. 13, 2013). The 2013
amendments did not affect the EAA Anti-Boycott Law’s operative provisions.
For a further discussion on the current status of the law and its regulations
see infra Part I.B.
182. 50 U.S.C.A. § 4607(a)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244).
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has, has had, or proposes to have any business
relationship (including a relationship by way of
sale,
purchase,
legal
or
commercial
representation, shipping or other transport,
insurance, investment, or supply) with or in the
boycotted country, with any business concern
organized under the laws of the boycotted country,
with any national or resident of the boycotted
country, or with any other person which is known
or believed to be restricted from having any
business relationship with or in the boycotting
country. . . .


Furnishing information about whether any person
is a member of, has made contributions to, or is
otherwise associated with or involved in the
activities of any charitable or fraternal
organization which supports the boycotted
country . . . .183

There are a number of exceptions provided for in the law, but
they are all of a non-substantive and technical nature and do not
diminish the law’s general prohibition on United States entities
and individuals from refusing to do business with a boycotted
country that is protected by the law.184 Importantly, while the
183. § 4607(a)(1)(A)–(F) (Westlaw).
184. § 4607(a)(2)(A)–(F) (Westlaw) provides the following exceptions to
the law:
(A) complying or agreeing to comply with requirements (i)
prohibiting the import of goods or services from the boycotted
country or goods produced or services provided by any business
concern organized under the laws of the boycotted country or by
nationals or residents of the boycotted country, or (ii) prohibiting the
shipment of goods to the boycotting country on a carrier of the
boycotted country, or by a route other than that prescribed by the
boycotting country or the recipient of the shipment;
(B) complying or agreeing to comply with import and shipping
document requirements with respect to the country of origin, the
name of the carrier and route of shipment, the name of the supplier
of the shipment or the name of the provider of other services, except
that no information knowingly furnished or conveyed in response to
such requirements may be stated in negative, blacklisting, or similar
exclusionary terms, other than with respect to carriers or route of
shipment as may be permitted by such regulations in order to
comply with precautionary requirements protecting against war
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EAA Anti-Boycott Law explicitly preempts state laws that purport
to govern the same subject matter as the EAA Anti-Boycott
Law,185 the law also explicitly states that it does not “supersede or
limit the operation of the antitrust or civil rights laws of the
United States.”186 This is an important proviso, as prior to the
enactment of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law the United States had
used antitrust laws against the Arab League Boycott and those
laws, and others, may still be used to prosecute those who
participate in the secondary and tertiary boycotts of Israel.187 The
EAA Anti-Boycott Law has survived a number of legal challenges,
including claims that its application violates First and Fifth
Amendment rights.188
risks and confiscation;
(C) complying or agreeing to comply in the normal course of business
with the unilateral and specific selection by a boycotting country, or
national or resident thereof, of carriers, insurers, suppliers of
services to be performed within the boycotting country or specific
goods which, in the normal course of business, are identifiable by
source when imported into the boycotting country;
(D) complying or agreeing to comply with export requirements of the
boycotting country relating to shipments or transshipments of
exports to the boycotted country, to any business concern of or
organized under the laws of the boycotted country, or to any national
or resident of the boycotted country;
(E) compliance by an individual or agreement by an individual to
comply with the immigration or passport requirements of any
country with respect to such individual or any member of such
individual’s family or with requests for information regarding
requirements of employment of such individual within the boycotting
country; and
(F) compliance by a United States person resident in a foreign
country or agreement by such person to comply with the laws of that
country with respect to his activities exclusively therein, and such
regulations may contain exceptions for such resident complying with
the laws or regulations of that foreign country governing imports
into such country of trademarked, trade named, or similarly
specifically identifiable products, or components of products for his
own use, including the performance of contractual services within
that country, as may be defined by such regulations.
185. § 4607(c) (Westlaw).
186. § 4607(a)(4) (Westlaw).
187. See FEILER, supra note 15, at 164 (describing the prosecution of the
Bechtel Corporation in 1977, “which established the general principle that
compliance with the tertiary boycott constituted a violation of US antitrust
laws . . . .”).
188. See, e.g., Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Baldridge, 782 F.2d 915 (7th Cir.
1984) (finding that boycott participation is not protected speech); Trane Co. v.
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B. The BDS Movement Under the EAA Anti-Boycott Law
The EAA Anti-Boycott Law was enacted in response to the
Arab League Boycott, but its reach was significantly broader than
just that boycott.
The EAA Anti-Boycott Law prohibits
compliance with any boycott by a foreign country of a friendly
country.189 But does that mean that the BDS Movement is
subject to the law? This section will examine that question.
In discerning the meaning and permissible application of the
provisions of a statute, the United States Supreme Court, in
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
developed the following two-part test:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.
If,
however, the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question
for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.190
With the question of whether the EAA Anti-Boycott Law
applies to the BDS Movement, we have a question as to the
meaning of a statute where the responsible agency’s
Baldridge, 552 F. Supp 1378 (W.D. Wis. 1983) (finding that the EAA AntiBoycott Law does not violate the First, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments and, in
particular, that the governmental interest in conducting foreign policy
through legislation such as the EAA Anti-Boycott Law is substantial and the
law directly advances the government’s interests). Note, however, that one
court has found that there is no private right of action available for violations
of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law. See Israel Aircraft Indus. Ltd. v. Sanwa Bus.
Credit Corp., 16 F.3d 198 (7th Cir. 1994). Whether other circuit courts would
follow this holding (and whether the Supreme Court would uphold the result)
remains an open question. See also Cain, supra note 176, at 140 (noting at
n.79 that while there may be a private right of action exemption in the law
for some purposes, that exemption may not exist for other types of claims).
189. § 4607(a)(1) (Westlaw).
190. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842–43 (1984).
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interpretation thereof is silent, which is a slightly different
scenario than the typical Chevron case where an agency’s
application of a law to certain parties is being challenged.
Nonetheless, the core issue of statutory interpretation remains, so
the two-part Chevron test should apply to such a question.191
Only the first part of the Chevron test need be applied, since
Congress has directly addressed the precise question of whom or
what the boycott prohibition applies to: any unsanctioned boycott
imposed or fostered by a foreign country against a country friendly
to the United States. Under the first prong of the Chevron test,
the issue is how to properly define the operative statutory terms
“impose,” “foster,” and “foreign country.” Conveniently, Chevron
provides the answer to that question: “[i]f a court, employing
traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that
Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that
intention is the law and must be given effect.”192 The “traditional
tools of statutory construction” include the “statute’s text,
structure, purpose, and legislative history.”193
A fundamental canon of legal interpretation, known as the
“ordinary-meaning rule,” states that “the words of a statute are to
be taken in their natural and ordinary signification and
import . . . .”194 In looking at the ordinary meaning of words, one
looks at “what the text says and fairly implies.”195 Applying this
canon to the remarkably clear and concise text of the EAA AntiBoycott Law, one finds that the law prohibits any individual or
entity in the United States from refusing to do business with an
entity or individual from a friendly country that is the subject of a
foreign boycott.
The ordinary meaning of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law shows
that if there is a boycott against a country that is friendly to the
United States, and that boycott is foreign in origin, Americans
may not participate in that boycott if one of two conditions is met:
191. Some would argue that under Chevron, the Commerce Department
not only can, but must, enforce the EAA Anti-Boycott Act against the BDS
Movement.
192. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, n.9.
193. Ariz. Pub. Svc. Co. v. EPA, 211 F.3d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing
Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984)).
194. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 69 (2012) (citing JAMES KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1826)).
195. Id. at 16.
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either the boycott is “imposed” by a “foreign country” or it is
“fostered” by a “foreign country.”196 Notwithstanding the fact that
each of these three terms has a common meaning, in order to
understand the scope of the prohibited activity under the EAA
Anti-Boycott Law we must analyze each term as it is used in the
context of the law so that we may see what the text “fairly
implies.”
This Article will first examine the two terms that have not
been subject to conflicting definitions, “imposed” and “fostered,”
and then it will examine the source of the conflicting definitions
for the third term, “foreign country,” and present a reasoned
definition of that term.
1. The Meanings of “Imposed” and “Fostered”
The EAA Anti-Boycott Act does not define either “imposed” or
“fostered” and neither term is known to be a legal term of art,197
so we must resort to the common dictionary definition of these
terms. The Merriam Webster Dictionary defines “imposed” as “to
cause (something, such as a tax, fine, rule, or punishment) to
affect someone or something by using your authority.”198 Black’s
Law Dictionary, an authoritative legal dictionary relied upon by
federal courts in the United States, has a substantially similar
definition.199
196. 50 U.S.C.A. § 4607(a)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244).
197. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 194, at 75 (discussing the need to
consult law dictionaries to discern meaning of a word or phrase before
resorting to a “nonscholarly dictionary.”) In certain circumstances, the
Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1, defines ordinarily used terms in statutes, but the
Dictionary Act does not define either of the terms discussed here. Id.
198. MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/imposed.
199. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 824 (9th ed. 2009) [hereinafter BLACK’S 9th
ed.]. Shortly after the EAA Anti-Boycott Law was enacted in 1977 the 5th
edition of Black’s Law Dictionary was published. Though the 5th edition is
not authoritative at the time of the writing of this Article, because it was the
current edition at the time that the EAA Anti-Boycott Law became effective I
have compared definitions in the two editions when citing to Black’s herein.
In no instance was there a substantive difference between any of the defined
terms to the extent that it would have changed the conclusions reached
herein, though there were, of course, stylistic and immaterial differences.
For example, in the case of the word “impose,” BLACK’S 9th ed. defined the
word as “[t]o levy or exact (a tax or duty)” while the 5th edition used the
definition “[t]o levy or exact as by authority; to lay as a burden, tax, duty or
charge.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 680 (5th ed. 1979) [hereinafter BLACK’S 5th
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For a foreign country to be able to impose a boycott on
someone or something, it would need to have authority over that
person or thing. By way of example, a foreign country could issue
a decree that none of its citizens shall do business with XYZ
Corporation, a company that has operations in Israel. In this
case, the foreign country has imposed a boycott. If a citizen of the
foreign country were to be resident in the United States, since
that citizen is still subject to the jurisdiction and laws of his or her
home country, the boycott would be imposed on that person. That
citizen, if he or she defied the decree of his or her country of
citizenship and purchased the products of XYZ Corporation, could
be subject to the penalties imposed by the foreign country, such as
imprisonment or monetary fines. But for any United States
citizen or resident who owes no allegiance to that foreign country
or otherwise is not subject to its jurisdiction, business dealings
with XYZ Corporation have no consequence; the foreign country’s
boycott could not be said to have been imposed on the United
States person.200
The word “fostered,” however, has a much broader meaning.
Merriam Webster’s Dictionary defines foster as “to promote the
growth or development of” and lists as synonyms “advance,
cultivate, encourage, forward, further, incubate, nourish, nurse,
nurture, [and] promote.”201 There is no Black’s Law Dictionary
definition for “fostered.” The ordinary meaning of “fostered,”
therefore, is to encourage or promote something, whether or not
the foreign entity has authority to compel action by the
individuals or entities that are the intended audience.
Since the principle proponent for a restrictive reading of the
EAA Anti-Boycott Law, the National Lawyers Guild,202 has been
silent on the meaning of the term “fostered or imposed by,” there
is no other known interpretation in the context of the EAA Antied.]. While there are stylistic differences between the two definitions, one
definition does not contradict the other.
200. Arguably, however, if the United States citizen sought to do business
with the foreign country, the foreign country could prevent the business
relationship from being consummated. This would be an extraterritorial
imposition of the boycott on a United States citizen.
201. MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, supra note 198.
202. See infra Part II.B.3 for a full discussion of the National Lawyers
Guild legal memorandum, which is the primary source of the erroneous
opinion that the EAA Anti-Boycott Law only applies to boycotts that are
directly imposed by a foreign government.
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Boycott Law that is contrary to the dictionary definitions of these
words. Nonetheless, to ensure that there is a proper
understanding of these prefatory words in the EAA Anti-Boycott
Law, it is important to go beyond the obvious meaning of the
words to determine whether a contrary meaning could have been
intended.
2. “Imposed” or “Fostered by” in the Context of the EAA AntiBoycott Law
In the context of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, while the United
States respected the autonomy of any foreign entity that desired
to engage in a primary boycott of Israel (for example, the
government of Syria refusing to buy wheat grown by Israeli
farmers), it also sought to insulate American individuals and
companies from any attempt to embroil them in the Arab world’s
war against Israel.203
a. Background: The Use of Similar Terms in Earlier
Congressional Debates
In the House Boycott Report, commissioned in late 1976 to
examine the reach of the Arab League Boycott on United States’
interests, a subcommittee of the House of Representatives’
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce concluded that
the Arab League Boycott was having far reaching and harmful
effects. In response, the House Committee recommended that the
existing anti-boycott law should be “amended to prohibit all
agreements to refrain from doing business (a) with a foreign
country friendly to the United States or (b) with a company or
supplier boycotted by a foreign concern, thereby furthering a
foreign imposed boycott or restrictive trade practice.”204
Though the terms “foreign imposed” and “foreign concern”
were not used in the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, an examination of
how they were used in the House Boycott Report, the precursor to
the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, sheds important light on the objectives
of the law. The House Boycott Report presumably uses the terms
203. HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144, at 13 (“Major factors in this
drive for anti-boycott legislation were concerns about religious discrimination
and U.S. support for Israel as well as the concern that foreign concerns
should not be allowed to dictate American business practices.”).
204. Id.
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“foreign concern” and “foreign imposed boycott” to refer to the
same thing: the source of the boycotts. The term “foreign country,”
however, clearly means the boycotted, rather than the boycotting,
country.205
The House Boycott Report’s identification of boycotts by a
“foreign concern” and “foreign imposed boycott[s]” must be read in
line with another canon of statutory interpretation, the
“Presumption of Consistent Usage.”206 Under this canon, if there
is a document that “has used one term in one place, and a
materially different term in another, the presumption is that the
different term denotes a different idea. If it says land in one place
and real estate later, the second provision presumably includes
improvements as well as raw land.”207 Thus, the House Boycott
Report’s use of “foreign concern” and “foreign imposed” in the text
quoted above must be read in a way that each of the different
formulations has its own specific meaning.
The term “foreign concern” refers to the parties engaging in
the boycott. The drafters understood that boycotts that were the
subject of the proposed anti-boycott law originated from and were
enforced by more than just foreign governments. The primary
focus of the proposed legislation was the Arab League Boycott and
Congress knew that neither the Arab League nor Palestine was a
recognized state, yet both were instrumental in the boycott’s
operations. Congress also knew that the Arab League called upon
a host of non-governmental actors to carry out its boycott of Israel.
Consequently, a “foreign concern” should be read to mean any
foreign source of support or promotion for the boycott of a friendly
country.
This interpretation also logically explains why “foreign
imposed” boycott was used later in the sentence, as it was
intended to encompass any foreign boycott that was enforced
under authority, such as by a state. By way of example, the BDS
Movement’s boycott can be considered a boycott of a friendly
foreign country (Israel) by a foreign concern (the BDS
Movement) that furthers a foreign imposed boycott (the boycott
imposed by states and other entities pursuant to the Arab League
Boycott).
205. For its meaning in the context of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, the
term “foreign country” is examined in depth infra Part II.B.3.
206. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 194, at 170.
207. Id. (emphasis added).
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The foregoing is primarily an aside, since the House Boycott
Report is not the controlling document for purposes of interpreting
the EAA Anti-Boycott Law. The House and Senate debates
discussed infra provide legislative and world history that is closer
in time to the enactment of the law. Nonetheless, the House
Boycott Report is helpful in understanding the missing context for
the “fostered or imposed” language: Congress was concerned with
boycotts originating outside of the United States, and even if one
gives “foreign concern” and “foreign imposed” distinct meanings,
neither limits the applicability of the law’s prohibition solely to
boycotts initiated by a foreign government.
b. The Policy Goal of Including “Imposed” or “Fostered” in the EAA
Anti-Boycott Law
The more important prong of the “imposed or fostered”
predicate is clearly the “fostered” element. While there are
certainly cases where a foreign country would have the authority
to impose its will on its subjects in the United States, the cases of
this are relatively infrequent and, for the most part, were not the
problem that Congress sought to address. Rather, Congress
focused on American citizens and businesses that would be
targeted by foreign concerns that could only indirectly dictate
compliance with a boycott through economic coercion.
Furthermore, while individual Arab League countries
promulgated rules and regulations to implement the Arab League
Boycott, the boycott at a more conceptual level was not one that
originated from any individual member country. The individual
countries were simply the political subdivisions within the Arab
League that could “impose” the provisions of the Arab League
Boycott on their respective citizens and companies. The boycott as
a weapon to be used against Israel, however, was conceived by and
existed (and continues to exist) above the country level, at the
Arab League itself. Consequently, the boycott is implemented in
non-Arab League entities through various Arab League affiliates,
such as the BDS Movement, that “foster” the boycott’s secondary
and tertiary elements. This is why the term “fostered” was used
in the EAA Anti-Boycott Law’s description of the type of boycotts
that were to be prohibited.
The House Boycott Report also examined the non-state
elements of the Arab League Boycott in considerable detail and
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concluded that they were as much the target of the proposed antiboycott law as state actors were. One area of focus in the House
Boycott Report was the various United States-Arab chambers of
commerce that were located in major United States cities. While
these organizations were described as being incorporated entities,
each independent from the other and with no Arab League
membership status, the House Boycott Report described them as
raising “unique issues regarding the Arab boycott and its impact
on U.S. laws and business practices.”208 In particular, the House
Boycott Report found that the non-governmental organizations
such as the chambers of commerce served “to carry out the
interests and policies of foreign governments” in enforcing the
Arab League Boycott and stated that their actions were “in
contravention of expressed U.S. policy . . . .”209
From this history it becomes clear that the entire apparatus
of the boycott machine, not just the governments that had the
legal power to impose penalties for noncompliance with the
boycott, was the subject of the proposed legislation. A non-state
actor on its own can only sanction its own members for
unauthorized activities, but when a non-state actor serves as a
promoter of an activity, such as a boycott, and acts in coordination
with facially independent governmental entities that have the
legal authority as a sovereign to impose penalties and punishment
on those who do not comply, the reach of the governmental
entities is dramatically expanded.
The only logical explanation for the use of the term “fostered
by” in the Congressional reports and hearings prior to the
enactment of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law is that Congress always
meant to include both non-state entities, such as the Arab League,
and subordinate non-governmental entities, such as chambers of
commerce or organizations like the BDS Movement, as well as
governments, within the scope of the law. Excluding non-state
actors, such as the Arab League, from the reach of the EAA AntiBoycott Law would have been utterly nonsensical and would have
hindered, if not absolutely undermined, the efficacy of the law. In
addition, as discussed infra, this type of exclusion would clearly
contradict the meaning of the term “foreign country” as it was
ultimately included in the EAA Anti-Boycott Law.
208.
209.

HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144, at 43.
Id.
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Such a result would violate the canon of statutory
interpretation
known
as
the
“Presumption
against
Ineffectiveness,” which states that there is a presumption that a
textually permissible interpretation that furthers rather than
obstructs the document’s purpose should be favored.210 The EAA
Anti-Boycott Law’s purpose is clear on its face. It was enacted to
prevent foreign concerns (which includes states as well as nonstate actors) from using United States individuals and businesses
to further boycotts against countries that are friendly to the
United States and, in particular, to counter the imposition of the
secondary and tertiary aspects of the Arab League Boycott in the
United States. An interpretation of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law
that exempts boycotts fostered by non-state actors would clearly
obstruct the purpose of the law.
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia explained the
Presumption against Ineffectiveness through a well-known 19th
century case.211 In that case, a statute imposed a tax on private
companies based on number of shares of the company’s capital
stock above a certain numerical threshold.212 The company that
was subject to the tax argued that the statute’s language referred
to the number of shares of stock that it could issue, rather than
the number that it had actually issued.213 The Court rejected this
argument, pointing out that a company could evade taxation
simply by authorizing an astronomically large number of shares
without changing the number of shares that were actually
issued.214 Justice Scalia concluded that such an absurd result,
which undermined the clear purpose of the statute, violated the
Presumption against Ineffectiveness.215 A claim that foreign foes
of Israel could evade the reach of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law by
simply interposing a non-state entity to promote the boycott would
be an equally absurd result. Yet, this is the exact claim that has
been made by legal groups providing the BDS Movement with
cover for its unlawful boycott activities.
Notwithstanding the Presumption against Ineffectiveness and
the House Boycott Report’s explicit language, in the next section
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 194, at 63–65.
Id. at 64.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 64–65.
Id. at 63–65.
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this Article will assume, hypothetically, that the term “fostered
by” cannot be read to require that non-state actors must be
included within the scope of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law’s
provisions. Even with the established understanding of the term
“fostered by” so bastardized, a more persuasive argument in favor
of reaching the conclusion that non-state actors are covered by the
provisions of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law exists.
3. What is a Foreign Country? Smoke, Mirrors, and the National
Lawyers Guild’s Defense of the BDS Movement
With two of the three definitional hurdles now resolved, the
missing piece of the interpretative puzzle is the proper definition
of the term “foreign country” within the context of the EAA AntiBoycott Law. Before examining the meaning of the term “foreign
country,” this Article will first explain why the interpretative
question exists. The National Lawyers Guild (NLG), a United
States legal advocacy organization, has publicly disseminated a
memorandum (NLG Opinion) supporting the BDS Movement’s
legality under, inter alia, the EAA Anti-Boycott Law.216 At the
time of the publication of this Article, no other legal organization
or authority in the United States was known to have issued any
such legal guidance on the topic of the BDS Movement’s status
under the EAA Anti-Boycott Law. Thus, to the extent those
participating in the BDS Movement or complying with its boycott
activities in the United States have relied on any publicly
available guidance in support of their activities, the NLG Opinion
is likely the source of that guidance.217
The NLG Opinion provides no legislative background on the
EAA Anti-Boycott Law nor does it examine the background of the
Arab League Boycott or the BDS Movement (other than to
erroneously state that the BDS Movement is not acting in “concert

216. Impact of Federal Anti-Boycott and Other Laws on BDS Campaigns,
NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD INT’L COMM. (Oct. 2009), http://www.nlginternational.
org/report/NLG_BDS_legal_memo.pdf [hereinafter NLG Opinion].
217. While the NLG Opinion states that it is a draft and individuals
should seek the advice of an attorney if they want specific legal advice on
boycott activities, it has been cited by a number of organizations that
participate in the BDS Movement. See, e.g., The Legality of Academic
Boycott: Frequently Asked Questions, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS. 3, https://
www.ccrjustice.org/files/FAQonLegalityofBoycott_1.10.14_FINAL_SH.pdf; see
also NLG Opinion, supra note 216.
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with the Arab League’s boycott of Israel . . . .”).218 Rather, it
jumps to a conclusory observation that limits its reach solely to
boycotts initiated by foreign governments:
[BDS Movement activities are not prohibited under the
EAA Anti-Boycott because the EAA Anti-Boycott Law]
specifically defines an “unsanctioned” foreign boycott as
one that is “fostered or imposed by a foreign country
against a country which is friendly to the United States
and which is not itself the object of any form of boycott
pursuant to United States law or regulation.” A boycott
against the State of Israel or an Israeli company or
concern would be prohibited under the EAA only if the
boycott is specifically intended to support or comply with
boycotts initiated by foreign countries. The phrase
“foreign country” refers to the official government of the
country and does not encompass NGOs.219
The NLG Opinion contains a number of materially misleading
statements. First, neither the EAA Anti-Boycott Law nor 15
C.F.R. part 760—the regulations that implement the EAA AntiBoycott Law—(Regulations)220 limit “foreign country” to mean
only the official government of a country.221 Further, the NLG
Opinion limits prohibited boycotts to those “initiated by foreign
countries.” The plain language of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law and
the Regulations, however, contains no such limitation. While
“initiated” may be a synonym for “imposed,” the NLG Opinion’s
use of “initiated” effectively strips the term “fostered” out of the
text of the law. The EAA Anti-Boycott Law prohibits boycotts that
are “fostered” by foreign countries. This means any foreign
boycott that is promoted, not just initiated, by a foreign
country.222
An example will demonstrate the significance of the NLG
Opinion’s misdirection. Assume for purposes of this hypothetical
that the BDS Movement is not a foreign country under any legal
standard. Further, assume that the BDS Movement is the entity
that has initiated a boycott of Israel and that boycott is being
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See NLG Opinion, supra note 216.
Id. at 1.
15 C.F.R. pt. 760 (Westlaw) [hereinafter Regulations].
Id.
Supra Part I.B.1.
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promoted in the United States by companies and officials from
Syria, but Syria did not initiate the boycott. Under the NLG
Opinion’s “initiated by foreign countries” standard, neither the
BDS Movement’s boycott nor Syria’s boycott promotion would be
subject to the EAA Anti-Boycott Law because the boycott was
initiated by the BDS Movement, rather than Syria. Given the
text, history, and purpose of the law, this result would clearly be
illogical, and, yet, it is the NLG Opinion’s conclusion.
The NLG Opinion also deceptively states:
[I]t is our opinion that the [EAA Anti-Boycott Law’s] antiboycott provisions cannot lawfully be enforced unless the
EAA [Anti-Boycott Law] is reenacted by Congress.
Presidential Executive Orders purport to continue the
[EAA Anti-Boycott Law], but this is, in our opinion,
dubious authority for imposing sanctions for violation of
the anti-boycott provisions.223
It is exceedingly unlikely that any court would rule that the
continuation of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law and the Regulations
are without proper authority. The continuation of the law was
effected pursuant to a series of presidential executive orders
(Executive Orders) explicitly provided for under congressional
authorization contained in the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA). 224 The IEEPA provides the President with
discretionary authority to promulgate regulations covering a wide
range of matters regarding commerce and foreign affairs, and it
has been cited as authority under each Executive Order issued to
continue the EAA Anti-Boycott Law and Regulations.225
The NLG Opinion presents no challenge as to the
enforceability of the IEEPA, and the Executive Orders that have
continued the EAA Anti-Boycott Law’s provisions have never been
questioned as to form or effect. The powers granted to and
exercised by numerous presidents under the IEEPA are likely a
political question226 that should be resolved by the legislative and
223. NLG Opinion, supra note 216, at 2.
224. Pub. L. No. 95–223, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. §§
1701–1707 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244)).
225. Id.
226. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (holding that
“[t]he Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of
power between the President and Congress until the political branches reach
a constitutional impasse. Otherwise, we would encourage small groups, or
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executive branches. The United States Supreme Court has ruled
that “[w]here a statute . . . commits decision making to the
discretion of the President, judicial review of the President’s
decision is not available.”227 The IEEPA gives the President
discretion to continue the EAA Anti-Boycott Law.
The Executive Orders explicitly state that the provisions of
the EAA Anti-Boycott Law shall continue in full force and effect.
No court has ever taken any action or rendered any decision
validating the NLG Opinion’s conclusion that there is no valid
authority to enforce the EAA Anti-Boycott Law. As such, unless
Congress enacts superseding provisions to the IEEPA that
eliminate the President’s authority to continue laws that may
have lapsed or acts to supersede the EAA Anti-Boycott Law itself,
the EAA Anti-Boycott Law—with the terms and provisions that
existed on its sunset date in 2001—should be considered fully
effective.
The question of which entities are subject to the EAA Antieven individual Members of Congress to seek judicial resolution of issues
before the normal political process has the opportunity to resolve the
conflict.”). Congress has chosen to not take any action in response to use of
Presidential authority under the IEEPA by successive administrations to
extend the effectiveness of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law. If Congress had
considered this use of the IEEPA to be an unauthorized expansion of the
powers granted therein, Congress could have amended the IEEPA to
explicitly limit that exercise of Executive authority. No Congress has ever
done so. It would be extremely unusual for the Judiciary to step in to a
matter that has been sanctioned by both other branches of government. In
fact, a 2001 report from the Ways and Means Committee of the House of
Representatives detailed the many times that Presidential authority under
the IEEPA has been used, generally, and with regard to the extension of the
EAA Anti-Boycott Law specifically. H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
OVERVIEW AND COMPILATION OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES, 107TH CONG., WCMP
107–4, at 210 (2001). It would be anomalous for Congress to chronicle the use
of the IEEPA over such an extended period of time without amending the
law, were it to have disagreed with the Executive’s use of the law. But cf.
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012) (finding that a
statutory right to identify Jerusalem as part of Israel on a United States
passport is not a political question).
227. Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 477 (1994); but c.f., Chamber of
Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding a limit to the use
of executive orders where there was an independent conflict between the
exercise of grant of authority and another law). In the case of the
continuation of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, the IEEPA clearly grants the
President discretion to provide for the continuation of this law, so Dalton
would likely result in the court refusing to interfere with the President’s
authority.
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Boycott Law’s prohibitions is another area of obfuscation in the
NLG Opinion.
The NLG Opinion only discusses official
governments of a country (whose acts the NLG Opinion states are
subject to the law) and non-governmental organizations (whose
acts the NLG Opinion claims are not subject to the law).228
Though the NLG Opinion is silent on why it did not include other
types of entities, the likely reason that it only discussed official
governments and non-governmental organizations is that the
NLG Opinion was focusing on the legality of the BDS Movement,
which is known as a non-governmental organization. Yet, there is
a wide gap between official governments, on the one hand, and
non-governmental organizations, on the other hand.
Non-state
actors,
which
include
non-governmental
organizations as well as intergovernmental organizations,229 fill
part of this gap. The Arab League, as an intergovernmental
organization, is a prime example of the type of non-state actor230
that was intended to be subject to the EAA Anti-Boycott Law. As
the next section of this Article will demonstrate, contrary to the
unfounded and patently absurd conclusion of the NLG Opinion, to
the extent any non-state actor231 qualifies as a representative of a
228. NLG Opinion, supra note 216.
229. For an overview of the types of entities that are considered to be nonstate actors, see generally NON-STATE ACTORS AND AUTHORITY IN THE GLOBAL
SYSTEM (Richard A. Higgott et al. eds., 2000).
230. Professor Andrew Clapham, the first Director of the Geneva
Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights and a
former advisor to the United Nations, has defined non-state actors to include
“any entity that is not actually a state, often used to refer to armed groups,
terrorists, civil society, religious groups or corporations; the concept is
occasionally used to encompass inter-governmental organizations . . . . [A]
non-state actor can be any actor on the international stage other than a
sovereign state . . . .” ANDREW CLAPHAM, POSTCONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING: A
LEXICON 200–12 (Vincent Chetail ed., Oxford University Press 2009).
231. While I have included citations to scholars who have attempted to
define the term “non-state actors,” the question is far from resolved. For
purposes of this Article, non-state actor should be understood under the
Andrew Clapham definition: any entity other than a sovereign state. While
this may not be an appropriate definition for other purposes, such as the
issue of the status of armed non-state actors under international law, it is
appropriate to rebut the disjunctive approach of the NLG Opinion regarding
the applicability of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law vis à vis “official governments”
and all other entities/parties, a colloquial definition of “non-state actors” as
“any entity that is not an official government” is appropriate. See, e.g., Noelle
Higgins, The Regulation of Armed Non-State Actors: Promoting the
Application of the Laws of War to Conflicts Involving National Liberation
Movements, 17 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 12–18 (2009).
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foreign country, whether as a non-governmental organization,
intergovernmental organization or other entity, it would be
subject to the EAA Anti-Boycott Law.
a. The Legal Meaning of “Foreign Country”
The EAA Anti-Boycott Law does not define the term “foreign
country,” nor does it include any provision that explicitly or
implicitly excludes any type of non-state actors from its operation.
While the Regulations contain the word “country” in over 700
separate instances, not one of them has any language that refers
to the official government of a country comprising that country,
nor is there any mention of, nor exclusions for, non-state actors.232
To arrive at its misleading and erroneous conclusion limiting
the reach of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, the NLG Opinion inserted
a word into the EAA Anti-Boycott Law and Regulations that does
not exist in either document: the term “governments.”233 The
operative term that is used in the law is “foreign countries,” which
is very broad.234 The anti-boycott prohibitions never were
intended to be limited to only boycotts that are imposed or
fostered by foreign governments.
There can be no serious debate over what the term “foreign”
means in the context of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law: it is anything
outside of the United States. The term “country,” however, does
not have such an obvious definition. According to Black’s Law
Dictionary, a country is “a nation or political state . . . the territory

232. Even if the Regulations did state that foreign countries are
specifically foreign governments and not non-state actors, they would likely
be found to be overly narrow under, inter alia, Chevron, since the EAA AntiBoycott Law does not contain those limitations and the legislative history of
the law clearly indicates that no such limitation was intended. The
Regulations actually use the phrases “foreign government” and “foreign
country” as distinct and unique terms. See, e.g., Regulations, supra note 220,
§ 760.3(d)(18), Examples of Suppliers of Services (iii) (“A, a U.S. construction
company, is hired by C, an agency of the government of boycotting country Y,
to build a power plant in Y.”) (emphasis added). If a government is a country,
the Regulations’ example would be redundant in referring to a government of
a country. If the Regulations sought to limit the term “country” to mean only
its “government,” it would have provided an appropriate definition for
“foreign country” to limit the meaning in such a manner.
233. NLG Opinion, supra note 216.
234. Likewise, neither the EAA Anti-Boycott Law nor the Regulations
make any exceptions for NGOs.
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of such a nation or state”.235 While a state is not synonymous
with a government, a state is managed by its government236 and a
fair reading of the word would require one to presume that a
reference to a state is also a reference to that state’s
government.237
A “nation” on the other hand, has a different constituency
according to Black’s Law Dictionary. Black’s defines a nation as
“[a] large group of people having a common origin, language and
tradition and usu. constituting a political entity.”238 While a
nation may also be a state239 it does not have to be a state.
Black’s notes that:
[A] nation is a group of people bound by a common
history, common sentiment and traditions and, usually by
common heritage. A state, on the other hand, is a society
of men united under one government. These two forms
of society are not necessarily coincident. A single
nation may be divided into several states, and conversely,
a single state may comprise several nations or parts of
nations.240

235. BLACK’S 9th ed., supra note 199, at 404. BLACK’S 5th ed. defines a
country as “[t]he territory occupied by an independent nation or people, or the
inhabitants of such territory. In the primary meaning, ‘country’ denotes the
population, the nation, the state or the government, having possession and
dominion over a territory.” BLACK’S 5th ed., supra note 199, at 316. In this
definition, there is a clear use of the disjunctive with regard to a government
and the other types of aggregations that can constitute a country, such as a
group of people without a government representing them.
236. BLACK’S 9th ed., supra note 199, at 1537 (citing THEODORE D.
WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 36, at 34 (5th
ed. 1878)).
237. BLACK’S 5th ed. explicitly defines a state as a people who exercise
their sovereignty “through the medium of an organized government. . . .”
BLACK’S 5th ed., supra note 199, at 1262.
238. BLACK’S 9th ed., supra note 199, at 1121. BLACK’S 5th ed. defines a
nation, at its core, as having the same characteristics: “a people, or
aggregation of men, existing in the form of an organized rural society, usually
inhabiting a distinct portion of the earth, speaking the same language, using
the same customs, possessing historic continuity, and . . . generally, but not
necessarily, living under the same government and sovereignty.” (emphasis
added).
239. BLACK’S 9th ed., supra note 199, at 1121 (defining a nation-state as a
nation that is coincident with a state).
240. Id. (emphasis added) (citing JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 136
(Glanville L. Williams ed., 10th ed. 1947)).
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b. The Term “Foreign Country” in Context
The proper understanding of the EAA Anti-Boycott Act’s use
of the term “foreign country” is that any boycott that is fostered or
imposed by either (i) a foreign state (meaning a body of people
acting through a sovereign government) or (ii) a foreign nation
(meaning a body of people who share commonalities, but are not
necessarily organized as a state or acting through a government)
against a friendly country, is prohibited. Since a foreign nation is
any group of people having commonality but not necessarily acting
through a government,241 the term “foreign country” may include
non-state actors representing such people.
This is a far broader definition than was used in the NLG
Opinion and it clearly does not exclude non-state actors of any
nature.242 A non-state actor, therefore, can be, and often is, a
representative of a nation.243 The BDS Movement declared that it
241. If a group of people is acting through a government, they are
properly terms a state, under the Black’s Law Dictionary definition. A group
of people not acting through a government but having commonality would
thus be properly termed a nation under the Black’s Law Dictionary
definition. Without a government, a nation acts through its popular
representatives, which is the case with the Palestinian Arabs and their
representatives, which include the BDS Movement.
242. See United Nations and the Rule of Law, UNITED NATIONS,
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2016). Coincidentally, the
United Nations refers to non-governmental organizations as “civil society
organizations.” This is the same term that the BDS Movement uses in
describing its Palestinian Arab origins. See About Us, BDS MOVEMENT,
https://bdsmovement.net (last visited Sept. 9, 2016). A civil society is
generally understood to refer to the social compact between individuals that
is distinct from the political apparatus that governs a society; that is, a civil
society may be a nation that actions outside of the constraints of a political
system. A state, as Black’s Law Dictionary notes, is a political society, but it
only governs to the extent that the civil society (i.e., the people who constitute
a non-governmental nation) permits it to do so. See BLACK’S 9th ed., supra
note 199, at 1537.
243. Obviously, not all non-state actors can be considered nations for
purposes of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law. To be a nation, there must be a
commonality at the core of the organization. Amnesty International and
Wikimedia, two of the largest non-governmental organizations according to
The Global Journal, would not properly be considered nations since they
represent issue-oriented non-national causes.
See NGO ADVISOR,
http://theglobaljournal.net/group/top-100-ngos/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2016).
The BDS Movement, on the other hand, acknowledges that it is an
aggregation of Palestinian Arabs working to further the goal of establishing a
Palestinian Arab state in the future, which clearly meets the threshold
criteria of having a common origin and tradition. There is no Palestinian
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was formed by and speaks for Palestinian Arab civil society. In
fact, the BDS Movement was founded upon the principle that it
speaks for the entirety of the Palestinian Arab nation; to wit, the
BDS Movement was formed by the agreement of the
representatives constituting:
[T]he three major components of the Palestinian people:
the refugees in exile, Palestinians under occupation in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip and the discriminated
Palestinian citizens of the Israeli state.244
The BDS Movement has said that these three components are to
represent the entire Palestinian Arab civil society, which in turn,
would a fortiori constitute a legal entity known as the Palestinian
Arab nation.
Indeed, while other entities may claim to represent a portion
Arab state at the current time. The Palestinian Arab people, arguably a
unique national identity, operate through non-state apparatuses that
represent the Palestinian Arab nation. The BDS Movement, like Hamas, is
one of those apparatuses and serves as a mechanism for the Palestinian
Arabs to assert a right to self-determination. Non-state organizations are
often, in fact, precursors to political states and the vehicle through which the
political state is formed and founded. See generally DEVELOPMENT, NGOS AND
CIVIL SOCIETY (Deborah Eade ed., 1st ed. 2000). The Palestinian Arab
statehood journey is a case in point. To deny the representative status of a
non-state actor is to deny the peoples’ right to future political statehood. The
fact that there are non-Palestinian Arabs who support the BDS Movement
has no bearing on its representative status; there are non-Palestinian Arabs
who support Hamas and Fatah, yet those two political organizations are
accepted as representatives of a Palestinian Arab nation. The determinative
factors are the origin of the organization (Palestinian Arab civil society) and
its objectives (the establishment of a political state for the nation of
Palestinian Arabs to supplant the political state of Israel for the nation of
Jews). The determination of whether other non-state organizations are
nations (and thus foreign countries) would clearly have to be made on a caseby-case basis for purposes of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law. It is important to
note that the treatment of the BDS Movement as a representative of a foreign
country under the EAA Anti-Boycott Law would not represent an American
acknowledgement of Palestinian Arab statehood. Such recognition relates
solely to the recognition of a government and political system; the EAA AntiBoycott Law does not limit the definition of foreign countries to only those
that are states. 50 U.S.C.A. § 4607 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244).
244. Palestinian
BDS
National
Committee,
BDS
MOVEMENT,
https://bdsmovement.net/bnc (last visited Sept. 9, 2016). The language in the
2005 document calling for the initial formation of the BDS Movement states
that “[t]he Palestinian political parties, unions, associations, coalitions and
organizations [endorsing the document] represent the three integral parts of
the people of Palestine: Palestinian refugees, Palestinians under occupation
and Palestinian citizens of Israel.”
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of Palestinian Arab political society, only the BDS Movement has
claimed to represent all of the elements of the Palestinian Arab
civil society, within Israel, in disputed territories and worldwide.
Hamas may claim that it represents Palestinian Arabs in Gaza,
and Fatah may claim that it represents Palestinian Arabs in the
West Bank/Judea and Samaria, but those are mere fragments of
the Palestinian Arab nation as a whole.
If there is any
representative of the Palestinian Arab nation, which was
Balkanized by Hamas, Fatah, and even the Palestine Liberation
Organization in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, it is now the
BDS Movement, which rests its legitimacy on the support of
hundreds of smaller representatives of Palestinian Arab civil
society.245 No other representative of the Palestinian Arabs
makes a claim to such wide popular support. This is all in the
context of the Palestinian Arab claim to statehood, based on the
assertion that the Palestinian Arab people are a unique people
with a common tradition and history.246 This assertion coincides
with the legal definition of a nation and only the BDS Movement
claims support of the whole of that nation.
Since a foreign country is, inter alia, any foreign nation, a
foreign non-governmental organization like the BDS Movement
that purports to represent the entirety of a distinct national
identity would be considered the representative of that nation.
For purposes of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law the BDS Movement,
representing the Palestinian Arab nation, could therefore be a
foreign country that imposes or fosters an illegal boycott.
The only explanation for the NLG Opinion’s conclusion that
245. Id.
246. See Manuel Hassassian, Historical Dynamics Shaping Palestinian
National Identity, 9 PALESTINE-ISRAEL J. OF POL., ECON. & CULTURE (2002).
Hassassian, the Palestinian Authority’s current diplomatic representative to
the United Kingdom, argues that there is a distinct Palestinian Arab
identity, one that became more established concurrent with the
establishment of the State of Israel. See also PAPPE, supra note 11. The
official position of the United States, is less clear. While the United States
clearly considers the Palestinian Arabs to be a unique people, the United
States neither recognizes a Palestinian Arab state nor supports the
establishment of such a state at the present time. See, e.g., Jen Psaki,
Spokesperson, Daily Press Briefing, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Oct. 3, 2014), http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/10/232550.htm (“We believe international
recognition of a Palestinian state is premature. We certainly support
Palestinian statehood, but it can only come through a negotiated outcome, a
resolution of final status issues, and mutual recognition by both parties.”).
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non-governmental organizations are not covered by the EAA AntiBoycott Law is that the National Lawyers Guild relied upon
wishful thinking, rather than the legal analysis, in reviewing the
text of the statute. In fact, though, neither the law, nor the
implementation of regulations, nor the dictionary definition of the
term “country” limits the term to an “official government.” Nor
can any of the foregoing be understood to do anything other than
specifically include non-state actors within the scope of the antiboycott law.
While under some theories of statutory
interpretation there would be no need for further review of the
EAA Anti-Boycott Law (since the foregoing discussion settles any
question as to the meaning of the statute’s text), other theories of
statutory interpretation require that we review the reasons that
the law was enacted and the intentions of those who drafted and
debated it.247
c. Understanding the Meaning of “Foreign Country” Through the
Congressional Debates on the EAA Anti-Boycott Law
Though the NLG Opinion does not discuss the legislative
history of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, it does note that the
Commerce Department, as the agency responsible for
implementation of the Regulations, refers to the prohibited
boycotts as those that are “foreign boycotts” generally, but then
dismisses this more general term without explanation. 248 Far
from being an isolated inconsistency, the term “foreign boycotts”
appears 10 times in the Regulations.249 While the use of the term
“foreign boycotts” may be inconvenient for the NLG Opinion’s
conclusions, it is, in fact, critical to the understanding of the scope
of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law.
The term “foreign boycott” reflects the Executive Branch’s
rulemaking efforts to implement the Congressional goal of
prohibiting any boycotts that originate from foreign sources, be
they a state, a government or any other foreign entity that is
247. Though outside the scope of this Article, the theory of textualism
holds that the text of the statute, without regard to any external factors,
governs the implementation of the law. The theory of original intent, on the
other hand, requires a review of the reason that a law was enacted to discern
how to apply the law, which may result in an application of the law contrary
to its plain language.
248. NLG Opinion, supra note 216, at n.1.
249. See 15 C.F.R. pt. 760 (Westlaw).

2017]

THE BDS MOVEMENT

71

furthering the goals of a boycott against a country that is friendly
to the United States. This is in line with the definition of “foreign
country” as described in the preceding section of this Article.
The legal meaning of the term “foreign country” (as including
non-governmental organizations), however, is not the only basis
for concluding that the BDS Movement’s activities are subject to
the EAA Anti-Boycott Law. Since the text of the EAA AntiBoycott Law is the ultimate authority on the scope of its
prohibitions250 and the law is broad on its face, the legislative
history of the law can provide greater insight into any conflicts
between the legal meaning of “foreign country” (as determined in
the preceding section of this Article) and the intended scope of the
law as it was enacted. While the general political climate in the
early 1970s was dealt with in the section of this Article discussing
the meaning of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law’s “fostered or imposed”
language,251 a more thorough examination of world events
occurring at the time of the EAA Anti-Boycott Debates is
necessary to understand the objectives of the law.
d. The Globalization of the Arab/Israel Conflict: The
Weaponization of Commerce as the Impetus for the EAA AntiBoycott Law
Though anti-boycott legislation had been the subject of
Congressional discussion for decades, a perfect storm of global
political events occurring in the early 1970s intensified the effort
250. In the federal system, Congress enacts legislation and an Executive
Branch agency is responsible for implementing that law through regulations
it writes to detail enforcement and other matters. A regulation written by an
Executive agency cannot change the controlling legislation enacted by
Congress, so while regulations can be drafted at the discretion of the
responsible agency, they have to comport with and are limited by the
contours of the legislation. As the Supreme Court recently stated, “[a]n
agency has no power to ‘tailor’ legislation to bureaucratic policy goals by
rewriting unambiguous statutory terms. Agencies exercise discretion only in
the interstices created by statutory silence or ambiguity; they must always
‘give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’” Util. Air
Reg. Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2445 (2014). In order to determine
whether regulations are within the scope of the law, courts often will review
the legislative history of the law. Thus, while the EAA Anti-Boycott Law has
lapsed, it and the regulations that are in effect pursuant to the executive
orders are best understood by reference to the legislative history of the EAA
Anti-Boycott Law under which they were developed.
251. Supra Part II.B.1.
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to counteract what had become an economic and humanitarian
crisis. On October 6, 1973, a coalition of Arab League members,
led by Egypt and Syria, launched a multi-front surprise attack on
Israel.252 With the goal of destroying the State of Israel, precisely
as first called for in the Arab League’s foundational documents
from the 1940s and as later codified in the “Three No’s” Arab
League policy from 1967,253 Arab League forces254 initially
achieved overwhelming battlefield successes against Israel and
were within days, if not hours, of accomplishing their goal of
destroying Israel as a state.255 Israel was perilously close to
depleting its remaining military supplies and issued repeated
requests to the United States for immediate shipments of
replacement materiel. Though it had initially resisted Israel’s
requests, the United States began a significant airlift of military
equipment to Israel that, by the time it was completed on October
14, 1973, had “played a decisive role in preventing the defeat of
Israel.”256
United States’ intervention in support of Israel was seen as a
declaration of war against the Arab League.257 The PLO called
for all Arab oil producing nations to suspend the production of oil
that would be exported to the United States, and Iraq quickly

252. Yom Kippur War, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/yomkippur-war (last visited Sept. 24, 2016).
253. See Khartoum Resolution, supra note 115.
254. In addition to Egypt and Syria, participants in the Arab League
military coalition included Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco,
Saudi Arabia and Tunisia.
255. See, e.g., ABRAHAM RABINOVICH, THE YOM KIPPUR WAR: THE EPIC
ENCOUNTER THAT CHANGED THE MIDDLE EAST 322 (2004) (describing Israeli
ambassador to the United States being ordered by Israeli Prime Minister
Golda Meir to urgently request arms shipments from the United States on
the third day of the war with the admonition “Call Kissinger now. Tomorrow
may be too late.”). Israeli General Moshe Dayan stated at approximately the
same time “this is the end of the third temple,” a reference to the destruction
of Israel, on the third day of the war. Violent Week: The Politics of Death,
TIME (Apr. 12, 1976).
256. Chris J. Krisinger, Operation Nickel Grass: Airlift in Support of
National Policy, AIRPOWER J. 11–16 (Spring 1989). See also RABINOVICH,
supra note 255, at 491 (discussing the military and psychological implications
of the United States’ airlift of arms to Israel and concluding that the arms
allowed Israel to move away from cautious tactics designed to preserve
supplies).
257. Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its Legality
Under International Law, 68 AM. J. INT’L L. 591 (1974).
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responded by nationalizing two American oil companies.258 On
October 17, 1973, just a few days after the completion of the
United States airlift of supplies to Israel, Arab oil ministers
delivered their own economic counterattack against Israel and the
United States. They declared that oil production would be
decreased by 5% per month until such time that Israel was forced
to (i) withdraw to borders existing prior to the 1967 Arab-Israeli
war and (ii) restore the “legitimate rights of the Palestinian
people”.259 Countries that had been sympathetic to Arab interests
would not have their oil deliveries cut; the United States was
specifically targeted for the most severe reductions in
deliveries.260
If these demands sound familiar, it is because they mirror the
tenor of the calls of the Arab League Boycott Declaration of 1945
and the BDS Manifesto today to use commerce as a weapon
against Israel. It is also worthy of note that the oil embargo, like
the BDS Movement’s boycott, was instituted following the call for
it by a Palestinian Arab non-state actor. The effects of the Arab
League oil embargo were dramatic and extensive. Though the
embargo was of a relatively short duration, by the time it ended in
mid-1974 oil prices in the United States had quadrupled and the
United States economy was thrust into a painful recession.261 In
the short term, the United States’ response to the oil embargo was
a series of quick-fix policy measures, primarily focused on energy
conservation mandates.262
While the oil embargo was not
permanent, it made such a strong impression on American
policymakers that a number of long term legislative responses
were initiated, including the study that led to the House Boycott
Report.263

258.
259.
260.
261.

Id. at 592.
Id. at 593.
Id.
Michael L. Ross, How the 1973 Oil Embargo Saved the Planet,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
140173/michael-l-ross/how-the-1973-oil-embargo-saved-the-planet.
262. Id. (“The U.S. government’s response was bipartisan and farreaching.
Nixon pushed emergency conservation measures through
Congress, including a nationwide 55-mile-per-hour speed limit. President
Gerald Ford signed legislation that established mandatory fuel economy
standards.”).
263. HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144, at vii (specifically referring
to the Arab League oil embargo of 1973–1974 as its impetus).
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Though the House Boycott Report provides valuable insight
into anti-boycott considerations, it was prepared for the 94th
Congress, whose term ended before the EAA Anti-Boycott Law
was enacted. As such, the Congressional debates of the 95th
Congress, which enacted the law, are more relevant. The
Congressional debates on what became the EAA Anti-Boycott Law
memorialize what Congress considered in drafting the law and
what the law was intended to accomplish. While the Arab oil
embargo was the tipping point for the law’s enactment, oil was far
from the only concern. As an initial matter, Congress was
concerned that the Arab League countries had amassed sufficient
global economic influence to be capable of moving beyond the
primary boycott of Israel. With their enhanced economic clout, the
Arab League was rapidly expanding their use of commerce as a
weapon to further their agenda against Jews and Israel, among
other things.264
Congress paid particularly close attention to the bigoted
foundation of the Arab League Boycott, noting that the boycott
was, in addition to being an economic issue, a “discriminatory
practice” that created “racial problems” in the United States.265
This concern was shared by a large number of American business
interests that testified before Congress at the EAA Anti-Boycott
Law hearings; indeed, none other than the AFL-CIO, the thenparent of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union,266
testified that:
[The boycott of Israel] attempts to impose upon the
American people practices of racial and religious bigotry
which violate American belief and law, and to make
American firms the agents of hostile acts against a

264. Many Arab League members were also within the Soviet Union’s
sphere of influence, so the prospect that Soviet allies might possess a
devastating economic weapon aimed at the United States was part of
Congress’ calculus in considering the law.
265. Extension of the Export Administration Act: Hearings and Markup
Before the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 95th Cong. 111 (1977) [hereinafter
House EAA Hearing Report] (testimony of Rep. Gilman).
266. See infra Part III.A for a discussion of the International Longshore
and Warehouse Union’s (ILWU) participation in the BDS Movement’s illegal
boycott of Israel in 2010 and 2014. Though the ILWU recently separated
from the AFL-CIO, the irony that it was part of the union that so forcefully
condemned the very same boycotts and urged Congress to enact the EAA
Anti-Boycott Law which it now violates remains.
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friendly nation. This constitutes a repugnant intrusion
into American domestic life, and an unacceptable effort to
coerce American foreign policy. The Executive Council [of
the AFL-CIO] believes that the imposition of this boycott
on Americans, American owned business, or on any
transactions occurring on American territory must end
now.267
The use of secondary and tertiary boycotts, where the Arab
League actively coerced and intimidated foreign companies and
individuals against engaging in any commercial activities with
Israel upon the penalty of being excluded from Arab markets, was
now a potent threat to the United States economy. On its own,
this would have been a disturbing global phenomenon, but
Congress had also just seen the American economy and American
public targeted and hurt by the Arab oil embargo, which was
directly rooted in the Arab League’s desire to push the Palestinian
Arab issue onto the shores of the United States. It was in this
environment that the Congressional debates occurred.
Far from being concerned solely with boycotts of Israel
initiated by foreign governments, as the NLG Opinion deceptively
purports, Congress was acting in response to the increasingly
effective efforts of non-state actors (the Arab League, among
others), acting through and in coordination with other non-state
entities and even states, to draw American companies and
consumers into the Palestinian Arab-aspect of the broader ArabIsraeli dispute.268
The intention to create a law with a broad enough reach to
combat the secondary and tertiary boycotts’ economic coercion and
intimidation of American interests is borne out through the
voluminous testimony before both the House of Representatives
and Senate. The most succinct declaration of American policy and
statement of the goals of the nascent EAA Anti-Boycott Law were
made by the Secretary of the Department of Commerce, Juanita
M. Kreps, during Senate hearings on the bill:
I welcome the opportunity to appear before this
committee to discuss what I believe is necessary
267. House EAA Hearing Report, supra note 265, at 389 (testimony of
AFL-CIO Executive Council on the Arab Boycott).
268. House EAA Hearing Report, supra note 265, at 111 (testimony of
Rep. Gilman).
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legislation to prohibit foreign boycott practices that go
beyond commercial dealings and intrude into the lives
and business decisions of U.S. citizens . . . [w]e are in full
accord that the law should prohibit U.S. persons from
generally refusing to do business with a boycotted
country friendly to the United States, or the nationals of
that country, in order to comply with a foreign boycott.
For example, U.S. persons should not be permitted to
refuse a licensing agreement or other general
arrangement to do business with a friendly nation or its
nationals on the basis of boycott considerations . . . . [W]e
are in full agreement that no U.S. persons should be
permitted generally to refuse to do business with another
U.S. person in order to comply with foreign boycott
requirements. We should not permit foreign boycotts
to cause American firms to boycott other American
firms.269
In the House of Representatives’ hearings on the EAA AntiBoycott Law, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance explained the
purpose and goal of the law in substantially identical terms:
Refusals by American firms to deal with a friendly
foreign country, demonstrably related to a foreign
boycott, should be prohibited. So, in general, should
refusals to deal with other U.S. firms. We believe that
decisions as to what commerce U.S. firms may or may not
have with other countries or with other U.S. firms should
be made consonant with American policy, by Americans
and only Americans.270
In each of the preceding quoted statements from the
Congressional hearings, the remarks were prepared in advance
and carefully worded. And in each of the statements, there was a
clear decision to use the general term “foreign boycotts” rather
than a term that would limit the targeted boycotts to those that
269. Foreign Investment and Arab Boycott Legislation: Hearing on S. 69
and S. 92 Before the S. Subcomm. on Int’l Fin. of the S. Comm. on Banking,
Hous. and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 446–47 (1977) [hereinafter Senate EAA
Hearing Report] (emphasis added to show that “foreign boycott” was used as
a term without regard to the participation of a foreign country’s government).
270. House EAA Hearing Report, supra note 265, at 5 (emphasis added).
The same comments were made by Secretary Vance to the Senate. Senate
EAA Hearing Report, supra note 269, at 426.
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originate from a foreign governmental entity. The bold text in
each passage shows the deliberate and repeated use of this
convention. For example, in Secretary Vance’s prepared remarks,
he specifically referred to the boycotted entity as a country but
used the general term “foreign boycott” to describe the subject of
the legislation. Secretary Kreps’ testimony was identical in this
regard.271
The legislative history of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law shows
that lawmakers’ only substantive areas of concern with the
proposed law were in discrete technical points relating to
enforcement.
The overall goal of the law, however, was
universally accepted and agreed upon. For example, in the
Senate, Senator Adlai Stevenson, the subcommittee chairman,
described the imposition of a foreign boycott against Israel as a
threat to national sovereignty:
The Arab boycott intrudes upon American sovereignty. It
interferes with basic human rights and religious freedom.
It impedes free competition in the marketplace and
systematically enlists American citizens against their will
in a war with Israel. It excludes other Americans from
economic opportunities.
Such behavior cannot be
272
tolerated.
Senator William Proxmire’s comments not only supported those of
Senator Stevenson, they expanded on the economic rationale for
the law:
The Arabs have not hesitated to use their clout to conduct
an economic war against Israel.
In the prevailing
circumstances in the Middle East, I do not question the
authority of the Arab nations to refuse to do business
with Israel, even though I believe that business
relationships over time might help to defuse the
situation. But I do object to the Arab nations using their

271. There were instances where the boycotts under consideration were
referred to as those from foreign countries or states, such as in Secretary
Vance’s introductory remarks. See House EAA Hearing Report, supra note
265, at 6 for an example in the context of distinguishing primary boycotts
from secondary and tertiary boycotts. The use of these specific terms,
however, was far outweighed in both House and Senate hearings by general
references to “foreign boycotts.”
272. Senate EAA Hearing Report, supra note 269, at 1.

78

ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:1

power to dictate the terms of trade to American firms.
Ours is a pluralistic society. We believe that quality and
price should be the ultimate arbiter in the marketplace
both in our domestic and foreign commerce. The Arab
boycott is fundamentally destructive of these basic
tenets . . . . We cannot sit back and let the Arabs dictate
a fragmentation of our own economic relations to serve
their own selfish and destructive purposes.273
And, in describing the nature and geographic scope of the threat
posed by the anti-Israel boycott, Senator Harrison Williams noted:
The reach and scope of the Arab boycott have been
extended far beyond the Middle East. It is no longer a
direct and primary boycott of Israel. It is now an
unfocused and transnational assault on fundamental
American freedoms and longstanding precepts of
unimpeded international commerce . . . . Against this
background, new and effective antiboycott legislation
must be enacted in order to accomplish several objectives.
First, the basic Export Administration Act must be
strengthened to make it illegal for American firms to
engage in secondary or tertiary boycotts.274
The undisputed goal of the law under debate was to prevent
foreign boycotts from being introduced into American commerce.
There was no argument or disagreement with this objective by
members of either the House or the Senate. Even the New York
Times, known as being critical of Israel, voiced editorial support
for this broad goal.275
273. Id. at 2–3.
274. Id. at 3.
275. Id. at 266–67 (exhibit consisting of the editorial from the New York
Times (Sept. 14, 1976) that took issue with the Ribicoff Amendment but
wholeheartedly endorsed the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, with the conclusion that
“Congress nevertheless should strengthen the Export Administration Act by
making it illegal for American firms to engage in secondary or tertiary
boycotts. The threat of economic reprisal by the Arabs cannot be accepted as
a basis for permitting American firms to submit to odious terms that violate
the rights and interests of other Americans, or abridge this nation’s sovereign
powers.”). It is important to note, again, that the law was referred to as a
general law that prohibited Americans from engaging the in the secondary or
tertiary boycotts of Israel. Nowhere is there any hint of a limitation that
would make the law applicable only to boycotts that are from a foreign
government.
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Furthermore, the targeted boycott activity was described by
the effect it had on the United States. The focus was on the
ideology behind the boycott, not the political status of the
boycotting entity. Whether or not the boycott originated in a
foreign government was not germane for the law’s intended reach;
rather, any foreign boycott that infringed upon the sovereignty
and free will of America, its citizens, and its businesses in order to
further the Arab war on Israel was to be subject to the law’s
provisions.
To the extent there were any areas of disagreement on the
proposed law, however, they were specific to the following areas:


The extent to which the law should apply to the
operations of foreign subsidiaries of United States
companies.



Whether the law would pre-empt state laws on the
topic of participation in foreign boycotts.



Whether there would be grace periods and
grandfather provisions after the law became
effective.



The scope of paperwork requirements for boycott
reporting.



The permissibility of providing positive,
opposed to negative, certifications of origin.276

as

Indeed, the issue of negative certifications (i.e., the requirement
that American businesses affirmatively certify that their products
did not include any Israeli components or rely upon Israeli labor
or technology) versus positive certifications (i.e., a certification
stating that the product was American) was the most frequently
debated element of the proposed law.277
What was not in dispute was the overall scope of the EAA
Anti-Boycott Law’s provisions as they related to types of boycott
activity affecting American business and individuals. Secretary of
State Vance explained that the functioning of the law in respect of
276. House EAA Hearing Report, supra note 265, at 5–6.
277. See, e.g., Senate EAA Hearing Report, supra note 269, at 223
(testimony of Maxwell Greenberg) (describing the differences between
positive certificates of origin, which were not unusual in international
commerce, and negative certifications, which were primarily intended to have
a discriminatory effect).
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types of boycotts was black and white: “The main thrust of the
principles which we have enunciated is that we should be dealing
with secondary and tertiary boycotts and not the primary
boycott.”278 This, and not whether the source of the boycott was a
government, is the only area where the substantive reach of the
law was intended to be limited.
As to what was meant by a primary versus a secondary or
tertiary boycott, one example was given by the Chairman of the
Board of E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company during the Senate
hearings:
I think everyone agrees that every nation has a right to a
primary boycott. It has a right to control what happens
within the four corners of its own territory. If you start
from that premise, you have a different set of rules in a
sense for trade with that nation than you do for trade
elsewhere. Let me just take a couple of the specific cases
to illustrate what I have in mind and to distinguish it
from the trade that would be affected in other parts of the
world . . . . Suppose that Saudi Arabia, on its own
volition, said we want to buy trucks, but we do not want
DuPont tires on trucks that come into Saudi Arabia.
Under the principles we have proposed, there would be no
legal liability for an American shipper in respecting that
request.
On the other hand, if, because of this request by the
Saudis, the American shipper changed his line of
suppliers and stopped putting DuPont tires on trucks
going elsewhere, then one would have a right to infer that
he had associated himself with the boycott and a jury
might very well conclude that there was an implicit
agreement in violation of the law.279
In this example, Saudi Arabia’s refusal to purchase trucks that
contained DuPont components was deemed to be a permitted
exercise of a primary boycott. However, if Saudi Arabia demanded
that the truck supplier cease using DuPont products on all of its
trucks, even those sold to non-boycotting countries, it would be a

278.
279.

House EAA Hearing Report, supra note 265, at 12.
Senate EAA Hearing Report, supra note 269, at 481.
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prohibited action.280
The best explanation of what would constitute a secondary or
tertiary boycott, however, was provided by Professor Irwin Cotler,
who testified before the Senate subcommittee on Canada’s
experience with anti-boycott laws:
Canadian firms, as a condition of doing business with an
Arab League government, company or national must
agree to refrain from doing business with Israel or any
Israeli company or national, otherwise known as the
secondary boycott. This, in effect, compels a Canadian
boycott of a country with whom Canada has friendly
relations and against whom Canada has not itself
authorized a boycott.
Canadian firms, as a condition of doing business with any
Arab League government, company or national, must
agree to refrain from doing business with any other
Canadian firms that do business with Israel, otherwise
known as the tertiary boycott. This compels a restrictive
trade practice with Canada and between Canadian
firms.281
Thus, under the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, any American company
or person who refuses to do business with Israeli companies or
individuals pursuant to a foreign boycott of Israel would be in
violation of the prohibition on secondary boycotts of Israel. An
American company or person who refused to do business with

280. The applicability of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law’s prohibitions in the
example given may not be as clear as the DuPont Chairman described. 50
U.S.C. § 4607 provides an exception for “complying or agreeing to comply
with requirements . . . prohibiting the import of goods or services from the
boycotted country or goods produced or services provided by any business
concern organized under the laws of the boycotted country or by nationals or
residents of the boycotted country . . . .” 50 U.S.C.A. § 4607 (Westlaw
through Pub. L. No. 114–244). Only if DuPont was an Israeli corporation or
was using Israeli labor would the shipper be allowed to comply with the
Saudi demand as it related to the shipment of trucks to Saudi Arabia. Thus,
if DuPont had a factory in Israel making truck tires, Saudi Arabia could
lawfully require the shipper to not use DuPont tires on the trucks it was
selling to Saudi Arabia. In all other cases, the shipper could not lawfully
comply with the Saudi demand. In no event would the shipper be permitted
to comply with the Saudi demand that it not use DuPont tires for any of the
other trucks it sold (i.e., even those sold to non-boycotting customers).
281. Senate EAA Hearing Report, supra note 269, at 518–19.
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another American that did business with Israel would be in
violation of the prohibition on tertiary boycotts of Israel.
Importantly, the EAA Anti-Boycott Law does not limit its
prohibitions to defined types of boycott participation, such as
providing negative certifications of origin. The law generally
prohibits any refusal to do business that is based on compliance
with a foreign boycott. If, for instance, a Syrian company
demanded that United States dockworkers refuse to unload cargo
from a ship that was believed to be owned by Israelis, the
dockworkers would be in violation of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law if
they complied with the demand. Certainly, providing a negative
certificate of origin would violate the Regulations, but the actual
scope of the law is far more encompassing than the specific
prohibitions contained in the Regulations.
While the EAA Anti-Boycott Law applies to any foreign
boycott of a friendly country, Congress was responding to the Arab
League Boycott when it debated and passed the EAA Anti-Boycott
Law. The Arab League Boycott is a boycott by a non-state actor
(the Arab League). The clear legislative intent of the law was to
prevent American businesses and individuals from being used as
commercial weapons against Israel (or any other friendly foreign
country) by foreign boycotters. Not only was there no intent to
limit the application of the law to boycotts fostered or imposed
only by foreign governments, there was an overriding intent to
apply the prohibition against any and all attempts by any foreign
source, in particular, non-governmental organizations, to impose
secondary or tertiary boycotts of Israel on Americans.
4. Conclusion: Any Non-State Actor Can be a Foreign Country
Under the EAA Anti-Boycott Law
Returning to the Chevron test and the principles of statutory
construction that apply to understanding the EAA Anti-Boycott
Law,282 the text of the law and its legislative history more than
fairly imply that foreign non-governmental organizations and nonstate actors were intended to be included within the term “foreign
country.” Furthermore, legislation that was enacted several
months prior to the enactment of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law (and
debated contemporaneously in the same Congress that produced
282. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842–43 (1984).
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the House Boycott Report) showed that when Congress wanted to
limit the application of a law to a foreign government and its
subdivisions, it did so with elegant precision.
In the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,283 signed into law
in October 1976, Congress not only used the term “foreign state”
to designate those entities that would be immune from suit in
United States courts, it provided a comprehensive definition for
that term:
A “foreign state[,]” except as used in section 1608 of this
title, includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or
an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined
in subsection (b).
(b) An “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state”
means any entity–
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or
otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political
subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other
ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political
subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United
States as defined in section 1332 (c) and (e) of this title,
nor created under the laws of any third country.284
This is the definition that the NLG Opinion seeks to
incorporate into the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, yet no such limiting
definition was ever considered in Congressional debates on the
EAA Anti-Boycott Law nor was one included in the final text of
the law or the Regulations promulgated thereunder.
Had
Congress intended for the EAA Anti-Boycott Law to be limited to
only foreign governments, it would have used the same language
that it used in the contemporaneously enacted Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act. It chose to not use that definition, which, taken
together with the legislative history showing that the focus of the
law was to be all foreign boycotts, not just those by a foreign
government, must be understood as a rejection of any such
283. Pub. L. No. 94–583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §§
1602–1611 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244)).
284. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1603(a), (b) (Westlaw).
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limitation on the term “foreign country.”
C. Are the BDS Movement’s Boycott Activities Subject to the EAA
Anti-Boycott Law?
For the BDS Movement’s activities to be subject to the EAA
Anti-Boycott Law, we would have to show that the boycotts
promoted by the BDS Movement are imposed or fostered by a
foreign country against a country that is friendly to the United
States and not otherwise subject to a permitted boycott. The only
argument that has been made to exempt the BDS Movement from
the provisions of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law is that the BDS
Movement is a non-governmental organization and the law only
applies to governments. As this Article has documented, however,
in order to support the interpretation favored by the NLG
Opinion, one would have to textually revise the law, replacing
“foreign country” with “foreign government,” and then rewrite the
historical records of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law and the Arab
League Boycott.
1. The BDS Movement as a Foreign Country: Is It Part of the Arab
League Boycott or Does It Represent a Standalone Boycott?
While the BDS Movement represents a foreign country for
purposes of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, there is an open question
as to the nature of its boycott activities. To wit, is the BDS
Movement’s boycott of Israel a continuation of the Arab League
Boycott or is it an entirely new and different boycott? Though the
BDS Movement is not a member of the Arab League, it is precisely
the type of non-state organization that was described and called
for in the Arab League Boycott Declaration of 1945. By this
standard, the BDS Movement “fosters” the Arab League Boycott.
It would be nonsensical for the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, which was
enacted in response to a boycott initiated by a non-state actor (the
Arab League),285 to not apply to a non-state actor that is both an
entity called for by the original Arab League Boycott Declaration
of 1945 and also a distillation of the most politically radical and
commercially disruptive elements of the Arab League (the BDS
Movement).
285. See Hall, supra note 121, for a discussion on the status of the Arab
League as a non-state entity.
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Furthermore, in its own manifesto, the BDS Movement
acknowledges that it exists to be the non-violent arm of the
Palestinian Arab “resistance” movement whose goal is to
eliminate Israel as a Jewish state. The BDS Movement, like the
radical participants at Durban I, utterly rejects a two-state
solution and hews to the original Arab League goal of Arab
hegemony in Palestine. This is at a time when even many
members of the Arab League have accepted, at least nominally, a
two-state solution.
In many ways, the BDS Movement represents the reradicalization of the Arab League. Where some of the Arab
League states have found that the hard line anti-Zionist rhetoric
of the past will not be tolerated by modern western nations, the
BDS Movement is a veritable throwback to the origins of the Arab
League and its unyielding resistance to any self-determination for
Jews in their historic lands.
All one has to do is compare the BDS Movement’s activities
and manifesto to the founding declaration of the Arab League
Boycott to see that the BDS Movement is nothing more than the
latest iteration of this proclamation from 1945: “the boycott (of
Zionist goods) should not be confined to governmental action only,
but should also be (undertaken) through the people. Thus,
necessary propaganda should be conducted in order to convince
the Arab peoples of the necessity of boycotting Zionist goods.”286
Therefore, even if the BDS Movement itself is not seen as a
“foreign country” under the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, because it can
be seen as the non-governmental apparatus that has been part of
the Arab League Boycott since its inception in 1945, its activities
constitute an alter ego of the member states of the Arab League
Boycott. In other words, the BDS Movement is simply an organ
interposed by foreign governments in an attempt to evade the
reach of anti-boycott laws and it is the entity that “fosters” the
Arab League Boycott today.
Alternatively, though it would be difficult for a reasonable
person to do, if the connections between the BDS Movement and
the Arab League’s call for a non-governmental boycott apparatus
are ignored, the BDS Movement, as a “grass roots” boycott of
286. Nancy Turck, The Middle East: The Arab Boycott of Israel, 55
FOREIGN AFF. (Apr. 1977); Pact of the League of Arab States [LAS], Boycott of
Zionist Products and Goods, Res. 70, at 18–19 (June 12, 1946).
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Israel by “Palestinian civil society” still runs afoul of the letter and
intent of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law. The law simply does not
contain an exception for non-governmental organizations and by
the law’s unambiguous text its prohibitions are not limited to the
Arab League Boycott. Furthermore, any attempt to exclude nongovernmental organizations from the operation of the EAA AntiBoycott Law would violate the Presumption against
Ineffectiveness, as states could simply run their boycott operations
through non-governmental “astroturf”287 campaigns.
2. Policy Reasons to Apply the EAA Anti-Boycott Law to the BDS
Movement
Ultimately, though, the BDS Movement should be seen as a
hybrid of the Arab League Boycott and a separate and unique
Palestinian Arab boycott with roots in current Islamist radicalism.
This distinction is especially important in viewing the illegality of
the BDS Movement’s boycott through the prism of the factors that
gave rise to the EAA Anti-Boycott Law and the law’s policy
objectives. On the one hand, Congress was concerned with the
boycott’s economic impact of foreign interference in domestic
American affairs. On the other hand, Congress was also concerned
with the racist motivations and effects of the Arab League Boycott
and sought to prevent Americans from being used to further a
racist war against Jews and Israel. The House Boycott Report
explicitly referenced the racist nature of Arab boycotts of Israel as
an impetus for the EAA Anti-Boycott Law.
Despite emphatic Arab statements that the boycott is not
directed against Jews, in practice the boycott is directed against
supporters of Israel, including those living in the United States,
many of whom are also members of the Jewish faith. The belief
that the boycott is based on religious discrimination tends to
generate a profound American reaction because it strikes closely
at U.S. ideals.288
The BDS Movement, and the groups with which it aligns its
goals, makes similar claims as to their non-racist nature. No
287. An “astroturf” campaign is one that is purported to be a grassroots
campaign but, just as astroturf is an artificial substitute for grass, is in fact
one that has been created by an éminence grise. See, e.g., Thomas P. Lyon &
John W. Maxwell, Astroturf: Interest Group Lobbying and Corporate Strategy,
13 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 561 (Dec. 2004).
288. HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144, at 2.
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amount of double talk and obfuscation, however, can hide the fact
that the BDS Movement rejects the two-state solution, calls for
the elimination of Israel as a Jewish state and has deep and
disturbing ties to radical Islamist groups. At the NGO Durban
Conference, which is widely understood to be the birthplace of the
BDS Movement and which spawned the framework for the BDS
Manifesto, the conference declaration could easily be mistaken for
an al-Qaeda or Hamas screed:
We declare Israel as a racist, apartheid state in which
Israels [sic] brand of apartheid as a crime against
humanity has been characterized by separation and
segregation, dispossession, restricted land access,
denationalization, ¨bantustanization¨ and inhumane
acts . . . .
[The NGO Durban Conference calls for] the reinstitution
of UN resolution 3379 determining the practices of
Zionism as racist practices which propagate the racial
domination of one group over another through the
implementation of all measures designed to drive out
other indigenous groups, including through colonial
expansionism in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (in
the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, including Jerusalem), and
through the application of discriminatory laws of return
and citizenship, to obliterate their national identity and
to maintain the exclusive nature of the State of Israel as
a Jewish state to the exclusion of all other groups. Also
call for the repeal of all discriminatory laws within the
state of Israel, including those of return and citizenship,
which are part of the institutionalized racism and
Apartheid regime in Israel.289
The most blatant connection to radical Islam is the BDS
Movement’s ideological coordination and affiliation with Hamas.
Prior to the introduction of the BDS Movement as a standalone
propaganda arm, Hamas rejected the Oslo Accords’ two-state
solution and declared its goal of eliminating Israel as a Jewish
state.290 This is the exact position that the BDS Movement has
289. Durban NGO Declaration, supra note 63, ¶¶ 162, 419.
290. JIM ZANOTTI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41514, HAMAS: BACKGROUND
AND ISSUES FOR CONG. (2010).
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taken vis à vis any potential two-state solution. The ties between
Hamas and the BDS Movement run much deeper than ideology, of
course. As one recent news report found:
Much BDS and pro-Palestinian NGO activity in Europe
and the United States is connected to radical Islamic
groups and Palestinian terror organizations such as
Hamas.
Hamas and its parent Muslim Brotherhood organization
fuel and direct international BDS and anti-Israel political
activities on hundreds of university campuses across the
United States via the Muslim Students Association.
Many of the MSA’s 600 chapters in North America have
been branded “extensions of the Muslim Brotherhood,” as
the MB itself stated in its operational plan, captured in
the FBI’s raid on the Holy Land foundation—a Hamas
charity, in 2001.
. . . Scores of other Pro-Palestinian BDS groups that are
active in Israel Apartheid Week, such as American
Muslims for Palestine and Students for Justice in
Palestine, have funneled hundreds of thousands of dollars
in donations to Hamas. The Investigative Project revealed
material support the American Muslims for Palestine
provided to Hamas.
Hamas’s Gaza leadership has also endorsed international
BDS activities against Israel. According to the Middle
East Monitor, Hamas issued a statement on February 14,
2014, saying, “We in Hamas appreciate and welcome
these economic boycotts against the Zionist occupation
and we consider it a step in the right direction toward
pressuring the occupation to stop its settlement activities
and its Judaization of the Palestinian land.”
. . . Hamas’ role in BDS activities in London may be even
less ambiguous.
Non-government organizations such as the British
Muslim Initiative, the Palestine Solidarity Campaign (an
umbrella group for pro-Palestinian groups and Stop the
War Coalition, and action Palestine have twinned British
and Gaza universities and stage university “occupations”
of university offices until their BDS demands are met.
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Mohammed Sawalha, Hamas’ fugitive commander in
Judea Samaria/West Bank, who fled in the early 1990s
and became a British national, founded the British
Muslim Initiative and is deeply involved leading the
Palestine Solidarity Campaign.
Another leader of the London BDS Movement, and a
Hamas insider in London, is Azzam Tamimi, a professor
of political thought and a leader of the Palestine
Solidarity Campaign.
. . . The international Israel Apartheid Week and its
accompanying BDS campaign is far from being a peaceful
grass roots movement to bring “justice, equality and
peace to Palestine.” Rather, it is largely a Muslim
Brotherhood—and Hamas—fueled network that supports
the same radical Islamic agenda of destroying Israel.
NGOs involved in Israeli Apartheid Week and BDS
should be placed under the legal and media spotlights for
direct and indirect ties to and support for hybrid Islamic
terror groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah that use BDS
as a soft terror strategy to complement their “hard” terror
campaigns.291
The BDS Movement has been linked to other global Islamist
terror organizations as well.
For example, in 2010 the
Humanitarian Relief Foundation (HRF), an Islamist group aligned
with Hamas violently engaged Israeli military forces off of the
coast of Gaza.292 Immediately after the HRF incident, the BDS
Movement issued an international call for, among other things,
dockworkers in the United States to refuse to offload Israeli

291. Dan Diker, The World from Here: Hamas and BDS, JERUSALEM POST
(Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/The-world-fromhere-Hamas-and-BDS-344303. See also Israel Imperiled: Threats to the
Jewish State, Joint Hearing Before H. Foreign Affairs Comm., H. Subcomm.
on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, and H. Subcomm. on the Middle
East and North Africa, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement of Jonathan Schanzer,
Vice President, Research Foundation for Defense of Democracies).
292. Editorial, Turkey’s Erdogan bears responsibility in flotilla fiasco,
WASH. POST (June 5, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content
/article/2010/06/04/AR2010060404806.html?utm_term=.73f8428201ab (“[The
Humanitarian Relief Foundation] is a member of the ‘Union of Good,’ a
coalition that was formed to provide material support to Hamas and that was
named as a terrorist entity by the United States in 2008.”).
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cargo,293 and BDS Movement supporters around the world
organized protests against Israel in support of the HRF. Not only
is the HRF a Hamas affiliate, one of its prominent members and a
participant in the 2010 incident reportedly joined forces with the
Islamic State terror organization and was killed in combat by
American forces.294
The HRF has also been linked to al-Qaeda.295 It should also
be noted that Hamas, like Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, and the Islamic
State, has been designated a foreign terror organization by the
United States.296 One need only examine al-Qaeda’s historical
statements regarding Israel and the Palestinian Arab issue to see
that al-Qaeda, Hamas and the BDS Movement are ideological
triplets on the subject. The following are selected statements from
al-Qaeda leaders regarding Israel and Palestine:
Osama bin Laden, [Former] Al-Qaeda Leader
“We will continue, God permitting, the fight against the
Israelis and their allies . . . and will not give up a single
inch of Palestine as long as there is one true Muslim on
earth.” – May 2008
“The Palestinian cause is the major issue. . . . It was an
important element in fueling me from the beginning and
the 19 others with a great motive to fight for those
subjected to injustice and the oppressed.” – May 2008
293. Statement of BDS National Committee, BDS MOVEMENT (June 1,
2010), http://www.bdsmovement.net/2010/in-response-to-israels-assault-onthe-freedom-flotilla-bnc-calls-for-action-710.
294. Itamar Eichner, From Marmara to ISIS atrocities; Prominent IHH
member killed by US airstrikes after attacking IDF troops on Marmara and
joining ranks of ISIS, YNET.COM (Sept. 28, 2014, 9:54 AM), http://www.
ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4575328,00.html (“Ya’akov Bolinet Alniak, a
well-known figure within the [HRF] . . . joined the ranks of ISIS recently and
was directly involved in combat in Syria. One of his last Facebook posts
before being killed in US strikes on an ISIS camp in Syria read, ‘My life and
death are for Allah.’”).
295. Susan Fraser, Turkish police detain al Qaeda suspects, USA TODAY
(Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/01/14/turk
ey-qaeda-erdogan-assad/4471453/ (“Turkish anti-terrorism police carried out
raids in six cities on Tuesday, detaining at least five people with alleged links
to al-Qaida . . . . The [HRF], said that police searched its office in Kilis, near
the border with Syria on Tuesday, and detained one of its employees . . . .
Another [HRF] employee was detained in Kayseri after a police raid at his
home, said Saban Dozduyar, a spokesman for the group’s local branch.”).
296. Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.
state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.
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“In closing I would like to say that Palestine will not
return to us through negotiations of the surrendered
rulers and their conferences, nor by protests of the sitting
scholars and their elections, as these are two faces to the
same problem. Palestine will return to us by the
permission of Allah if we wake from our ignorance and
holdfast to our religion and sacrifice for it our money and
lives.” – March 2008
“We will not recognize a state for the Jews, not even one
inch of the land of Palestine. . . . Our jihad is to liberate
Palestine—the whole of Palestine, from the river to the
sea if Allah wills it. . . . Blood for blood, destruction for
destruction.” – December 2007
Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda’s [Leader]
“Muslims everywhere, fight against the Zionist-Christian
campaign, and strike its interests wherever you
encounter them.” – January 2009
“As for the Mujahideen of HAMAS and the rest of the
Mujahideen in Palestine, I supported them and continue
to support them, and I call on the Ummah to aid them,
especially the tribes of the Sinai.” – April 2008
“ . . . we endorse every operation against Jewish
interests.” – April 2008
Adam Gadahn, American Al-Qaeda Spokesman
“End all support, moral, military, economic, political, or
otherwise, to the bastard state of Israel, and ban your
citizens, Zionist Jews, Zionist Christians, and the rest
from traveling to occupied Palestine or settling there.
Even one penny of aid will be considered sufficient
justification to continue the fight.” – May 2007 297
These quotes demonstrate that, like the BDS Movement, al-Qaeda
has a history of rejecting Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state,
aligning itself ideologically with Hamas and calling for attacks on
Israel’s economic interests. So, while in certain tangible ways the
BDS Movement is an arm of the Arab League Boycott, in
297. Al-Qaeda’s Jihad Against Israel and Jews: Al-Qaeda in its Own
Words, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (Feb. 5, 2009), http://archive.adl.org/main
_terrorism/al-qaeda_jews_israel2cb9.html#.VDMFvvldXng (emphasis added).
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ideological ways it is more closely affiliated with the likes of
Hamas, al-Qaeda, or the Islamic State.
The BDS Movement’s rejection of the two-state solution and
its call for the elimination of Israel as a Jewish state is
Islamic/Arabic supremacy on blood-soaked steroids. As such, the
war that Congress did not want Americans to be dragged into
through any foreign boycott of Israel is now a genocidal campaign
that directly threatens not only Israel, a friendly nation, but also
the United States. The long line of Islamist attacks on American
interests, most notably the September 11, 2001 al-Qaeda terror
attacks that claimed nearly 3,000 American lives,298 are of the
same origin as the BDS Movement’s radical ideology.
Coerced American participation in the BDS Movement’s
actions against Israel, which occurs when, for example, BDS
Movement activists picket at United States ports and cause dock
workers to refuse to unload cargo from Israeli-affiliated ships,299
must be seen as a form of material support for both the BDS
Movement and BDS Movement affiliates like Hamas and other
Islamist groups as well.
Coordination between the BDS Movement and American
dockworkers has serious implications on American commerce and
national security. For example, one local of the dockworkers
union in California has been very active in supporting BDS
Movement activities against commerce tied to Israel.300 In 2014,
the dockworkers union operating in the Port of Oakland,
California, ILWU Local 10, heeded the BDS Movement’s call to
interfere with the docking and offloading of cargo from a ship with

298. Brad Plumer, Nine facts about terrorism in the United States since
9/11, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/wonk/wp/2013/09/11/nine-facts-about-terrorism-in-the-united-statessince-911/.
299. See supra note 293 regarding the 2010 BDS activities at American
ports to prevent ships believed to be affiliated with Israel from unloading
cargo; subsequent BDS activities of the same nature have occurred in 2014.
See also Charlotte Silver, Protestors block and delay Israeli ships up and
down
US
West
Coast,
ELEC.
INTIFADA
(Aug.
28,
2014),
http://electronicintifada.net/blogs/charlotte-silver/protestors-block-and-delayisraeli-ships-and-down-us-west-coast. It should be noted that boycotts by
labor unions, such as those at the Port of Oakland, also violate the
prohibition on secondary boycotts under § 8(b)(4) of the National Labor
Relations Act. See, e.g., Allied Int’l, Inc. v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 456
U.S. 212 (1982).
300. See Silver, supra note 299.
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alleged ties to Israel.301 Union officials claimed that they were
not participating in the BDS Movement’s activities but were,
instead, refusing to put workers in the middle of a potentially
violent conflict between BDS protesters and police.302
The truth, however, comes directly from influential ILWU
organizers and members. These individuals not only openly
support the BDS Movement’s activities against Israel,303 they
openly acknowledge that the union coordinated with the BDS
Movement to ensure that the Israeli cargo ship would not be
unloaded.304 The 2014 Port of Oakland BDS Movement action
was described in detail by one of the union-affiliated participants:
International calls for workers protest actions were made
by the Palestinian General Federation of Trade Unions
(PGFTU), the International
Transport Workers
Federation and the International Dock workers Council
(IDC), as well as an urgent call for action by the
Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS)
National Committee. Messages of support for labor action
were sent to the International Longshore and Warehouse
Union (ILWU) Local 10 . . . .
....
. . . [T]he anti-Zim protest on the morning of September
27 [didn’t] require a picket line at the [stevedores
association] terminal gate because longshore gangs didn’t
show up to work the Zim Shanghai. An announcement
was made at the hiring hall about the picketing. Only one
union member took a dispatch slip to work Zim. This was
longshore workers solidarity in action . . . .
. . . A deal was sealed between the union and [the
stevedores association]. All the jobs were filled on the
evening dispatch and the police were removed by [the
stevedores association] from the vicinity of the terminal.
Longshoremen informed the pickets about the
union/[stevedores association] deal, assuring them that
Local 10 would honor the line. With no police to violate
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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free speech rights, picketers blocked the main gate with
cars and pickets. Longshoremen saw the picket line,
drove to another terminal and stood by with their union
official. With no longshore workers the Zim Shanghai
couldn’t be worked. Not one container was moved after
two full shifts. Zim sent her down to LA. Irate Zionists
were calling for the arrest of the protesters but to no
avail . . . .305
Such close coordination between foreign organizations tied to
terrorism and American unions that are, in effect, monopolistic
gatekeepers for international commerce clearly implicates the
provisions of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law.
The unfortunate reality is that while Arab and Islamist hate
groups have changed their names, areas of operation and public
personas over the decades, they have steadily expanded their
focus from solely Israel to the western world as a whole. The
Islamic Front became al-Qaeda, which became the Al-Nusra
Front, but the ideology remained the same and their targets
remained the same. Islamic Front affiliates bombed the World
Trade Center in New York in the early 1990s and their successors
in al-Qaeda finished the job less than 10 years later.306 Similarly,
the Arab League’s economic boycott became the BDS Movement,
and tomorrow the BDS Movement may change its name and
façade in an attempt to claim that it is yet another “grassroots”
Palestinian Arab movement, but the core ideology will remain the
same.
Enforcing the EAA Anti-Boycott Law against the boycott
activities of the BDS Movement would not be without precedent.
Federal laws and regulations aimed at combating the extremist
anti-peace agenda originating from radical Arab/Islamist groups
such as Hamas, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda (and now, the BDS
Movement) by depriving those groups of support from Americans
or American businesses have been enacted and upheld by federal
305. Jack Heyman, How Protests Against Israeli Bombing of Gaza
Stopped Zim Ships, COUNTERPUNCH (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.counter
punch.org/2014/11/12/how-protests-against-israeli-bombing-of-gaza-stoppedzim-ships/.
306. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, at 60, 285
(2004).
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courts.
For example, in the wake of the Oslo Accords and subsequent
efforts by Hamas and other Palestinian Arab groups opposed to
peace and a two-state solution to undermine the peace process,
President Bill Clinton signed Executive Order 12947 on January
25, 1995.307 This executive order deemed a number of radical
Palestinian Arab groups to be threats to the Middle East peace
process and the interests of the United States and prohibited
financial transactions with any of those groups and individuals
deemed to be threats (the list was subsequently expanded through
Executive Order 13099 on August 20, 1998 to include, among
others, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda).308
After the September 11th Islamist terror attacks, President
George W. Bush signed Executive Order 13224 on September 23,
2001.309 This executive order expanded the general strategy for
disrupting the operations of Islamist groups by prohibiting
Americans from providing material support to them.310
Palestinian Arab affiliated groups opposed to a two-state solution
constitute an overwhelming majority of the named entities subject
to the prohibitions. These executive orders were signed pursuant
to the authority of the President granted under the IEEPA, the
same authority under which the EAA Anti-Boycott Law has been
extended.
In litigation that followed the implementation of Executive
Order 13224, the United States Supreme Court upheld a federal
law311 that prohibits Americans from providing material support
to, inter alia, Islamic terror organizations and in so doing found
that prohibitions on providing support to terror groups did not
violate the First or Fifth Amendment rights of those who sought to
provide such support.312 In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
the Supreme Court found that a prohibition on providing support
that was in the nature of humanitarian or advocacy activities to a
terror organization was a valid exercise of the government’s power

307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
244).
312.

Exec. Order No. 12947, 60 Fed. Reg. 16, 5079 (Jan. 23, 1995).
Exec. Order No. 13099, 63 Fed. Reg. 164, 45167 (Aug. 20, 1998).
Exec. Order No. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 186, 49079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
See id.
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–
See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 2 (2010).
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to protect the country from terrorism.313 In particular, the Court
found that the prohibition on speech and/or conduct in support of
even demonstrably non-terrorist activities of a terror group was
permissible under the First Amendment due to the fact that
humanitarian or advocacy actions in support of a terror group
work to legitimize and further the terror activities of the group.314
In fact, the Humanitarian Law Project Court used facially
benign support for Hamas’s charitable work as an example of how
any support for a terror group promotes its terror activities and
differentiated that prohibited type of support from individuals
engaging in “independent advocacy or expression of any kind,”
which is outside of the scope of the prohibition.315 Those who
engage in truly independent advocacy are free to “say anything
they wish on any topic. They may speak and write freely about
the [terror groups], the governments of [the terror groups’
targets], human rights, and international law. They may advocate
before the United Nations.”316
Similarly, even under the EAA Anti-Boycott Law Americans
can protest against Israel or engage in independent advocacy
before international organizations in support of Palestinian Arabs.
What the EAA Anti-Boycott Law prohibits is the type of
coordination with foreign groups in support of an illegal boycott of
a United States ally that occurs in BDS Movement boycott
activities, turning American citizens and businesses into pawns in
a foreign dispute. Whether one sees the BDS Movement as a
continuation of the Arab League Boycott or an altogether new
anti-Israel boycott organization that is aligned with radical hate
groups, the EAA Anti-Boycott Law is applicable to such boycott
activities.
While Congress was concerned about Arab world
discrimination against American Jews when it enacted the EAA
Anti-Boycott Law in the 1970s, the scope of discrimination and the
existential threats to the United States and its interests posed by
radical Islamist groups has metastasized. As a result, the United
States has been engaged in global military action to confront the
radical Islamist threat, which is now in its second decade. The
313. See id. at 5; see also infra Part III.B (discussing the material support
statute as a RICO predicate offense).
314. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 25.
315. Id. at 26.
316. Id. at 25–26.
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BDS Movement’s historical basis in the Arab League Boycott and
its current ideological alignment with radical Islamist groups pose
precisely the threat to vital United States’ interests that were the
impetus for the enactment of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law. As a
matter of policy, enforcement of the law against the BDS
Movement’s activities is within the letter and the spirit of the
EAA Anti-Boycott Law.317
III. BEYOND THE EAA ANTI-BOYCOTT LAW:
THE BDS MOVEMENT, ANTI-TRUST LAWS, AND RICO

Though the EAA Anti-Boycott Law provides a comprehensive
tool for the government to use against disruptive foreign boycotts,
it is not the only federal law implicated by the BDS Movement’s
activities. Additional federal laws that were believed to be
applicable to foreign boycotts were discussed in the 1976 House
Boycott Report (the analytical foundation for the EAA AntiBoycott Law) and the potential uses of these laws were discussed
in detail by a Department of Justice attorney who would later
become a Supreme Court Justice (House Legal Analysis).318
Antonin Scalia, the late Supreme Court Justice who worked
as an assistant attorney general at the Department of Justice at
the time of the report, concluded that the Arab League Boycott
violated anti-trust laws and anti-discrimination provisions of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Executive Order 11246.319
317. This is not to say that Americans cannot be critical of or protest
against Israel, including by way of a primary boycott of Israeli goods.
However, there is a long and established history in the United States of
prohibiting support for organizations and ideology that are declared to be
contrary to United States’ interests. Just as a person in the United States
can independently march in the street to protest American treatment of
Muslims overseas, that conduct becomes unlawful under anti-terrorism laws
if it is coordinated to provide material support for al-Qaeda’s activities. The
goal of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law was to prevent the American public and
businesses from being drawn into, and used as weapons in, a war by radical
elements against a friendly country. Nothing in this Article prevents
Americans from protesting against Israel or engaging in individual primary
boycotts of Israeli goods.
318. HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144, at 47–55.
319. Id. at 48. Executive Order 11246 prohibits federal contractors,
subcontractors and federally-assisted construction contractors that generally
have contracts that exceed $10,000 from discriminating in employment
decisions on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. It also
requires covered contractors to take affirmative action to ensure that equal
opportunity is provided in all aspects of their employment. See Exec. Order
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In addition, there was a discussion of whether federal securities
laws were violated by publicly traded companies that participated
in the Arab League Boycott, though no definitive answer was
reached on that question.320 Though providing an analysis of the
potential anti-trust claims that is as exhaustive as was provided
for the EAA Anti-Boycott Law is outside the scope of this Article,
any discussion of the BDS Movement’s activities and applicable
federal laws would be incomplete without a general description of
the framework for potential violations of such laws.
A. Anti-Trust Laws and the BDS Movement
The primary focus of the House Legal Analysis was the
applicability of federal anti-trust laws (in particular, the Sherman
Act,321 a federal anti-trust statute applicable to boycotts and other
anti-competitive activities) to anti-Israel boycotts that affected
United States businesses. Justice Scalia noted that the tertiary
boycott of Israel was the most likely candidate to be the basis for
anti-trust prosecution by the government and explained the
general principal that:
If two or more U.S. firms were to combine for the purpose
either of not dealing with some other firm(s), or of
preventing some neutral third-party firms from dealing
with the object of the U.S. boycotter’s activities, the
combination could be termed a true “boycott” in the sense
that that term has traditionally been employed in
antitrust law.322
Justice Scalia’s analysis continued to compare “horizontal
boycotts (those involving the combination of firms at the same
level of production, and generally in competition, with each other
No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. pts. 60–1, 60–2, 60–4, 60–50 (2014).
320. See HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144, at 49.
321. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1–7 (Westlaw through Pub. L.
No. 114–244). See Kenneth Glazer, Concerted Refusals to Deal Under Section
1 of the Sherman Act, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2002) for an overview of Sherman
Act principles, especially as they relate to group boycotts.
322. HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144, at 50. Justice Scalia’s
analysis acknowledged that a “concerted refusal to deal” was distinct from a
boycott in some ways, but for purposes of anti-trust law it was equivalent to a
boycott, other than to the extent that with a case predicated upon an
allegation of a concerted refusal to deal, the government would have to
distinguish between unilateral action, which is permissible, and
conspiratorial action, which is not permissible. Id.
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but for the combination),” which, according to Justice Scalia, “are
generally considered to be so pernicious that they constitute per se
antitrust offenses”323 (that is, once it is established that there is a
horizontal boycott in effect, no further inquiry is necessary) with
“vertical boycotts (those involving restraints imposed by a firm at
one level in the marketing chain upon the dealings of one or more
firms at a lower level in the chain),” which require a review of “the
context of the entire transaction.”324 In other words, if there is
not a basis for finding a per se violation of the anti-trust laws, a
court would have to employ a test to determine whether the
subject boycott “poses such a pernicious effect on competition”325
that it constitutes a violation of the law (also known as the “rule of
reason”).326
Notwithstanding the differences in proof required for
establishing a Sherman Act case dealing with horizontal as
compared to vertical boycotts, Justice Scalia’s analysis pointed to
the objectives of the Sherman Act as the reason for the law’s
applicability to the boycott of Israel. The Sherman Act was
enacted to “vindicate public interest in a free market,”327 and case
law has created a presumption that “any concerted refusal to deal
is per se unlawful.”328 The House Legal Analysis also noted that a
“concerted refusal to deal” (that is, a collaboration between firms
to refuse to deal with a targeted entity) is “virtually
indistinguishable from a boycott” and further noted that many
instances of compliance with the Arab League Boycott in the
United States were of the “concerted refusal to deal” variety. 329
What the government was most concerned with was a
scenario where, due to pressure from the Arab League, one United
States entity would refuse to deal with another entity that was
being targeted by the Arab League for having relations with
Israel. Such a refusal to deal would not only have damaging
effects on United States commerce and competition, it would, in

323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 51.
326. For a summary of the “rule of reason” in anti-trust law, see Michael
Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16
GEO. MASON L. REV. 827 (2009).
327. See HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144, at 51.
328. Id. at 52.
329. Id. at 50 (alteration in original).
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essence, be a private usurpation of the federal government’s
exclusive authority to regulate commerce. In the House Legal
Analysis, Justice Scalia cited to Fashion Originators Guild of
America v. F.T.C (Fashion Guild)330 in support of his argument
that such boycotts are prima facie illegal and must be justified by
those engaging in them to survive court scrutiny.331 That case,
involved a trade guild’s imposition of a boycott to prevent nonguild sales from occurring, included important dicta.332 The Court
concluded that the boycott was a violation of the Sherman Act
because the boycott had potential for infringing upon commerce as
well as competition. The Court, though, also noted that by
interfering with commerce, the guild “[was an] extragovernmental agency, which prescribes rules for the regulation
and restraint of interstate commerce, and provides extra-judicial
tribunals for determination and punishment of violations, and
thus ‘trenches upon the power of the national legislature and
violates the statute.’”333 In the same way, the BDS Movement’s
activities put the regulation of commerce into private, indeed
hostile, foreign hands.
In fact, at the time of the House Boycott Report, the United
States Department of Justice was in the early stages of
prosecuting the Bechtel Corporation for Sherman Act violations.
The Department of Justice alleged that Bechtel had conspired
with a number of other unnamed entities or individuals as part of
the Arab League Boycott. The acts that were the principle focus of
the claim were Bechtel’s agreement to not do business with any
entity that was on the Arab League Boycott’s blacklist. The case
against Bechtel was settled pursuant to a consent decree that
“established the general principle that compliance with the
tertiary boycott constituted a violation of US antitrust
laws . . . .”334
Though the case against Bechtel was not fully litigated, what
is interesting about the prosecution is that the Department of
Justice apparently found that the conspirators consisted of
Bechtel, on the one hand, and Arab companies or individuals who

330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

312 U.S. 457, 475 (1941).
HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144, at 50.
Fashion Originators Guild, 312 U.S. at 465.
Id.
FEILER, supra note 15, at 164.
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were not subject to the Court’s jurisdiction, on the other hand.335
Analogizing to other antitrust prosecutions where parties that are
exempt from prosecution under the applicable provisions of
antitrust laws (such as unions) could be combined with nonexempt parties in order to find that there is the requisite
combination of parties or a conspiracy among parties, the House
Legal Analysis hinted at potential future anti-trust prosecutions
aimed at a single non-exempt United States company or
individual who conspired with exempt foreign boycott
promoters.336
In other words, a boycott prohibited by the Sherman Act,
which usually requires at least two participating entities, can be
found even in a situation where only one domestic entity is
involved in the boycott. In practical terms, this would mean that
any United States company or individual cooperating with the
BDS Movement could be part of an illegal boycott under the
Sherman Act, and would be subject to the monetary and criminal
penalties that may be imposed for such violations. The need to
determine whether the boycott is horizontal, resulting in per se
illegality, or vertical, requiring an inquiry into the objectives of
the boycotting parties and the effect on United States Commerce
as a threshold issue, would complicate the prosecution but would
not vitiate potential liability for participation in the BDS
Movement’s activities.
1. Sherman Act Liability for Dockworkers’ Collaboration With the
BDS Movement
One entity that has taken part in BDS Movement activities in
the United States is the dockworkers union. Though unions are
generally exempt from the provisions of the Sherman Act, as the
court held in USS-POSCO Industries v. Contra Costa County
Building & Construction Trades Council, when a union acts in
concert with a non-union entity to further an illegitimate
objective, it loses its Sherman Act immunity.337 Furthermore,
335. HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144, at 52–53.
336. Id. at 54–55.
337. 31 F.3d 800, 806 (9th Cir. 1994) (restating the analysis to determine
whether union activities are exempt from anti-trust laws as announced in
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941) as a two-prong test: “(1) Did
the union combine with a non-labor group? [and] (2) Did the union act in its
legitimate self-interest?”).

102 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:1

while it has been argued that anti-trust laws do not apply to
“protest” boycotts, foreign boycotts of Israel are not considered to
be “protest” boycotts and are, instead, better understood to be
horizontal boycotts.338
Consequently, where a union such as ILWU Local 10
cooperates with the BDS Movement as part of a scheme to inflict
economic injury on third parties, such as shipping companies
affiliated with Israeli investors, Sherman Act immunity for ILWU
Local 10 would not exist and the union may be prosecuted for
criminal and civil penalties under the Sherman Act. The case
against the union would be based on the fact that participation in
the BDS Movement boycott has a negative effect on United States
markets and competition (which the BDS Movement
acknowledges as one of the goals of the boycott) and is not part of
any collective bargaining or other permitted labor organizing
activity.339
This is, of course, a simplified analysis of the case that would
be made for the union’s Sherman Act liability in connection with
338. Protest Boycotts Under the Sherman Act, 128 U. PENN L. REV. 1131,
1134 (1980) (“[A] consumer boycott protesting high prices would be a protest
boycott, but the Arab League’s secondary boycott of foreign companies
trading with Israel would not, despite its political motivations. Under the
terms of the Arab boycott, companies wishing to deal with Israel or with Arab
nations are prohibited from dealing with Israel or with any firm having
commercial relations with Israel. This horizontal agreement is aimed not
only at Israeli businesses but also at “Zionist sympathizers,” who may be
competitors of the complying companies. Thus, firms participating in the
Arab boycott cannot be said to lack a significant business interest in the
boycott’s success.” (citing The Arab Boycott: The Antitrust Challenge of
United States v. Bechtel in Light of the Export Administration Amendments
of 1977, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1440, 1446 (1979)).
339. Henry K. Lee, Ship Hit by Protest Unloads, Leaves Oakland, SF
GATE (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Protest-hobbledship-is-partially-unloaded-sails-5700706.php (“‘Zim has undoubtedly suffered
significant economic losses, and we have set a powerful precedent for what
international solidarity with Palestine, through boycott, divestment and
sanctions, can look like,’ said Reem Assil of the Arab Resource and
Organizing Center.”); Renee Lewis, Seattle protesters aim to block Israeli
cargo ship over Gaza siege, AL JAZEERA AMERICA (Aug. 25, 2014),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/8/25/seattle-israel-boat.html
(Organizers said the action is part of a wider Boycott, Divest and Sanction
(BDS) movement, modeled after a similar effort targeting South Africa under
apartheid. In a press release, they describe the actions as economic sanctions
imposed in response to the current siege of the Gaza Strip and the occupation
of the Palestinian territories.) (emphasis added to highlight the affiliation
between the local “Block the Boat” actions and the BDS Movement).
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supporting the BDS Movement boycott. However, comparing the
potential case against dockworkers to the Bechtel litigation, there
are strong similarities. The United States dockworker’s union,
like Bechtel before it, can be seen as collaborating with foreign coconspirators (the BDS Movement and the Arab League) to harm
United States markets and competition. Of course, there would
have to be a determination made as to the legitimacy of the
union’s boycott support, which would hinge on a facts and
circumstances analysis. As the court in USS-POSCO Industries
noted:
What, then, does it mean for a union to pursue an
illegitimate purpose? In the broadest sense, everything a
union does serves its self-interest.
But Hutcheson
requires that it act in pursuit of its legitimate selfinterest. Whether the interest in question is legitimate
depends on whether the ends to be achieved are among
the traditional objectives of labor organizations. Thus, if
a union forces employers to funnel money into a
commercial enterprise from which the union derives
profits; or if it forces the employer to hire the union
president’s spouse; or if a union is involved in illegal
activities unrelated to its mission, such as dealing drugs
or gambling, those would not be objectives falling within
the union’s legitimate interest. In such cases, the unions
“cease to act as labor groups.”340
Unions often engage in boycotts that are exempt from the
anti-trust laws, but those boycotts are in support of “traditional
objectives” of labor organizing, such as is the case when a union
boycott is launched against a non-union employer in order to
coerce that employer into hiring union workers.341 Supporting a
foreign boycott aimed at weakening and ultimately destroying a
friendly foreign country is many things, but one cannot reasonably
describe it as a traditional objective of American labor unions.

340. 31 F.3d at 808 (quoting Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. Int’l
Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 457 U.S. 702 (1982)); see also Allied Int’l, Inc. v. Int’l
Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 456 U.S. 212 (1982).
341. Id. at 809 (observing that the traditional tactics used by the unions,
like handbilling, picketing, and encouragement of work stoppages at the
project site, were protected because unions are entitled to encourage use of
unionized labor).

104 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:1

The text and history of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law amply
demonstrates that preventing foreign interference in American
commerce and foreign policy was, and is, a paramount concern of
the federal government. As a result, application of the anti-trust
laws to either the BDS Movement or its supporters (including, but
not limited to, unions) would be in keeping with the Claiborne
Court’s pronouncement that “the strong governmental interest in
certain forms of economic regulation, even though such regulation
may have an incidental effect on rights of speech and
association.”342 It would also be consistent with Justice Scalia’s
positions in the House Legal Analysis regarding the applicability
of anti-trust laws to foreign boycotts of Israel affecting United
States commerce.
Because the EAA Anti-Boycott Law explicitly provides that it
does not supersede anti-trust laws, any individual, company, or
union that participates in the BDS Movement’s activities may be
subject to civil and criminal prosecution and suits may be brought
by the government as well as by private parties who are affected
by the boycott participation.343 Justice Scalia’s concluding remark
in the House Legal Analysis noted that the preferred approach to
combating the effects of anti-Israel boycotts would be legislative or
through an executive order (due to the fact that using thenexisting anti-trust laws might have had unpredictable outcomes
as a result of novel theories that would have to be employed in the
prosecutions),344 but the potential use of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, in particular, has been established by Congress and the legal
analysis of a late United States Supreme Court Justice.
Furthermore, since the House Boycott Report was published the
underlying threat posed by anti-Israel boycotts has grown from
one of a primarily commercial and competitive nature to one that
directly implicates national security and foreign policy. The need
for a multi-faceted response, encompassing combined legislative,
342. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912 (1982). Since
individuals and organizations would still be free to protest against Israel
independently, the prohibition on BDS Movement boycotts would not infringe
upon core First Amendment rights. See infra Part III.B for a discussion of
the Humanitarian Law Project case.
343. See generally Charles Koob & Peter Kazanoff, Private Antitrust
Remedies Under US Law, SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, http://www.
stblaw.com/docs/default-source/cold-fusion-existing-content/publiations/pub
484.pdf?sfvrsn=2 (last visited July 8, 2016).
344. HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144, at 54.
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executive and existing statutory resources, is greater today than it
was in 1976.
B. RICO and the BDS Movement
The EAA Anti-Boycott Law and anti-trust laws are powerful
and effective tools that may be used in response to those who
participate in the BDS Movement’s unlawful boycotts. But
prosecuting those who participate in boycotts contrary to
American policy is only half of the answer. The source of the
boycotts must also be addressed, and one law in particular is
especially well suited for this task—the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act345 (RICO).
RICO had its origins in the government’s need for a tool to
fight organized crime, especially in respect of organized crime’s
involvement in labor movements, where the leaders of criminal
organizations were generally immune from prosecution due to the
attenuated connection they had to the criminal acts that were
committed on their behalf and at their direction.346 Though a
primary impetus for the creation of the RICO statute347 was
organized crime, the true reach of the statute was intended to be
any enterprise engaging in a pattern of unlawful behavior,
whether organized crime or not, especially where the top level
participants were not directly engaging in the criminal
activities.348 In a RICO prosecution, once a pattern of criminal
activity is connected to an organization, liability attaches to the
members of the organization, even if the ringleaders have
otherwise isolated themselves from being connected to individual
criminal acts. RICO has been successfully used to prosecute
everything from racketeering in professional sports to investment
fraud. In the aftermath of the September 11th terror attacks,
RICO was amended to broaden its scope significantly and to
provide the government with a wide-ranging weapon to be used

345. Pub. L. No. 91–452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §§
1961–1968 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244)).
346. See, e.g., Donald Rebovich, Kenneth Coyle & John Schaaf, Local
Prosecution of Organized Crime: The Use of State RICO Statutes, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE (Oct. 1993), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/143502N
CJRS.pdf.
347. Id.
348. Id.
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against global terrorist organizations.349
1. The Elements of a RICO Prosecution
A simplified overview of a RICO case shows that it is
comprised of three basic elements: (1) a pattern of racketeering
activity, (2) by or involving an “enterprise,” and (3) that affects
interstate or foreign commerce.350 The first step in establishing a
RICO case is establishing a pattern of racketeering activity (two
or more offenses will generally suffice to prove that a pattern
exists). The RICO statute specifies the activities that are
racketeering “predicates” for RICO prosecution. These predicate
offenses can be put into three general categories: (1) any act or
threat that is chargeable as one or more of certain enumerated
felonies under state law, (2) any act that is indictable under
certain enumerated federal statutes, and (3) any offense involving
three enumerated categories of federal law. Unless there is a
predicate offense from the foregoing list, there can be no RICO
claim.351
If a racketing predicate offense is found to exist, the next step
is to determine whether it is connected to certain prohibited
conduct. Professor Pamela Pierson provided a concise overview of
this step in her recent article RICO Trends: From Gangsters to
Class Actions:
The RICO statute is complex. It applies to a wide range
of conduct and contains abstract terms not easily
correlated with everyday experience. There are four
types of conduct prohibited by RICO: (1) investing
349. Frank Marine, et al., Criminal RICO: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968; A
Manual for Federal Prosecutors, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 8–9 (5th ed. Oct.
2009),
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/foia/docs/2009rico-manual.pdf
[hereinafter DOJ RICO Manual].
350. Civil and criminal RICO cases are quite complicated and hinge on a
number of determinations that are much more involved than the basic three
steps outlined above. This Article is not intended to be a guide to preparing a
RICO case. See Koob & Kazanoff, supra note 343, and the DOJ RICO
Manual, supra note 349 for detailed guidelines on the preparation of private
and government RICO cases, respectively.
351. See DOJ RICO Manual, supra note 349, at 20–49, for a
comprehensive listing of the predicate offenses and citations to cases for each
type of offense. Naturally, the predicate offense can be prosecuted on its own,
but the penalties and reach of the RICO statute broadens the efficacy of a
prosecution that involves a somewhat amorphous group, such as the BDS
Movement or organized crime.
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proceeds from a pattern of racketeering activity in an
enterprise, (2) acquiring or maintaining control over an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, (3)
conducting or participating in the affairs of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity, and (4)
conspiring to do any of these types of conduct. Because
RICO is both a crime and a civil cause of action, it may be
prosecuted by United States Department of Justice
prosecutors, criminally or civilly, or it may be brought as
a civil suit by private individuals who have suffered
damage to their business or property. Those convicted of
RICO crimes face stiff penalties: a possible prison term of
twenty years, forfeiture of property acquired or
maintained in violation of RICO, and fines of $250,000
per offense ($500,000 per offense if the defendant is an
organization).
Those found civilly liable also face
significant consequences: treble damages, and payment of
attorneys’ fees and costs.
RICO’s civil cause of action, which is available to “[a]ny
person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation” of RICO requires RICO plaintiffs to prove that
the defendants committed crimes. Thus, in addition to
proving “RICO elements” (“pattern” and “enterprise”)
private plaintiffs in civil RICO actions must prove the
elements of the crimes they allege as “racketeering
activity.”352
As Professor Pierson notes, a RICO claim can be either civil or
criminal.353 A civil claim can be brought by either the government
or a private party who has been harmed by the RICO activity.354
The basic elements of civil and criminal RICO claims are
substantially similar, though for a civil claim there need not be a
showing of criminal intent and the burden of proof is also lower.355
352. Pamela Bucy Pierson, RICO Trends: From Gangsters to Class
Actions, 65 S.C. L. REV. 213 (2013) (citations omitted), http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2179211.
353. Id. at 5.
354. Id. at 4.
355. In a civil RICO proceeding brought by a private party, the potential
remedy is treble damages; in such a proceeding brought by the government,
the potential remedies include equitable relief, such as injunctions,
dissolution of an entity and government supervision of the offending party.
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If a pattern of racketeering that affects commerce has been found,
the final step is to determine whether the conduct is part of an
“enterprise.” The RICO statute defines an enterprise to include
“any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other
legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity.”356
The statutory list is
representative, rather than exclusive, and courts have shown
great latitude in finding that an association is an “enterprise.”357
In addition,
it is not necessary to prove “that every member of the
enterprise participated in or knew about all its activities.”
Rather, “it is sufficient that the defendant know the
general nature of the enterprise and know that the
enterprise extends beyond his individual role.” Nor is it
necessary to prove that the enterprise or its members
acted with criminal intent.358
A more thorough summary of the elements of RICO claims
and the standards that have applied in deciding these cases359 is
outside the scope of this Article and is not necessary to
understand how RICO can apply to the BDS Movement. Rather, a
line of Supreme Court cases arising from abortion clinic protests
prosecuted under RICO are illustrative of how RICO would be
used against the BDS Movement’s activities in the United
States.360
To set the stage, though, in a RICO prosecution against the
BDS Movement the two predicate offenses that this Article will
focus on are violations of the Hobbs Act 361 and violations of
These remedies are mutually exclusive to the respective party bringing suit
(i.e., the government cannot seek treble damages and the private party may
not seek equitable relief). See Frank Marine & Patrice Mulkern, Civil RICO:
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968: A Manual for Federal Attorneys, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE 26–33 (Oct. 2007), http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading
_room/usam/title9/civrico.pdf [hereinafter DOJ Civil RICO Manual].
356. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(4) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244).
357. DOJ RICO Manual, supra note 349, at 70–74.
358. Id. at 82–83 (citation omitted).
359. See JED RAKOFF & HOWARD GOLDSTEIN, RICO: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
LAW AND STRATEGY (Law Journal Press 2014) for what is arguably the
definitive guide to RICO. See also DOJ RICO Manual, supra note 349 and
DOJ Civil RICO Manual, supra note 355.
360. See NOW I, NOW II, and NOW III, infra note 363.
361. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1951 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244). The
Hobbs Act is a federal law that criminalizes extortion and robbery. The
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federal laws dealing with providing material support to
terrorists.362 The category of prohibited conduct that would form
the basis for a RICO case would be “conducting or participating in
the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity.” The BDS Movement’s status as a RICO enterprise
would be established by showing coordination among the various
BDS Movement affiliates and with outside organizations.
2. The NOW Cases and the Hobbs Act
In the NOW cases,363 abortion providers filed suit against
individuals and organizations (Activists) who engaged in
disruptive acts at or near abortion clinics.364 The Activists’
objectives included preventing women from having abortions and,
ultimately, forcing the clinics to shut down.365 RICO was among
the laws implicated in the attempt to stop the Activists.
The NOW cases proceeded through various stages of litigation
for 20 years, resulting in three United States Supreme Court
decisions that defined the contours of RICO in the context of
protest activity. In NOW I, decided in 1994, the United States
Supreme Court examined the claim that by disrupting the
operations of abortion clinics the Activists had engaged in an act
of extortion under the Hobbs Act,366 a predicate racketing offense
under RICO.367 The applicable provision of the Hobbs Act368
prohibits, inter alia, any conduct that “obstructs, delays, or affects
commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in
commerce,
by
robbery
or
extortion
. . . .”369 Extortion is defined as “obtaining of property from
another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or

history and provisions of the Hobbs Act are discussed in detail in NOW I and
NOW II, infra note 363.
362. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2339A, 2339B (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–
244).
363. Nat’l Org. of Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994) (NOW I);
Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. of Women, 537 U.S. 393 (2003) (NOW II); Scheidler v.
Nat’l Org. of Women, 547 U.S. 9 (2006) (NOW III).
364. NOW I, 510 U.S at 249.
365. See generally NOW I, 510 U.S. 249; NOW II, 537 U.S. 393; NOW III,
547 U.S. 9.
366. NOW I, 510 U.S at 253.
367. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1)(B) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244).
368. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1951 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244).
369. § 1951(a) (Westlaw).
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threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official
right.”370
What made the NOW cases unique is the efforts the plaintiffs
went through to convince the Court that abortion clinic jobs and
abortion services were a property right that could be extorted by a
group that did not seek to obtain an economic benefit from such
rights.371 The Activists did not want to use the extorted property
for their own purposes, nor did they seek to replace their targets
as the provider of abortion services.372 The Activists simply
sought to reduce the availability of abortion services.373
The NOW I Court first explained that when considering the
enterprise vehicle through which the extortion is performed, that
enterprise need not have “an economic motive for engaging in
illegal activity; it need only be an association in fact that engages
in a pattern of racketeering activity.”374 The Court continued its
analysis of the economic element of extortion to find that the effect
of the extortion on the economy and businesses, rather than a
financial benefit accruing to the protesters, is what brings the
activity into the scope of the Hobbs Act.375
The NOW I defendants argued that their activities were
political, not economic, and deserved a blanket protection under
the First Amendment.376 In their concurrence, Justices Kennedy
and Souter reiterated the principle that being a “protest
organization” does not shield defendants from RICO liability
under an extortion predicate and a First Amendment defense
could certainly be raised, but it could not be said that the
application of RICO to protest organizations is a per se First
Amendment violation.377 NOW I established that so long as
370. § 1951(b)(2) (Westlaw).
371. NOW II, 537 U.S. 393, 401 (2003).
372. Id. at 405–06.
373. Id. at 406
374. NOW I, 510 U.S. 249, 259 (1994).
375. Id. at 260 (responding to the lower courts’ logic that there was a need
to prove that the protesters had a self interested economic motive:
“Respondents and the two Courts of Appeals, we think, overlook the fact that
predicate acts, such as the alleged extortion, may not benefit the protesters
financially but still may drain money from the economy by harming
businesses such as the clinics which are petitioners in this case.”).
376. Id. at 254.
377. Id. at 263–65. The practical effect of this is that a case brought
against a protest organization would have to proceed on the merits, thus
requiring a time consuming and expensive trial.
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property was obtained, “RICO contains no economic motive
requirement.”378 The question of whether the deprivation of
property rights by the Activists constituted the requisite
“obtaining” of property for purposes of the RICO predicates would
not be definitely answered until nine years later.379
The NOW I Court remanded the case to the district court for
further proceedings in 1994. On remand, the district court, and
then the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals answered the question
of whether the Activists had obtained property. Both courts found
that the Activists had obtained the subject property (abortion
services) and thus had committed extortion under the Hobbs Act
based upon the following conclusions: (i) the intangible rights to
obtain and perform abortion services were property for purposes of
the Hobbs Act and (ii) even if the Activists did not receive “money
or anything else . . . [a] loss to, or interference with the rights of,
the victim is all that is required” to constitute obtaining property
from the victim.380
In 2003, the case once again returned to the United States
Supreme Court. The NOW II Court took issue with the lower
courts’ determinations and ruled that the Activists had not
engaged in Hobbs Act extortion since they did not “obtain” the
property that they were interfering with.381 After acknowledging
that the purpose of the Hobbs Act was to “use all the
constitutional power Congress has to punish interference with
interstate commerce” and to further that purpose the court was
not to restrictively interpret the law,382 the NOW II Court
purported to distinguish the law of extortion from that of coercion.
Deciding that what the Activists had done was more like coercion
than extortion, the NOW II Court found no Hobbs Act violation in
the case (since coercion, unlike extortion, is not prohibited under
the Hobbs Act) and thus no predicate for RICO prosecution.383
The NOW II Court explained that there must be an acquisition of
the subject property (which did not occur under its coercion
theory), as well as a deprivation of it.384
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

Id. at 262.
NOW II, 537 U.S. 393, 397 (2003).
Id. at 399–400.
See id. at 402.
Id. at 408 (citing Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960)).
Id. at 409.
Id. at 405.
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In making that argument, the NOW II Court created a
conflict with precedent as well as the established purpose of the
Hobbs Act. Some believe that the NOW II Court’s determination
that the protests were not a form of extortion under the Hobbs Act
was sui generis to Supreme Court abortion protest cases;385
Justice Stevens’ dissent in NOW II clearly indicates as much.386
Citing a long line of cases that applied Hobbs Act extortion
provisions to other instances where property rights were
infringed, though not necessarily acquired, by the extorting party,
Justice Stevens pointed in particular to lower court cases that
found Hobbs Act extortion liability to apply to abortion clinic
protest activity under the theory that an extortionist’s
interference with property rights constituted “obtaining” property
under the Hobbs Act.387
Justice Stevens summed up his disagreement with the
majority in three points. First, he believed that if Congress
disagreed with the Court’s longstanding definition of extortion
under the Hobbs Act it was up to Congress, and not the courts, to
amend the law accordingly.388 Second, Congress intended for the
Hobbs Act to have a broad reach and it was not for the courts to
artificially restrict that reach.389 Third, and most importantly,
Justice Stevens, as did Justice Ginsburg, noted that intervening
1994 enactment of a federal law imposing significant restrictions
on abortion clinic protests390 had a de facto effect of rendering the
RICO claim moot and the majority chose to create an extremely
narrow, fact based distinction (that the case involved coercion and
not extortion) rather than acknowledge that the claim was
moot.391 This choice, Justice Stevens argued, would have a
385. Emily Elman, Defining the Scope of Extortion Liability After
Scheidler v. NOW, 14 N.Y.U. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 213, 231 (2011) (citing United
States. v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973) and United States v. Debs, 949 F.2d
199 (6th Cir. 1991) as examples of sui generis extortion definitions under the
Hobbs Act and stating that NOW II should be read as sui generis to abortion
protest cases).
386. See NOW II, 537 U.S. at 415.
387. Id. at 414–15 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Arena,
180 F.3d 380 (2d. Cir. 1999)).
388. See id. at 415.
389. Id. at 416–17.
390. See Freedom of Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–259,
108 Stat. 694 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 248 (Westlaw through Pub. L.
No. 114–244)) [hereinafter the “FACE Act”].
391. NOW II, 537 U.S. at 416–17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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chilling effect on legitimate RICO prosecutions.392
The notion that the NOW II limitation on extortion-based
RICO prosecutions is sui generis to Supreme Court abortion cases
is one that has also been endorsed by other federal courts. Shortly
after NOW II was decided, in a separate RICO case the Second
Circuit reverted to precedent that extortion did not require the
extortionist to acquire the property interest that it had deprived
its victim of and explicitly stated that, “Supreme Court
jurisprudence about abortion is sui generis . . . .”393
This conclusion is supported by the NOW II majority’s
affirmation that they did not reject “lower court decisions such as
United States v. Tropiano . . . .”394 In Tropiano, the Second
Circuit found Hobbs Act extortion liability where a group forced a
disposal company to give up its right to conduct business.395 As
Justice Stevens noted in his NOW II dissent, Tropiano held that
under the Hobbs Act, obtaining property “does not depend upon a

392. Id. at 416–17. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, in their concurrence,
stated that the FACE Act provided the legislative response to abortion
protest issues and feared that if the court were to also find that RICO applied
it could create an unintentional expansion of RICO’s scope. In other words,
the NOW II majority was simply leaving the question of RICO extortion
applicability for another day under circumstances where another statute did
not already provided victims with a remedy. See, e.g., Elman, supra note 385,
at 238–39.
393. United States v. Porcelli, 404 F.3d 157, 162 (2d. Cir. 2005). Though
this RICO case was based on a predicate act of statutory mail fraud, a
predicate crime distinct from Hobbs Act extortion, the appeal was based on
the NOW II Hobbs Act interpretation of the element of obtaining money or
property. Both the mail fraud statute and the Hobbs Act require that money
or property be obtained, but the Porcelli Court stated “[u]nder this Court’s
analysis, the defendant does not need to literally ‘obtain’ money or property
to violate the statute. The fact that the Hobbs Act and the mail and wire
fraud statutes contain the word ‘obtain’ does not necessitate imposing
Scheidler’s construction of a wholly separate statute onto this Court’s preexisting construction of the mail fraud statute.” Id. This conclusory
explanation followed the Porcelli Court’s statement that Supreme Court
abortion cases are sui generis, so it logically follows that the decision to limit
the NOW II Court’s definition of “obtain” solely to abortion cases was in
keeping with what the Second Circuit understood Supreme Court precedent
on the matter to be. As such, the more expansive definition of “obtain”
(requiring only the deprivation of a property right, rather than a disposition
of that right as well) from existing precedent should be applied in all cases
other than Supreme Court cases relating to abortion.
394.
NOW II, 537 U.S. at 402 n.6 (citing United States v. Tropiano, 418
F.2d 1069, 1076 (1969)).
395. Tropiano, 418 F.2d at 1071, 1082–83.
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direct benefit being conferred on the person who obtains the
property.”396 Importantly, in Tropiano, it did not matter whether
or not the extortionist was the entity that directly received the
financial benefits from the extortion.397
To the extent that NOW II is sui generis to Supreme Court
abortion cases, that distinction relates solely to the application of
extortion principles to abortion clinic protests. The principle that
protest activity can be subject to extensive government regulation
is not within the purportedly sui generis nature of NOW II, and
the federal law that severely restricts protest activity at abortion
clinics, the FACE Act, has survived all challenges brought against
it.398 Since the NOW II Court did not reject Tropiano, the NOW II
holding must be seen as exceedingly narrow for Hobbs Act
purposes, limited to the facts of the NOW cases. A RICO
prosecution against the BDS Movement with a Hobbs Act
extortion predicate, therefore, would be properly decided under
Tropiano with regard to the definition of “obtaining of property”
under the Hobbs Act. Several years after NOW II was decided the
final NOW case came before the Supreme Court. Because NOW
III was a case relating to the very narrow question of whether
violence unrelated to extortion could be a RICO predicate, it is not
substantively relevant to this Article.399
a. Reconciling NOW I and NOW II
How are we to resolve the Supreme Court’s apparent aboutface between NOW I and NOW II? While it may be true that
Supreme Court abortion cases are sui generis in some aspects, the
better explanation is that two months after the Court decided
NOW I Congress provided a specific remedy to abortion clinic

396. Id. at 414–15 (citing United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415 (1956))
(Stevens, J. dissenting).
397. There were a number of individuals and companies involved in the
extortion, some of whom did in fact obtain the direct financial benefits from
the extortion and others who did not. The court did not distinguish between
the two in finding a violation of the Hobbs Act, as it focused on the fact that
the property rights were being deprived.
398. See United States v. Bird, 279 F. Supp. 2d 827 (S.D. Tex. 2003),
rev’d, 401 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2005) (upholding the constitutionality of the
FACE Act).
399. The NOW III Court found that violence not related to extortion
would not be a Hobbs Act violation that could function as a RICO predicate.
NOW III, 547 U.S. 9, 23 (2006).
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protests in the form of the FACE Act. The Supreme Court is well
known for deciding cases on the narrowest of grounds. The
enactment of the FACE Act allowed the Court to avoid a potential
expansion of RICO while still upholding the principle in NOW I
that protected abortion clinics from disruptive protests and
leaving in place Tropiano extortion precedent.
As the NOW II Court stated, “[w]hatever the outer boundaries
[of extortion liability under the Hobbs Act] may be, the effort to
characterize [the Activists’] actions here as an ‘obtaining of
property from’ [abortion providers and those seeking abortions] is
well beyond them.”400 The Court left open the possibility that
under other circumstances there could indeed be Hobbs Act
extortion liability “based on obtaining something as intangible as
another’s right to exercise exclusive control over the use of a
party’s business assets.”401 Since the BDS Movement’s activities
are directed at disrupting interstate and international commerce
and depriving a target of its property rights to conduct business,
they are comfortably within these “outer boundaries” of RICO
predicates, including the Hobbs Act.
3. After NOW: RICO Predicates and the BDS Movement
The NOW cases demonstrate there can be no question that
RICO may apply to what is otherwise seen as political or protest
activity. In ultimately finding that the Activists were not liable
under RICO for their abortion clinic protest activity, the United
States Supreme Court decided the case on the merits.402 This is
critically important, as the Court did not find that political or
protest speech was absolutely immune from RICO prosecution.403
In fact, in NOW I, Justices Souter and Kennedy acknowledged
that First Amendment concerns could only be raised as a defense
in particular cases.404
The import of this should not be overlooked. A RICO case can

400. NOW II, 537 U.S. at 402.
401. Id.
402. In other words, the Court did not decide the case on procedural
grounds, so the legal principle that regulation of abortion clinic protests does
not violate First Amendment protections is precedential. Had the Court
decided the case on other grounds, such as a finding that a party did not have
standing, the precedential value of the case would have been nil.
403. NOW II, 537 U.S. at 402.
404. NOW I, 510 U.S. 249, 264–65 (1994).
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be brought against the BDS Movement and it will be up to the
courts to determine whether the underlying activity is protected
speech. By way of example, if the BDS Movement were simply to
march in public holding signs critical of American support for
Israel, such action, absent any other factors (such as violence
emanating from the protesters) would likely be protected and the
RICO prosecution would fail. But the BDS Movement’s typical
activities are not focused on protected First Amendment speech;
rather, they are geared at promoting secondary and tertiary
boycotts to inflict economic harm on Israel and its supporters
while providing support to Israel’s foes. This objective was
originally announced as part of the Arab League Boycott
Declaration of 1945, reiterated at the NGO Durban Conference
and memorialized in the BDS Manifesto.405
The BDS Manifesto first bemoans the rise of Israel’s economy
in the post-Oslo period, noting that, “Israel benefited considerably
[post-Oslo], particularly in diplomatic and economic terms.
Financially, it resulted in a six-fold increase in direct foreign
investment, a jump from $686 million to about $3.6 billion. In
1994, Israel’s GDP grew by 6.8% and its exports by 12.6%.”406
The BDS Manifesto next devotes fifteen pages to a detailed
analysis of each major sector of Israel’s economy, from agriculture
to technology to military to tourism,407 and concludes with a
directed call for a global attack on Israel’s commercial interests:
The effectiveness of any programme of sanctions aimed at
a country’s foreign trade will depend upon the degree of
dependence of its economy on trade with the rest of the
world. Israel . . . has a vulnerable and volatile economy
that could feel the impact of coordinated BDS
campaigns.408
One need only look at recent BDS Movement activities at
American ports to see that they are primarily focused on
interfering with commerce and depriving Israel of its property
rights in foreign trade. After preventing a cargo ship with partial
Israeli ownership from unloading cargo at American ports, local
affiliates of the BDS Movement proudly hailed the financial harm
405.
406.
407.
408.

BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at 22.
Id.
Id. at 138–53.
Id. at 161.
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they had inflicted upon Israel: “the Zim boat was delayed from
coming to port in Tacoma, costing the company approximately
$500,000. Blocking the boat puts a dent in the profits being sent
to power Israel.”409 In fact, a leader in the dockworker’s union
that facilitated the BDS Movement’s interference with Israeli
trade in the United States justified the union’s participation by
stating: “[a]s a longshoreman, I know how critical
international trade is to the economy . . . I think it is an
appropriate action against those who have prevented the selfdetermination of the Palestinian people and to show solidarity
with the people of Gaza.”410 There can be no question that the
goal of the BDS Movement is interference with commerce, the
very thing that the Hobbs Act and RICO were enacted to combat.
The NOW plaintiffs had to trace an attenuated logical path to
establish that abortion protests impermissibly interfered with
commerce, yet the Supreme Court found the linkage to be
sufficient. The NOW plaintiffs alleged that the protest activity
deprived the abortion clinic workers and clients of their property
rights to perform or obtain abortion services. The Activists stated
that their primary goal was to prevent the abortions from being
performed.411 There was no evidence adduced that the Activists
sought to otherwise interfere with the property rights of either the
service providers or recipients. The NOW I Court found that an
economic motive was not necessary to find a Hobbs Act violation
since the purpose of the Hobbs Act (to prevent interference with
interstate commerce) was to prevent any interference with
commerce (and in particular, property rights).
The BDS Movement, on the other hand, is first and foremost a
409. Jill Mangaliman & Katrina Pestaño, Why block the boat? Resistance
from Ferguson to Palestine to the Philippines, THE SEATTLE GLOBALIST (Aug.
25, 2014), http://www.seattleglobalist.com/2014/08/25/block-the-boat-pales
tine-philippines-bds-israel-tacoma/28647. See also Charlotte Silver,
Protestors block and delay Israeli ships up and down US West Coast, ELEC.
INTIFADA (Aug. 28, 2014), http://electronicintifada.net/blogs/charlottesilver/protestors-block-and-delay-israeli-ships-and-down-us-west-coast (“The
action originated in Oakland, California, which set a high bar for others to
follow. Protestors there successfully prevented the unloading of the Zim
Piraeus container ship for nearly four full days. But other cities’ more modest
demonstrations were nevertheless successful in temporarily delaying the Zim
ships from unloading, costing the company hundreds of thousands of
dollars . . . .”) (emphasis added).
410. Mangaliman & Pestaño, supra note 409.
411. NOW II, 537 U.S. 393, 402 (2003).
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movement that seeks to interfere with all commerce that involves
its target (Israel) through acts that directly and significantly
interfere with American and international commerce. Economic
motive and interference with commerce in the United States are
at the heart of the BDS Movement’s existence. Consequently, a
Hobbs Act claim against the BDS Movement under RICO would
be colorable (if BDS Movement activities are not seen as a prima
facie violation of the Hobbs Act) and, under the NOW cases and
other RICO principles, should easily survive attempts to dismiss
the claims at a preliminary stage.
Additionally, the property rights that the BDS Movement
obtains from Israel provide a benefit to the BDS Movement in two
distinct ways. First, since the BDS Movement’s goal is to harm
Israel in any way possible, the deprivation of revenue and
commercial markets available to Israel provides the BDS
Movement with a direct realization of its objectives, which leads to
more success in recruiting supporters and raising funds, especially
among more radical constituencies.412 Furthermore, the public
relations benefit of using American unions and individuals, rather
than foreign provocateurs, to interfere with commerce involving
Israel helps the BDS Movement to grow in mainstream influence
and, therefore, enhances its ability to raise funds globally. BDS
Movement fundraising is estimated to be in excess of tens of
millions of dollars annually.413 At the same time, Israel’s public
412. Ahmad Moussalli, a professor at the American University of Beirut
who specializes in the dynamics of Islamist groups, found that there is a
tangible benefit from Islamist groups’ extreme actions. Professor Moussalli
stated that exceeding societal norms to attack perceived enemies of the
Islamist movement “gets [the Islamist groups] money, support and recruits
from around the world.”
Yaroslav Trofimov, Taliban Attack Reflects
Barbarity Competition Among Jihadists, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2014), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/taliban-attack-reflects-barbarity-competition-amongjihadists-1418841416.
413. See, e.g., Silver, supra note 299 (“Elia says that while organizers are
content with the victory they set out to achieve, they hope to build their
coalition: ‘At this point what we want to work on is getting labor on board–
getting the union to realize this is an issue of social and global justice.’
Meanwhile, down the coast in Southern California’s Long Beach port,
organizers were moved to mobilize an action in the span of only two and a
half days after witnessing Oakland’s action. ‘Oakland was so amazingly
successful and it really inspired a lot of people,’ Garrick Ruiz of BDS-Los
Angeles told The Electronic Intifada. ‘We in Los Angeles wanted to do
something along the same lines and that’s when the larger coalition came
together.’”). In the absence of the collaboration between the BDS Movement,
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standing is wrongfully harmed and its opportunities in
commercial, academic, scientific and other endeavors are
negatively impacted.
Second, in the eyes of the BDS Movement there are two types
of commercial enterprises extant: those that support Israel and
those that oppose (either directly or implicitly) Israel. By
depriving Israeli businesses or businesses supportive of Israel of
commercial opportunities, the BDS Movement rewards other
businesses with an opening to obtain those newly available
commercial opportunities. By doing so, the BDS Movement
expands its reach and reputation and treats business
opportunities as a currency that can be showered upon those who
abide by its anti-Israel agenda. Unlike the Activists in the NOW
cases, the BDS Movement both deprives its target of a property
right and acquires those property rights.414 This type of activity
its United States affiliates and dockworkers’ unions, the costs to the BDS
Movement of itself creating such levels of interference with Israeli cargo
handling would have been significant. The BDS Movement’s funding is
veiled in secrecy, but it is clear that the more notoriety they achieve and the
more supporters they gather, the more funding they’ll receive. See, e.g.,
Edwin Black, Financing Mideast Flames–Confronting BDS and the New
Israel Fund, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.huffington
post.com/edwin-black/financing-mideast-flamescb_487 4795.html; NGOs and
the BDS Movement: Background and Funding, NGO MONITOR (Dec. 16, 2009),
http://www.ngo-monitor.org/article/ngos_and_the_bds_movement_backgroun
d_funding_and_strategic_options; Gerald Steinberg, Confronting European
funding for BDS, SCHOLARS FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST (Jan. 29, 2014),
http://spme.org/boycotts-divestments-sanctions-bds/confronting-european-fun
ding-bds/16783/ (“NGO Monitor research has exposed tens of millions of
Euros provided annually to NGOs via the EU and European governments.
For more than ten years, this highly politicized NGO funding has been
allocated for discriminatory anti-Israel warfare through secret processes
under frameworks for humanitarian aid, democracy and human rights, and
other universal moral principles. This money enables the network of
ostensibly “non-political” organizations to flood the media, universities,
parliaments and other platforms with a steady flow of anti-Israel
demonization.”). Each “successful” BDS Movement activity thus results in
further funding for the group’s activities.
414. The NOW II Court used a two-part test to determine whether
property had been obtained. First, there must be a deprivation. Next, there
must be an acquisition of the property. NOW II, 537 U.S. 393, 405 (2003). In
the NOW cases, there was no question that the Activists had deprived the
medical staff and the patients of a property right, but since the Activists did
not exercise any form of control over the property other than to deprive the
targets of it (in fact, the Activists’ goal was to ensure that no one utilized the
targeted property rights), the Court saw the activity as more akin to coercion
than extortion. In the case of the BDS Movement, however, the property
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is squarely within the parameters of Tropiano’s Hobbs Act
extortion calculus and clearly differentiates the BDS Movement’s
activities from those of abortion clinic protesters under the NOW
cases. While the viability of a RICO case with a Hobbs Act
predicate415 is obvious and strong based on, inter alia, the NOW
cases, there is another RICO predicate that could be asserted
against the BDS Movement’s activities: providing material
support to terrorists in contravention of federal law.416
4. Material Support to Terrorists as a BDS Movement RICO
Predicate Offense
In the mid-1990s, after a deadly increase in the frequency and
magnitude of terrorist acts, Congress enacted two laws in an
attempt to interrupt terror support coming from within the United
States. These laws, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B (Material
Support Laws), were subsequently strengthened after the
September 11th terror attacks to enhance the penalties for
violations of the laws and to make enforcement of the laws more
effective. In their current formulation, the Material Support Laws
make it a federal offense to “provide material support or
resources” in support of terrorist activities or to specific terrorist
groups.417 As a congressional report succinctly explains:
rights are intrinsically commercial and under any recognized theory of
commercial markets, eliminating one participant from a market necessarily
allows for another participant to either enter the market or expand its
existing share of the market. In Tropiano, defendant Pellegrino was found
liable of Hobbs Act extortion even though his activities were for the benefit of
separate businesses, not his own. In the same way, the BDS Movement can
be seen as engaging in extortion from Israeli companies and their supporters
for the benefit of BDS Movement supporters.
415. See United States v. Porcelli, 404 F.3d 157 (2d. Cir. 2005). In
addition to the potential for a RICO prosecution based on a Hobbs Act
extortion predicate, the Porcelli case shows that, to the extent the BDS
Movement uses communications via mail, a RICO prosecution could be
brought based on a predicate crime involving mail fraud. See 18 U.S.C.A. §
1341 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244). Since the Porcelli court
disclaimed the NOW II Court’s more restrictive formulation of “obtaining
property,” a mail fraud predicate would likely result in a more certain
prosecution of the BDS Movement’s activities. See id.
416. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1)(G) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244).
Section 1961(1)(G) incorporates the “material support to terrorists”
prohibitions of § 2332b(g)(5)(b)(i) as a predicate racketeering act. The two
material supports to terrorist prohibitions are contained in 18 U.S.C. §§
2339A, 2339B.
417. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A prohibits material support for terror activities,
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The precise scope of the term “material support or
resources” for purposes of Section 2339B has been a
source of controversy almost from the beginning. The
section uses the definition found in Section 2339A(b) and
thus covers “any property, tangible or intangible, or
service,” 18 U.S.C. 2339B(g)(4). The term excludes
medicine and religious materials, but includes currency
or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial
services, lodging, training (i.e., instruction or teaching
designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general
knowledge), expert advice or assistance (i.e., advice or
assistance derived from scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge), safehouses, false documentation
or identification, communications equipment, facilities,
weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (one or
more individuals who may be or include oneself), and
transportation.
Section 2339B also has a more explicit description of
personnel covered by its proscription, which confines the
term to those provided to a foreign terrorist organization
to direct its activities or to work under its direction or
control.418
In 2010, the United States Supreme Court was called upon to
examine the constitutionality of one of the Material Support Laws
in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.419 This case was a preenforcement challenge to the Material Support Laws filed on
behalf of a group of individuals and institutions (HLP Plaintiffs)
that sought to provide humanitarian aid to two separate foreign
groups that had been designated as “foreign terrorist
organizations” (Named HLP Groups) under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.420
while § 2339B prohibits material support to terror groups.
As a
congressional research service report explains, “[w]here Section 2339B
outlaws support of terrorist organizations, Section 2339A outlaws support for
the crimes a terrorist has or may be planning to commit. Section 2339B
designates terrorist organizations; Section 2339A designates terrorist
crimes.” CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41334, TERRORIST
MATERIAL SUPPORT: A SKETCH OF 18 U.S.C. 2339A AND 2339B 1–2 (2010),
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41334.pdf.
418. Id. at 1–2.
419. See generally 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
420. The two groups were “the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (also known as
the Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan or PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
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The HLP Plaintiffs sought to provide the Named HLP Groups
with monetary and other tangible aid (presumably, materials and
equipment), legal training, and political advocacy. In particular,
the HLP Plaintiffs intended to provide the following support: (1)
“train[ing] members of [the] PKK on how to use humanitarian and
international law to peacefully resolve disputes”; (2) “engag[ing] in
political advocacy on behalf of Kurds who live in Turkey”; and (3)
“teach[ing] PKK members how to petition various representative
bodies such as the United Nations for relief.” With respect to the
other plaintiffs, those activities are: (1) “train[ing] members of
[the] LTTE to present claims for tsunami-related aid to mediators
and international bodies”; (2) “offer[ing] their legal expertise in
negotiating peace agreements between the LTTE and the Sri
Lankan government”; and (3) “engag[ing] in political advocacy on
behalf of Tamils who live in Sri Lanka.”421
The HLP Plaintiffs alleged that the Material Support Laws
infringed, inter alia, their First Amendment rights to speech and
association. In upholding the Material Support Laws, the United
States Supreme Court first noted that the law prohibits activity in
support of an organization that a person knows is a terror
organization.422 It is not relevant whether the person intended to
provide support to that organization’s terror activities.
In
practical terms, this means that as long as a person knows that an
organization is a terror organization, any material support that
the person provides to any part of that organization will subject
him or her to prosecution, even if the support was intended to help
the organization’s non-terror activities.423 Just as providing
advocacy and other support to the non-terror arm of the PKK
subjected the HLP Plaintiffs to prosecution under the Material
Support Laws, providing those types of support to Hamas’ nonterror arm (the BDS Movement) would subject BDS Movement
supporters to the same type of prosecution.
Eelam (LTTE). The PKK is an organization founded in 1974 with the aim of
establishing an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey. The
LTTE is an organization founded in 1976 for the purpose of creating an
independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka.” Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S.
at 3 (citation omitted). This case dealt specifically with 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
The same principles should apply to 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, but the Court did not
explicitly rule on that section of the law.
421. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 9 (citations omitted).
422. Id. at 6.
423. Id. at 11.
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The Humanitarian Law Project court was careful to
differentiate permissible activities in relation to terror groups
from impermissible activities. Citing to the statute, the Court
noted that independent advocacy was not implicated by the
Material Support Laws: “Individuals who act entirely
independently of the foreign terrorist organization to advance its
goals or objectives shall not be considered to be working under the
foreign terrorist organization’s direction and control.”424 The
Court reached a similar conclusion with regard to the prohibition
on provision of “services” under the Material Support Laws:
The other types of material support listed in the statute,
including “lodging,” “weapons,” “explosives,” and
“transportation,” § 2339A(b)(1), are not forms of support
that could be provided independently of a foreign terrorist
organization. We interpret “service” along the same lines.
Thus, any independent advocacy in which plaintiffs wish
to engage is not prohibited by § 2339B. On the other
hand, a person of ordinary intelligence would understand
the term “service” to cover advocacy performed in
coordination with, or at the direction of, a foreign
terrorist organization.425
Thus, to the extent a service is provided without coordination or
without benefit to the terror group, it would be outside of Material
Support Law’s restrictions. On the First Amendment free speech
claims overall, the Court dismissed the HLP Plaintiff’s allegations
and concluded:
Under the material-support statute, plaintiffs may say
anything they wish on any topic. They may speak and
write freely about the PKK and LTTE, the governments
of Turkey and Sri Lanka, human rights, and
international law. They may advocate before the United
Nations. As the Government states: “The statute does
not prohibit independent advocacy or expression of any
kind.” Section 2339B also “does not prevent [plaintiffs]
from becoming members of the PKK and LTTE or impose
any sanction on them for doing so.” Congress has not,
therefore, sought to suppress ideas or opinions in the
424.
425.

Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
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form of “pure political speech.” Rather, Congress has
prohibited “material support,” which most often does not
take the form of speech at all. And when it does, the
statute is carefully drawn to cover only a narrow category
of speech to, under the direction of, or in coordination
with foreign groups that the speaker knows to be terrorist
organizations.426
Moving on to the issue of support for humanitarian activities
of designated terror groups, the Court concluded that Congress
had a legitimate reason to not make a distinction in the Material
Support Laws on this point. Congress found that “[f]oreign
organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by
their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an
organization facilitates that conduct.”427 In particular, the Court
reasoned:
Material support meant to “promot[e] peaceable, lawful
conduct,” can further terrorism by foreign groups in
multiple ways. “Material support” is a valuable resource
by definition. Such support frees up other resources
within the organization that may be put to violent ends.
It also importantly helps lend legitimacy to foreign
terrorist groups—legitimacy that makes it easier for those
groups to persist, to recruit members, and to raise funds—
all of which facilitate more terrorist attacks. “Terrorist
organizations do not maintain organizational ‘firewalls’
that would prevent or deter . . . sharing and commingling
of support and benefits.”428
Using the BDS Movement’s affiliate and benefactor, Hamas,
as an example of how non-terror related support cannot be
separated from terror-related support,429 the Humanitarian Law
426. Id. at 20–21 (citations omitted).
427. Id. at 24 (citing the Congressional Findings and Purpose of the
Material Support Laws).
428. Id. at 25 (emphasis added to show that Congress intended to prevent
terror groups from doing public relations outreach in the United States)
(citations omitted).
429. See id. at 26. The United States Supreme Court was prescient in
examining how support for Hamas’ non-terror work constituted materially
supporting terrorism. Even though Hamas had nothing to do with the
Humanitarian Law Project case, the Court’s use of Hamas as an example sets
important guideposts for applying of the Material Support Laws to Hamas
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Project Court went on to explain:
Investigators have revealed how terrorist groups
systematically conceal their activities behind charitable,
social, and political fronts. Indeed, some designated
foreign terrorist organizations use social and political
components to recruit personnel to carry out terrorist
operations, and to provide support to criminal terrorists
and their families in aid of such operations. Muddying
the waters between its political activism, good works, and
terrorist attacks, Hamas is able to use its overt political
and charitable organizations as a financial and logistical
support network for its terrorist operations.430
The Material Support Laws were enacted with a dual
purpose. First, they were designed to deny terror groups the
tangible and intangible support that is needed to carry out terror
attacks. Second, and just as important, the laws were enacted for
policy and diplomatic reasons. American support for foreign
terror groups provides those groups with a public relations coup
and stymies American efforts to coordinate with foreign nations
who are also fighting against terror. The Humanitarian Law
Project Court explained:
Providing foreign terrorist groups with material support
in any form also furthers terrorism by straining the
United States relationships with its allies and
undermining cooperative efforts between nations to
prevent terrorist attacks. We see no reason to question
Congress’s finding that “international cooperation is
required for an effective response to terrorism . . . .” The
material-support statute furthers this international effort
by prohibiting aid for foreign terrorist groups that harm
the United States partners abroad: “A number of
designated foreign terrorist organizations have attacked
moderate governments with which the United States has
vigorously endeavored to maintain close and friendly
relations,” and those attacks “threaten [the] social,
economic and political stability” of such governments.431
and other Islamic terror organizations.
430. Id. at 25–26 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
431. Id. at 27.
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In enacting the Material Support Laws, as well as the EAA
Anti-Boycott Law, the United States clearly set out a dividing line
between the rights of Americans to speak freely on their own
accord and the right of the United States government to be the
sole determinant of the country’s foreign policy objectives and
commercial relations. This type of reservation of powers to the
sovereign is one of the foundations of any democratic government.
a. Do BDS Movement Activities Violate the Material Support
Laws?
The BDS Manifesto acknowledges that the BDS Movement
does not disclaim terrorism against Israel.432 Rather, the BDS
Manifesto proclaims that the BDS Movement is simply one arm of
the Palestinian Arab “resistance” and it is but one part of the
overall “resistance” strategy employed against Israel.433 Hamas,
an organization named under the Material Support Laws as a
foreign terrorist organization, is reportedly connected to the
establishment of the BDS Movement, shares numerous objectives
and philosophies with the BDS Movement and is properly seen as
coordinating and affiliating with the BDS Movement.434 Whether
or not there are formal operational and financial ties between
Hamas (or other named foreign terrorist organizations) and the
BDS Movement is something that can only be determined through
432. BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at 14 (“BDS movements, no matter
how powerful, cannot and should not look to replace the resistance and
struggle of those people they are trying to support.”). Resistance is a
synonym for violence, as the BDS Manifesto implicitly acknowledges that,
“the Palestinian struggle has evolved over the decades as an expression of the
Palestinians, who challenge the occupation and use the means available to a
subjugated people to seek the attainment of their rights. The Palestinian
struggle cannot be so simply defined as violent or non-violent; it brings
together a variety of strategies in its path of resistance.” Id. at 11. In fact,
the name “Hamas” is an acronym for “Islamic Resistance Movement” and
Hamas itself has become a synonym for terrorism directed at Jews and
Israel.
433. See id. at 11.
434. See Dan Diker, Unmasking BDS: Radical Roots, Extremist Ends,
JERUSALEM CTR. FOR PUB. AFFAIRS, http://jcpa.org/unmasking-bds/ (last visited
July 6, 2016); see also Israel Imperiled: Threats to the Jewish State, Joint
Hearing Before H. Foreign Affairs Comm., H. Subcomm. on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade, and H. Subcomm. on the Middle East and
North Africa, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement of Jonathan Schanzer, Vice
President, Research Foundation for Defense of Democracies, detailing ties
between supporters of Hamas and supporters of the BDS Movement).
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the legal discovery process, as neither organization is forthcoming
about their respective inner workings, but the threshold
connections between the two are manifest and support the
presumption that the two organizations coordinate with each
other for purposes of the Material Support Laws.435
Indeed, there is precedent for both the government and
private parties filing suit against Hamas front organizations that
are purportedly focused solely on humanitarian or charitable
objectives. In a series of cases brought by the United States and
individuals who were harmed by Hamas’s terrorist acts, a Hamas
front organization was permanently disbanded, monetary fines
were imposed and the responsible individuals were sentenced to
long prison terms.436 Though this case was brought under a
435. In addition to the explicit Hamas endorsement of the BDS
Movement’s activities, the website of Hamas’s armed faction (Ezzedeen AlQassam Brigades) has published frequent calls to support the boycott of
Israel. See, e.g., Khudari calls for activating international boycott of Israel,
AL-QASSAM (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.qassam.ps/news-8037-Khudari_
calls_for_activating_international_boycott_of_Israel.html; Resheq: Expand
the boycott of Israeli goods campaign, AL-QASSAM (May 1, 2012), http://www.
qassam.ps/news-5655-Resheq_Expand_the_boycott_of_Israeli_goods_campai
gn.html (“Member of Political Bureau Hamas, Ezzat Resheq called to expand
the boycott Zionist products campaign . . . .”); Hamas urges states to boycott
Israel, end siege, AL-QASSAM (June 1, 2010), http://www.qassam.ps/news2918-Hamas_urges_states_to_boycott_Israel_end_siege.html;
Boycotting
Israeli and American Goods, AL-QASSAM (Nov. 28, 2006), http://www.qassam.
ps/news-17-Boycotting_Israeli_and_American_ Goods.html (issuing a fatwa
to “organize cells to build a boycott” against Israel and the United States).
436. In what are known as the “Holy Land Foundation” cases, the United
States first designated a Hamas front group named the Holy Land
Foundation as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist,” froze its assets and
ultimately obtained criminal convictions against its principals, resulting in
decades-long prison sentences. Holy Land Found for Relief & Dev. v.
Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (relating to the asset freeze). See
generally United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2011) (relating
to the criminal prosecution of individuals). See also Federal Judge Hands
Downs Sentences in Holy Land Foundation Case, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (May
27, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-judge-hands-downs-sentences
-holy-land-foundation-case (two of the Holy Land Foundation principals each
received sentences of 65 years). After the government’s action commenced,
American citizens who were harmed by Hamas’s terrorist activities filed suit
against certain Hamas front organizations in the United States, including the
Holy Land Foundation, under 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (providing a civil cause of
action for American victims of global terrorism), alleging that the front
groups aided and abetted Hamas through their charitable and humanitarian
activities in the United States. The plaintiffs were awarded damages of
$156,000,000. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 340 F. Supp. 2d 885, 890 (N.D.
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different anti-terrorism law, the precedent of finding a front group
liable for aiding and abetting the parent terrorist group’s
activities, especially a Hamas front group operating in the United
States, should not be overlooked.
Under the Material Support Laws, material support is defined
as the provision of “any property, tangible or intangible, or
service . . . except medicine or religious materials.”437 The BDS
Movement’s activities are easily classified as a service to Hamas,
as Hamas has called for a boycott of Israel and the BDS
Movement coordinates with Hamas for the implementation of that
boycott. By providing this service to Hamas, the BDS Movement
frees Hamas’s assets from being used for boycott promotion,
allowing them to be used for its terror activities instead, in exactly
the way that the Humanitarian Law Project Court described the
HLP Plaintiffs providing advocacy and other services material
support to the two named terror groups allowed those terrorist
organizations to free up resources for violent acts.
Moreover, since the BDS Movement’s terror affiliations have
not yet become known to the public in the United States, there is
likely greater public acceptance of the boycott under the BDS
Movement name than would be possible if a direct tie to Hamas
were known. Providing an untainted cover for Hamas’ activities
and enrolling new supporters for Hamas’ anti-Israel propaganda
campaign are properly characterized as services to Hamas. Put
another way, if Hamas were to hire public relations and lobbying
firms to do exactly what the BDS Movement does with regard to
anti-Israel advocacy in the United States, there is no question
that the firms’ activities would be considered a service to Hamas.
Furthermore, since the BDS Movement’s activities result in a
deprivation of property rights from Israeli companies and their
supporters, the corresponding shift in commercial activity438 to
Ill. 2004), vacated sub nom. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 511
F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2007), vacated, 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009). See generally Laura B. Rowe, Ending
Terrorism with Civil Remedies: Boim v. Holy Land Foundation and the
Proper Framework of Liability, 4 SEVENTH CIR. REV. 372 (2009) (providing
more information on the Holy Land Foundation civil cases); Adam N.
Schupack, The Arab-Israeli Conflict and Civil Litigation Against Terrorism,
60 DUKE L.J. 207 (2010) (also providing more information on the Holy Land
Foundation civil cases).
437. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339A(b)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244).
438. See BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at 105–07 (discussing the
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non-Israeli companies or companies that support the boycott is a
transfer of property rights. In this way, those who participate in
the boycott create commercial rewards for companies that are
either sympathetic to anti-Israel terrorism or that are favored by
such terror groups. Thus, it can also be said that the BDS
Movement is providing property in support of Hamas.
Because Hamas is a designated foreign terrorist
organization,439 the foregoing analysis of the types of material
support the BDS Movement provides to Hamas demonstrates that
there is a colorable case to be made that the BDS Movement’s
activities are in violation of § 2339B of the Material Support Laws.
It is also likely that the BDS Movement’s formative connection to
Iran440 (and Iran’s terrorism proxy in Lebanon, Hezballah, which
is also a designated foreign terrorist organization) and other
designated foreign terrorist organizations would provide the basis
for prosecution under § 2339B.
While it is clear that the inspiration for the BDS Movement
originated in Iran,441 the ongoing ties between Iran and the BDS
Movement have been obfuscated by the parties. Indeed, the ties
between Iran and the BDS Movement are likely much deeper than
the fact that the BDS Movement originated at the Tehran regional
meeting as part of Durban I. In November 2014, Iran’s Supreme
Leader,442 Ayatollah Ali Khameni, published a document that was
financial impact of the boycott).
439. Hamas was added to the foreign terrorist organization list in 1997.
Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov
/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.
440. See BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at 105.
441. The BDS Manifesto does acknowledge that the BDS Movement
originated at Durban I. BDS Manifesto, supra note 59, at 40 (“The first
important move from global civil society came in August–September 2001,
during the NGO Forum of the UN World Conference against Racism, Racial
Discrimination and Related Intolerances in Durban, South Africa. Tens of
thousands of people converged for the meeting, with Palestine one of the most
prominent causes. A resolution was passed pressing for the isolation of Israel
and denouncing its racist nature and policies.”). Durban I’s anti-Israel
agenda is documented to have been devised at the regional meeting held in
Iran prior to Durban I. See Durban III Conference Opens in New York Amid
Allegations of anti-Israel Bias, HAARETZ (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.haaretz.
com/israel-news/durban-iii-conference-opens-in-new-york-amid-allegations-ofanti-israel-bias-1.386116.
442. The “Supreme Leader” is the most powerful religious and political
office in the Republic of Iran and is responsible for appointing the leaders of
the military, judiciary and civil government.

130 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:1

unsettlingly similar to the BDS Manifesto’s core principles. The
document was titled “9 Key Questions About Elimination of
Israel” (sic) and was posted on Khameni’s government website.443
Though Khameni’s position paper was significantly less verbose
than the BDS Manifesto, the essence of his call to action is the
same as the BDS Manifesto’s. Khameni first brands Israel as a
criminal regime, then asserts that any Jewish state is illegitimate
and must be eliminated and replaced by a state that is controlled
by the “original people of Palestine.”444 Just like the BDS
Manifesto, Khameni’s paper proclaims that Jews who were in the
diaspora prior to the founding of the modern state of Israel should
be ethnically cleansed from the new Palestinian Arab state that
will replace Israel, with such Jews to be “return[ed] to their home
countries.”445 Until such time that Israel can be eliminated as a
443. The document was also posted to Khameni’s twitter account on
November 9, 2014. Why should & how can #Israel be eliminated? Ayatollah
Khamenei’s answer to 9 key questions, TWITTER (Nov. 9, 2014),
https://twitter.com/khamenei_ir/status/531366667377717248
[hereinafter
Khameni Manifesto]. See also Antonia Molloy, Iran’s supreme leader
Ayatollah Khamenei outlines plan to ‘eliminate’ Israel, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 10,
2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/irans-supremeleader-ayatollah-khamenei-outlines-plan-to-eliminate-israel-9850472.html.
444. Khameni Manifesto, supra note 443, at point 3.
445. Id. at point 4. The desire to ethnically cleanse Israel of all Jews is
made clear by Khameni’s description of who the “original people of Palestine”
are. The modern state of Israel exists on a portion of what was historically
the “Land of Israel” as described in the Bible. Over the course of centuries,
the Jewish residents of that land were either massacred or forcibly dispersed
across the globe into what was known as the Jewish Diaspora (i.e., Jews from
the Land of Israel who were relocated to other countries or regions).
Khameni lists the original people of Palestine to include “Muslims,
Christians[,] and Jews,” but he then excludes any Jew who emigrated to
Palestine. Id. at point 3. Since Christianity was founded in approximately
33 A.D. and Islam was founded in approximately 622 A.D., the original
people of Palestine, as between the three peoples listed, must be Jews, since
Judaism predates both other religions (having been founded in approximately
1300 B.C., roughly 2,000 years earlier than Islam). Yet Khameni allows for
Muslims who lived outside of modern Israel to be considered an original
people of Palestine, yet excludes Jews who lived outside of Palestine. A
review of historical demographic data of the land that is now modern Israel
explains why Khameni cherry picks in this way. Prior to the founding of
Christianity, the estimated population of the land that is modern Israel was
between 1 million and 2.5 million, with a vast majority of the inhabitants
being Jewish and none being Christian or Muslim. Only after the founding of
Christianity, and then Islam, and the corresponding purges of Jews from the
land, did Jewish populations represent less than a majority. See Sergio
DellaPergola, Demographic Trends in Israel and Palestine: Prospects and
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Jewish state, Khameni calls for “powerful confrontation” and
“resolute” resistance.446 Like the BDS Movement, Khameni
refuses to accept a two-state solution, insists upon a Muslim state
replacing Israel447 and embraces both violent and non-violent
“resistance” to undermine and weaken Israel.
The BDS
Manifesto’s objectives parallel those of not just Iran but of
virtually every other radical Islamist organization.
The
coordinated agendas of these organizations and countries cannot
be mere coincidence.
Again, only a thorough legal discovery process can definitively
conclude whether the BDS Movement is a front for these illegal
terrorist organizations and their sponsors, but one recent report
has shown that the BDS Movement’s own list of organizations
that were responsible for its formation included:
[I]llegal associations, terror organizations, and their
affiliates, such as the Council of National and Islamic
Forces in Palestine, which is a coordination forum for all
Palestinian terror organizations in their ongoing fight
against Israel. This forum includes Hamas, the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Palestinian
Liberation Front (acknowledged as a terrorist
organization by the U.S., EU, and Canada) and
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (acknowledged as a terrorist
organization by the U.S., EU, UK, Japan, Australia, and
Canada).448

Policy Implications, 103 AMERICAN JEWISH YEARBOOK 3, 10, 11 (2003),
http://www.bjpa.org/Publications/details.cfm?Publication ID=14672.
446. Khameni Manifesto, supra note 443, at point 6.
447. Neither the BDS Manifesto nor the Khameni Manifesto is forthright
with its call for replacing Israel with a Muslim state, but if their objectives
are achieved, a fortiori, that is exactly what would result. Muslims make up
over 80% of the current Arab population of Israel, so it follows that any
Palestinian Arab state would have a similar constituency.
448. Adam Shay, Manipulation and Deception: The Anti-Israel “BDS”
Campaign (Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions), JERUSALEM CTR. FOR PUB.
AFFAIRS (Mar. 19, 2012), http://jcpa.org/article/manipulation-and-deceptionthe-anti-israel-bds-campaign-boycott-divestment-and-sanctions/#sthash.E4n
S2Rcf.dpuf. Further ties between the BDS Movement and designated foreign
terrorist organizations were outlined in a 2014 report:
Letters of support [for the BDS Movement’s formation] were
accepted from senior figures in various PLO factions, such as Abu
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Even if the ties between the BDS Movement and designated
foreign terrorist organizations are not sufficiently demonstrable
for a § 2339B prosecution, prosecution under § 2339A could
proceed based on the types of support the BDS Movement provides
with respect to terrorism generally.449 The BDS Movement is
thus susceptible to government prosecution under either § 2339A
or § 2339B without regard to RICO and, using violations of either
of these laws as RICO predicates, both private plaintiffs (since
there is a private right of action under RICO) as well as the
government may bring civil or criminal (in the case of the
government) RICO actions against the BDS Movement and its
supporters.450 Potential remedies as a result of a successful case
Maher Ghneim, a member of Fatah’s Central Committee; Ahmed
Saadat, Secretary-General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP); Rakad Salem, Secretary-General of the Arab
Liberation Front (ALF); and Jamil Shahada, Secretary-General of
the Palestinian Arab Front (PAF); as well as from many trade
unions in Europe, South Africa, Canada, Australia, and the United
States. Finally, the conference called for the continuation of the
BDS campaign until the three obligations mentioned above were
fulfilled.
In September 2011, following President Abbas’ speech at the United
Nations, Dr. Sabri Saydam, the president’s adviser on high-tech
affairs, revealed Palestinian plans for the coming months: to use
weapons that were made available by modern technology—recruit
and develop social networks in order to organize campaigns for
boycotts of Israeli goods; apply more pressure on the Israeli academy
by asking universities in countries supporting the Palestinian cause
to cut their ties with these institutions; organize demonstrations
with more attendees; and strengthen the relations between various
solidarity groups, so they can better communicate and listen to each
other and not fall under specific factions.
Ehud Rosen, What is the Real BDS Endgame? The Elimination of Israel,
JERUSALEM CTR. FOR PUB. AFFAIRS (Feb. 12, 2014), http://jcpa.org/article/whatis-the-real-bds-endgame/#sthash.zhZ0b4fS.dpuf.
449. Because § 2339A requires the defendant to have an intention to
further specific terrorist activities, prosecution of the BDS Movement under
this section would be more complicated and less certain. See 18 U.S.C.A. §
2339A(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244). Section 2339B only
requires that the defendant provide material support to a designated
terrorist organization, without regard to whether the defendant intended for
a terrorist act to be committed. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(1) (Westlaw).
Section 2339A does not require that a designated foreign terrorist
organization be involved, which in some cases may make a prosecution under
that section more certain (where there is ample evidence that the defendant
intended to provide support to a terrorist attack by individuals not affiliated
with a designated foreign terrorist group). See § 2339A(a) (Westlaw).
450. To the extent they have RICO statutes, individual states may also be
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or prosecution include monetary fines (including treble damages
and legal fees), injunctive relief, forfeiture, and imprisonment.
C. NOW, Policy, and the BDS Movement
The NOW cases demonstrate that protests and boycotts like
those of the BDS Movement are not per se protected speech. To
the extent such activities interfere with commerce and involve
property deprivation, which is the proclaimed purpose of the BDS
Movement’s actions, those activities may be prosecuted as Hobbs
Act and RICO violations. In addition, since the BDS Movement’s
activities are intended to provide material support to terrorist
organizations, they may constitute RICO offenses under the
Material Support Laws, in accord with the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Humanitarian Law Project. Read in conjunction with the Holy
Land Foundation cases,451 Humanitarian Law Project and the
NOW cases provide a solid foundation on which to make a case
that the activities of the BDS Movement are not protected by the
First Amendment and are indeed actionable in cases brought by
either the United States government or private individuals under
extortion statutes (including the Hobbs Act) and the Material
Support Laws, individually, and as predicates for a RICO
prosecution.
IV. CONCLUSION

The objective of the BDS Movement, as set forth in the BDS
Manifesto and its countless public statements, is to disrupt
commerce in the United States as a means of inflicting economic
harm on a United States ally. The purpose of the EAA AntiBoycott Law, anti-trust laws and RICO (and its predicates) is to
protect American commerce and to prevent Americans from being
coerced into participating in foreign conflicts in contravention of
United States’ policy. While the First Amendment generally
protects the right to engage in a wide variety of protest activities,
as the Claiborne Court explained generally,452 and the
able to bring RICO actions against the BDS Movement.
451. See generally Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333
F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 340 F. Supp. 2d 885
(N.D. Ill. 2004), vacated sub nom. Boim, 511 F.3d 707, vacated, 549 F.3d 685,
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009); United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467
(5th Cir. 2011).
452. 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982).
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Humanitarian Law Project and NOW Courts held specifically, the
First Amendment is not absolute.453
It may be the case, as others have argued,454 that the federal
government sometimes acts in ways that are outside of its
constitutional authority. Yet, even in light of such complaints, the
general authority of the federal government to regulate commerce
and conduct foreign affairs has never been successfully
questioned.455 The primacy of federal government authority in
these two areas can be traced back to the founding documents of
this nation, where James Madison opined that: “[the power to
regulate commerce and relations with foreign nations] forms an
obvious and essential branch of the federal administration. If we
are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect
of other nations.”456
Madison’s point was that the rights of individuals under the
nascent American system may be sacrosanct in virtually all other
matters, but for the United States to operate as a sovereign nation
among other sovereign nations the control of foreign policy had to
be vested exclusively in the hands of the federal government.457
453. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 36 (2010); NOW
III, 547 U.S. 9, 17 (2006).
454. See, e.g., MARK R. LEVIN, THE LIBERTY AMENDMENTS: RESTORING THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1st ed. 2013). In arguing for a series of constitutional
amendments to return the government to the founding principles of limited
power, Levin chronicles the gradual expansion of the federal government
from “[w]hat was to be a relatively innocuous federal government, operating
from a defined enumeration of specific grants of power . . . [to] . . . an everpresent and unaccountable force.” Id. at 6. The enumerated grants of power
that Levin refers to are contained in Article I of the Constitution and include
the power to regulate commerce and the power to regulate affairs with
foreign nations. These powers are the ones that are directly implicated by
the BDS Movement’s activities. Id.
455. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
456. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 260 (James Madison).
457. There is some tension between the rights of individual states and the
supremacy of the federal government’s role in foreign affairs, but even to the
extent states may have some residual powers to act in the periphery of
foreign affairs, it has never been the case that individuals or nongovernmental entities have had any power superior to the federal
government’s in the realm of the conduct of foreign affairs. The Constitution
vests the government, not individuals, with the power to conduct foreign
affairs. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413–14 (2003)
(citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964)):
There is, of course, no question that at some point an exercise of
state power that touches on foreign relations must yield to the
National Government’s policy, given the “concern for uniformity in
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Individuals and groups, particularly those with ties to foreign
concerns agitating against American interests, may not
undermine this exclusive federal power. By acting on its own in
contravention of United States’ foreign policy to impose foreign
boycotts and other sanctions in the United States, the BDS
Movement undermines United States foreign policy and interferes
with the functioning of domestic commercial markets.
Humanitarian Law Project can be seen as outlining the
contours of constitutional government powers in the context of
inherent individual rights that are protected by the First
Amendment: at the intersection of a legitimate government
interest in regulating an area of foreign affairs and the desire of
individuals or non-governmental entities to advocate in that area
in a way that interferes with the government’s interests, the
government’s interest must prevail.
The United States government has enacted a number of laws,
including the EAA Anti-Boycott Law and the Material Support
Laws, that evince its intention to be the sole arbiter of American
tolerance for foreign boycotts involving American businesses and
individuals as well as what kinds of support, if any, may be
provided to foreign organizations that may be connected to
this country’s dealings with foreign nations” that animated the
Constitution’s allocation of the foreign relations power to the
National Government in the first place.
See also Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381–82 n.16
(2000) (“[T]he peace of the whole ought not to be left at the disposal of a
part.”) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, pp. 535–36 (J. Cooke ed. 1961)
(Alexander Hamilton)); THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, p. 299 (James Madison)
(emphasizing “the advantage of uniformity in all points which relate to
foreign powers”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, p. 279 (James Madison) (“If we are
to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other
nations”). See also Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 511 (2008) (“The conduct
of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution
to the Executive and Legislativee—‘the political’—Departments.”) (citing
Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)); Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979) (negative Foreign Commerce
Clause protects the National Government’s ability to speak with “one voice”
in regulating commerce with foreign countries (alteration in original)); First
Nat. City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 769 (1972)
(plurality opinion) (act of state doctrine was “fashioned because of fear that
adjudication would interfere with the conduct of foreign relations”); Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (“Our system of government is such that
the interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the
people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the
field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference.”).
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terrorism. If American commerce is to be used as a weapon
against foreign countries, it is up to the United States
government, not an organization affiliated with and controlled by
foreign nations and terrorists, to make that decision and then to
outline the methodology for its implementation.
The BDS
Manifesto asserts that the BDS Movement is an anti-apartheid
movement and on this basis the National Lawyers Guild assures
the BDS Movement that it is on firm legal ground to operate in
the United States. Based on these overt and other implied
assurances, a number of individuals and organizations, including
unions, have been lured into supporting the BDS Movement
without fully understanding the potential liability for their
participation.
As Mark Twain famously said, “a lie can travel halfway
around the world while the truth is putting on its shoes.” The
BDS Movement and its supporters have certainly tried to
legitimize their agenda by repeating the lie that Israel is an
apartheid state, but repeating an unfounded and self-serving
accusation does not make it so. Richard Goldstone, author of a
critical United Nations’ report on Israel and a former justice of the
South African Constitutional Court during the apartheid era,
dismantled the apartheid libel in a 2011 New York Times
editorial:
In Israel, there is no apartheid. Nothing there comes
close to the definition of apartheid under the 1998 Rome
Statute: “Inhumane acts . . . committed in the context of
an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and
domination by one racial group over any other racial
group or groups and committed with the intention of
maintaining that regime.” Israeli Arabs—20 percent of
Israel’s population—vote, have political parties and
representatives in the Knesset and occupy positions of
acclaim, including on its Supreme Court. Arab patients
lie alongside Jewish patients in Israeli hospitals,
receiving identical treatment.458
The fact that the BDS Movement’s actions against Israel are
based on a libel discredits the movement as a whole. Indeed, the
458. Richard J. Goldstone, Israel and the Apartheid Slander, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/01/opinion/israel-and-theapartheid-slander.html?_r=0.
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BDS Movement’s connections to global terrorist organizations
provide ample reason to deny it the opportunity to further its
objectives with American support. Yet, when it comes to the
application and enforcement of United States laws, more
important than opinions and accusations are precedent and policy.
United States policy was opposed to South African apartheid and
Congress enacted a law imposing sanctions on South Africa until
such time as the apartheid system was dismantled.459 Not only
has the United States not declared Israel to be an apartheid state
or imposed sanctions on Israel, the EAA Anti-Boycott Law
explicitly announced that, “[i]t is the policy of the United States to
oppose restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or imposed
by foreign countries against other countries friendly to the United
States or against any United States person.”460 This law was
specifically enacted in opposition to the Arab boycott of Israel and
the policy statement reflects American policy in support of, not in
opposition to, Israel.
The BDS Movement, however, in its short history has proven
to be adept at getting issues wrong, and it has erred
monumentally in asserting that its activities are legal by virtue of
its own hijacking of the anti-apartheid label and history. The
United States opposes, rather than supports, sanctions against
Israel. Israel is a longstanding and important ally of the United
States.
United States law and policy supports unfettered
commercial relations with Israel. And, as this Article has
demonstrated, the BDS Movement’s activities against Israel are in
violation of United States laws.
Far from being an anti-apartheid movement, the BDS
Movement seeks to impose a form of ethnic cleansing in the
Middle East by eliminating the sole exception to Arab and Islamic
hegemony in the region. In all regards, United States law and
policy is in opposition to the objectives and activities of the BDS
Movement. To illustrate how strong the case against the BDS
Movement is, it is worth returning to the quote from Claiborne
that appeared at the beginning of this Article: “Secondary
boycotts and picketing by labor unions may be prohibited, as part
of Congress’ striking of the delicate balance between union
459. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–440, 100
Stat. 1086 (1986) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 5001 (repealed Nov. 1993)).
460. 50 U.S.C.A. § 4602(5)(A) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–244).
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freedom of expression and the ability of neutral employers,
employees, and consumers to remain free from coerced
participation in industrial strife.”461 If “coerced participation in
industrial strife” was a basis for countenancing the government’s
prohibition on secondary boycotts, coerced participation in
international strife should be no less of a basis for the prohibition
of cooperation with the BDS Movement.
The EAA Anti-Boycott Law, antitrust laws, and RICO are all
common sense, reasonable and narrow regulations of speech that
further the important goal of promoting American foreign policy
objectives and commerce. As Justice Stevens noted in Claiborne, a
boycott, especially one that is secondary, loses its First
Amendment protections when it is “designed to secure aims that
are themselves prohibited by a valid state law.”462 Congress and
various states have made it clear that foreign boycotts of Israel
cannot be tolerated. Enforcement of these laws clearly supersedes
any First Amendment rights that may be claimed in connection
with participation in the BDS Movement.463
In fact, in some cases, such as labor union participation in the
BDS Movement’s activities, government enforcement of the laws is
essential. Labor unions often have a de-facto monopoly on the
supply of labor in critical industries, such as cargo handling,
granted with the government’s imprimatur.464 In other cases,
unions are allowed to represent public sector employees, such as
university employees. In the case of unions whose members are
employed by government entities, such as universities, there is
clearly a conflict between public funding of the underlying
employers and employee participation in illegal foreign boycotts.
This, in effect, compels all taxpayers to fund (and thus participate
in) a campaign that not only may be against an individual
taxpayer’s beliefs, is contrary to American foreign policy. Having
given unions unparalleled power over broad segments of labor
activity,465 government acquiescence to union contravention of
461. 458 U.S. 886, 912 (alteration in original).
462. Id. at 915.
463. See, e.g., Trane Co. v. Baldridge, 552 F. Supp. 1378, 1387–88 (D.W.D.
Wis. 1983) (finding that the EAA Anti-Boycott Law advanced a substantial
government interest and was narrowly drawn, thus it did not violate First
Amendment rights).
464. See Morgan O. Reynolds, Labor Unions, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF ECON., http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/LaborUnions.html.
465. See Edward S. Mason, The Monopolistic Power of Labor Unions, 79
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United States foreign affairs and commercial policy would be a
breach of public trust and potentially a violation of the
Constitutional non-delegation doctrine.466
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 161 (1959) (giving an overview of how unions monopolize
labor markets under government authority); see also Robert H. Lande &
Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., Reducing Unions’ Monopoly Power: Costs and Benefits,
28 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1985). See also Marla Dickerson, Louis Sahagun & Dan
Weikel, Ports Get Back to Business, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2002),
http://articles.latimes.com/2002/oct/10/business/fi-ports10 (giving an example
of the dockworkers unions domination of the labor market for cargo handling
and describing union officials as hand-selecting those who are allowed to
work at ports and preventing anyone outside of the union’s favor from being
allowed to work). “[U]nion bosses, and the security guards who blocked the
iron gates of the hiring hall, dissuaded the longshore hopefuls. The only
workers allowed in were those with ‘casual cards’ designating them as
members of the formal pool of laborers who take the dock jobs unfilled by
union members. Most hope to join the union when there is an opening.
‘People without a casual card, go home. You’re not going to get a job today,’
came a voice over a loudspeaker. ‘For the rest of you guys, welcome back.’”
Id.
466. The non-delegation doctrine proscribes congressional delegations of
power outside of the boundaries set by the Constitution. See Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–72 (1989). “The nondelegation doctrine is
rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite
system of Government. The Constitution provides that ‘[a]ll legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,’
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, and we long have insisted that ‘the integrity and
maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution’
mandate that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to
another Branch.” Id. In the case of unions using a government granted
monopoly to exercise foreign and commercial policy powers reserved
exclusively for the government, the delegation of power would have been to a
non-government entity, rather than another branch of government. Such a
delegation to an unaccountable, private entity would clearly violate nondelegation doctrine principles. See, e.g., Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 670 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“We open our discussion with a
principle upon which both sides agree: [f]ederal lawmakers cannot delegate
regulatory authority to a private entity. To do so would be ‘legislative
delegation in its most obnoxious form.’”) (citing Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298
U.S. 238, 311 (1936)). See generally Alexander Volokh, The New PrivateRegulation Skepticism: Due Process, Non-Delegation, and Antitrust
Challenges, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 931 (2014) (making an argument that
the issue in a case such as this should be governed by the Due Process
Clause, rather than under non-delegation doctrine). Under either Due
Process or non-delegation doctrines, the delegation of foreign policy and
commercial regulatory authority to not only a private entity, but a foreign
private entity, would be uncontrovertibly a violation of fundamental notions
of federalism and constitutionalism. If there are to be boycotts of or sanctions
against a foreign country promoted in the United States, that is a matter for
the federal government, and only the federal government, to decide, as it has
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The EAA Anti-Boycott Law, in particular, provides a broad
remedy for domestic propagation of illegal foreign boycotts. By its
terms, the EAA Anti-Boycott Law prohibits any individual from
acting with an “intent to comply with, further, or support any
boycott fostered or imposed by a foreign country.” Individual
Americans who act to further or support the BDS Movement’s
activities, even if they do not comply with the boycott dictates
themselves, are subject to the prohibitions of the EAA AntiBoycott Law. As a result, those who encourage others to
participate in BDS Movement boycotts can be found to be in
violation of the EAA Anti-Boycott Law without need to show that
such individuals participated in any boycott activity on their own.
Claims that the EAA Anti-Boycott Law does not apply to the
BDS Movement due to the fact that the BDS Movement is not an
official government are simply without basis and contrary to the
text and objectives of the law. The EAA Anti-Boycott Law was
enacted to provide a broad defense against foreign boycotts of
friendly nations.
To assert that a popularly selected
representative of Palestinian Arab civil society is not a
representative of that nation is to deny the existence of a
Palestinian Arab nation. Unless and until there is a unified
Palestinian Arab political system, the fragmentation of the
Palestinian Arab nation into multiple governing and
representative units, such as Hamas, Fatah, and the BDS
Movement, dictates that each of these entities can be considered
parts of the Palestinian Arab “country.” The BDS Movement is no
less capable of imposing and fostering a boycott of Israel than the
Arab League, Hamas, Fatah or any other organization that
represents national interests.
As was the case in Humanitarian Law Project, nothing in this
Article has argued for limitations on individuals exercising their
independent First Amendment rights. An American citizen is free
to take to the streets to criticize Israel and no American citizen
would be prevented from engaging in a truly grass roots,
independent primary boycott of Israeli goods. However, when
Americans join with foreign operatives to further an external
campaign against Israel that is contrary to United States policy
and law, and arguably is coordinated with the objectives of global
on numerous other similar situations (such as in the case of South Africa,
Cuba, Vietnam, Russia, Iran and numerous other instances). Id.
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terrorist organizations, the First Amendment provides no
protections. The rationale for anti-boycott prosecution announced
in the House Boycott Report’s is as applicable today as it was in
1976:
[T]he secondary and tertiary boycotts are tantamount to
blackmail and of concern to every American . . . [t]he
United States has always been committed to the
protection of businesses, large and small, against unfair
practices. The Arab boycott is a direct attack on these
values, harmful . . . to all American businesses
. . . . Congress must now act to uphold this tradition by
outlawing compliance with boycott practices which
intrude on American domestic concerns and on business
relations between American companies and Israel, a
nation with which we maintain close and friendly
relations . . . [t]his kind of intrusion into our domestic
order . . . directed against any country with which we
maintain friendly and close relations, is an invasion of
our national sovereignty.467
Indeed, enforcement of laws prohibiting cooperation with the
BDS Movement would not deny Americans the choice to not
support Israel; rather, by preventing foreign interlopers from
unilaterally preventing Israeli goods and services from entering
American markets, enforcement would simply preserve the right
of American consumers and businesses to choose whether or not
they will engage in commercial relations with Israel.
The risks of a continued failure to enforce existing laws
against foreign boycotts are best demonstrated by reference to the
current European experience with the BDS Movement. European
consumers, companies and academia are being denied access to
Israeli goods, services and academic resources as a result of a
highly coordinated and largely unopposed BDS Movement
campaign.468 The European BDS campaign is not simply a
secondary boycott of Israel; it is part of a coordinated offensive
against Israel, pairing a facially non-violent economic attack with
467. HOUSE BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 144, at 98.
468. See Christa Case Bryant & Sara Miller Llana, European boycotts
begin to bite, catching Israel’s attention, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 16,
2014),
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2014/0216/Europeanboycotts-begin-to-bite-catching-Israel-s-attention-video.

142 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:1

troubling and pervasive support for the radical Islamist
movements, including Hamas and Hezbollah, which wage war on
Israel.469
While it may not be the policy of European nations to prohibit
foreign boycotts of Israel, this Article has shown that the BDS
Movement’s activities in the United States violate the letter and
the intent of not only the EAA Anti-Boycott Law but also the
Hobbs Act, Material Support Laws and federal anti-trust laws.
These violations are substantive, inflict harm on important
national interests, deny American consumers and businesses the
choice to deal in Israeli goods and services and contribute to the
rise and spread of extremist ideology and violence. Private parties
that have been economically harmed by the BDS Movement and
its supporters have multiple avenues of recourse and should avail
themselves of the remedies available under RICO and applicable
anti-trust laws, which can provide for treble damages and legal
fees.
BDS Movement activities in or affecting the United States
unquestionably violate American law and policy. The BDS
Movement and its supporters can and should be prosecuted under
the EAA Anti-Boycott Law, Material Support Laws, RICO, and
anti-trust laws. To the extent the decision to prosecute BDS
Movement activities is at discretion of political appointees and
agency personnel, the President should require that those
responsible for exercising prosecutorial discretion either
commence prosecution or explain why a blanket non-prosecution
policy is in place.470 Prosecution of BDS Movement activities in
469. Matthew Levitt, Islamic Extremism in Europe: Beyond al-Qaeda–
Hamas and Hezbollah in Europe, WASH. INST. FOR NEAR EAST POLICY (Apr. 27,
2005),
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/
view/islamicextremism-in-europe-beyond-al-qaedahamas-and-hezbollah-in-europe;
see
also Steven Erlanger, Europe Tries to Stop Flow of Citizens Joining Jihad,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/01/world/
europe/isis-europe-muslim-radicalization.html?_r=0 (documenting the large
number of citizens from European Union nations who have joined with
radical Islamist terror organizations to fight against western interests in the
Middle East); Ben Winsor, Hundreds Of Westerners Have Joined ISIS–Here’s
Where
They
Came
From,
BUS.
INSIDER
(Aug.
27,
2014),
http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-is-recruiting-westerners-countries -20148#ixzz3MebNqkU8.
470. While a President and his or her agencies have a right to make case
by case decisions on how and when to apply a law in specific cases, this
discretion does not allow a wholesale abdication of the constitutional
requirement that the Executive “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
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the United States would have ample precedent. Moreover, it
would be a necessary and proper governmental action undertaken
to preserve the federal government’s exclusive power over the
conduct of foreign affairs, prevent American support from being
provided to terrorist organizations and protect the integrity and
efficient functioning of American commercial markets.

executed.” U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 3. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing
Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1985).
Congress, through its power of the federal budget, also has a role to play in
ensuring that agencies enforce laws.

